Summa Contra Gentiles

By Aquinas

Based on the translation by Joseph Rickaby, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.

Book I: Of God As He Is In Himself

1.1 That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith

If a truth of this nature were left to the sole inquiry of reason, three disadvantages would follow. One is that the knowledge of God would be confined to few. The discovery of truth is the fruit of studious inquiry. From this very many are hindered. Some are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must be in human society some people devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative inquiry to arrive at the highest point of human inquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by sloth. The knowledge of the truths that reason can investigate concerning God presupposes much previous knowledge. Indeed, almost the entire study of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over to be learned last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of divinity. Thus, only with great labor of study is it possible to arrive at the searching out of the aforesaid truth; and this labor few are willing to undergo for sheer love of knowledge. Another disadvantage is that such as did arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would take a long time over it, on account of the profundity of such truth, and the many prerequisites to the study, and also because in youth and early manhood, the soul, tossed to and fro on the waves of passion, is not fit for the study of such high truth: only in settled age does the soul become prudent and scientific, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says. Thus, if the only way open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best instrument for making people perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and to those few after a considerable lapse of time.

A third disadvantage is that, owing to the infirmity of our judgement and the perturbing force of imagination, there is some admixture of error in most of the investigations of human reason. This would be a reason to many for continuing to doubt even of the most accurate demonstrations, not perceiving the force of the demonstration, and seeing the diverse judgments of diverse persons who have the name of being wise. Besides, in the midst of much demonstrated truth there is sometimes an element of error, not demonstrated but asserted on the strength of some plausible
and sophistic reasoning that is taken for a demonstration. And therefore it was necessary for the real truth concerning divine things to be presented to people with fixed certainty by way of faith. Wholesome therefore is the arrangement of divine clemency, whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held on faith, so that all might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that without doubt and error. Hence it is said: Now ye walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their own notions, having the understanding darkened (Eph. iv, 17, 18); and, I will make all thy sons taught of the Lord (Isa. liv, 1, 5).

1.2 Of the Author's Purpose

Of all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime, the more useful, and the more agreeable. The more perfect, because in so far as a person gives himself up to the pursuit of wisdom, to that extent he enjoys already some portion of true happiness. Blessed is the man that shall dwell in wisdom (Ecclus xiv, 22). The more sublime, because thereby people come closest to the likeness of God, who hath made all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24). The more useful, because by this same wisdom we arrive at the realm of immortality. The desire of wisdom shall lead to an everlasting kingdom (Wisd. vi, 21). The more agreeable, because her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any weariness, but gladness and joy (Wisd. viii, 16).

But on two accounts it is difficult to proceed against each particular error: first, because the sacrilegious utterances of our various erring opponents are not so well known to us as to enable us to find reasons, drawn from their own words, for the confutation of their errors: for such was the method of the ancient doctors in confuting the errors of the Gentiles, whose tenets they were readily able to know, having either been Gentiles themselves, or at least having lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their doctrines. Secondly, because some of them, as Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognizing the authority of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New. But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to. But in the things of God natural reason is often at a loss.

1.3 That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories

Because not every truth admits of the same mode of manifestation, and "a well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits," as is very well remarked by the Philosopher (Eth. Nicom. I, 1094b), we must first show what mode of proof is possible for the truth that we have now before us. The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason, most manifestly appears. For since the leading principle of all knowledge of any given subject-matter is an understanding of the thing's innermost being, or substance -- according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, that the essence is the principle of demonstration -- it follows that the mode of our knowledge of the substance must
be the mode of knowledge of whatever we know about the substance. Hence if the human understanding comprehends the substance of anything, as of a stone or triangle, none of the points of intelligibility about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason. But this is not our case with regard to God. The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. But things of sense cannot lead our understanding to read in them the essence of the Divine Substance, inasmuch as they are effects inadequate to the power that caused them. Nevertheless our understanding is thereby led to some knowledge of God, namely, of His existence and of other attributes that must necessarily be attributed to the First Cause. There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason, and other points that altogether transcend the power of human reason.

The same thing may be understood from consideration of degrees of intelligibility. Of two minds, one of which has a keener insight into truth than the other, the higher mind understands much that the other cannot grasp at all, as is clear in the 'plain man' (in rustico), who can in no way grasp the subtle theories of philosophy. Now the intellect of an angel excels that of a man more than the intellect of the ablest philosopher excels that of the plainest of plain men (rudissimi idiotae). The angel has a higher standpoint in creation than man as a basis of his knowledge of God, inasmuch as the substance of the angel, whereby he is led to know God by a process of natural knowledge, is nobler and more excellent than the things of sense, and even than the soul itself, whereby the human mind rises to the knowledge of God. But the Divine Mind exceeds the angelic much more than the angelic the human. For the Divine Mind of its own comprehensiveness covers the whole extent of its substance, and therefore perfectly understands its own essence, and knows all that is knowable about itself; but an angel of his natural knowledge does not know the essence of God, because the angel's own substance, whereby it is led to a knowledge of God, is an effect inadequate to the power of the cause that created it. Hence not all things that God understands in Himself can be grasped by the natural knowledge of an angel; nor is human reason competent to take in all that an angel understands of his own natural ability. As therefore it would be the height of madness in a 'plain man' to declare a philosopher's propositions false, because he could not understand them, so and much more would a man show exceeding folly if he suspected of falsehood a divine revelation given by the ministry of angels, on the mere ground that it was beyond the investigation of reason.

The same thing manifestly appears from the incapacity which we daily experience in the observation of nature. We are ignorant of very many properties of the things of sense; and of the properties that our senses do apprehend, in most cases we cannot perfectly discover the reason. Much more is it beyond the competence of human reason to investigate all the points of intelligibility in that supreme excellent and transcendent substance of God. Consonant with this is the saying of the Philosopher, that "as the eyes of bats are to the light of the sun, so is the intelligence of our soul to the things most manifest by nature" (Aristotle, Metaphysics I, min. i). To this truth Holy Scripture also bears testimony. For it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the traces of God, and fully discover the Almighty (Job xi, 7). And, Lo, God is great, and surpassing our knowledge (Job xxxvi, 26). And, We know in part (1 Cor. xiii, 9). Not everything, therefore, that is said of God, even though it be beyond the power of reason to investigate, is at once to be rejected as false.
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1.5 That it is an advantage for things that cannot he searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith

Some may possibly think that points which reason is unable to investigate ought not to be proposed to man to believe, since Divine Wisdom provides for every being according to the measure of its nature; and therefore we must show the necessity of things even that transcend reason being proposed by God to man for his belief.

One proof is this. No one strives with any earnestness of desire after anything, unless it be known to him beforehand. Since, then, as will be traced out in the following pages (B.III, Chap.CXLVIII), Divine Providence directs men to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life, the mental faculties ought to be evoked and led onward to something higher than our reason can attain at present, learning thereby to desire something and earnestly to tend to something that transcends the entire state of the present life. And such is the special function of the Christian religion, which stands alone in its promise of spiritual and eternal goods, whereas the Old Law, carrying temporal promises, proposed few tenets that transcended the enquiry of human reason.

Also another advantage is thence derived, to wit, the repression of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some so presumptuous of their own genius as to think that they can measure with their understanding the whole nature of the Godhead, thinking all that to be true which seems true to them, and that to be false which does not seem true to them. In order then that the human mind might be delivered from this presumption, and attain to a modest style of enquiry after truth, it was necessary for certain things to be proposed to man from God that altogether exceeded his understanding.

There is also another evident advantage in this, that any knowledge, however imperfect, of the noblest objects confers a very high perfection on the soul. And therefore, though human reason cannot fully grasp truths above reason, nevertheless it is much perfected by holding such truths after some fashion at least by faith. And therefore it is said: Many things beyond the understanding of man are shown to thee (Ecclus iii, 23). And, The things that are of God, none knoweth but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them through his Spirit (I Cor. ii, 10, 11).

1.6 That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason

The divine wisdom, that knows all things most fully, has deigned to reveal these her secrets to men, and in proof of them has displayed works beyond the competence of all natural powers, in the wonderful cure of diseases, in the raising of the dead, and what is more wonderful still, in such inspiration of human minds as that simple and ignorant persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Ghost, have gained in an instant the height of wisdom and eloquence. By force of the aforesaid proof, without violence of arms, without promise of pleasures, and, most wonderful thing of all, in the midst of the violence of persecutors, a countless multitude, not only of the uneducated but of the wisest men, flocked to the Christian faith, wherein doctrines are preached that transcend all human understanding, pleasures of sense are restrained, and a contempt is taught of all worldly possessions. That mortal minds should assent to such teaching is the
greatest of miracles, and a manifest work of divine inspiration leading men to despise the visible and desire only invisible goods. Nor did this happen suddenly nor by chance, but by a divine disposition, as is manifest from the fact that God foretold by many oracles of His prophets that He intended to do this. The books of those prophets are still venerated amongst us, as bearing testimony to our faith. This argument is touched upon in the text: *Which (salvation) having begun to be uttered by the Lord, was confirmed by them that heard him even unto us, God joining in the testimony by signs and portents and various distributions of the Holy Spirit* (Heb. ii, 3, 4). This so wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is so certain a sign of past miracles, that they need no further reiteration, since they appear evidently in their effects. It would be more wonderful than all other miracles, if without miraculous signs the world had been induced by simple and low-born men to believe truths so arduous, to do works so difficult, to hope for reward so high. And yet even in our times God ceases not through His saints to work miracles for the confirmation of the faith.

1.7 That the truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith

The natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true: it is impossible to think of their being otherwise. Nor a gain is it permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are false, being so evidently confirmed by God. Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason.

Whatever is put into the disciple's mind by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless the teacher is teaching dishonestly, which would be a wicked thing to say of God. But the knowledge of principles naturally known is put into us by God, seeing that God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore these principles also are contained in the Divine Wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to these principles is contrary to Divine Wisdom, and cannot be of God.

Contrary reasons fetter our intellect fast, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If therefore contrary information were sent us by God, our intellect would be thereby hindered from knowledge of the truth: but such hindrance cannot be of God.

What is natural cannot be changed while nature remains. But contrary opinions cannot be in the same mind at the same time: therefore no opinion or belief is sent to man from God contrary to natural knowledge. And therefore the Apostle says: *The word is near in thy heart and in thy mouth, that is, the word of faith which we preach* (Rom. x, 8). But because it surpasses reason it is counted by some as contrary to reason, which cannot be. To the same effect is the authority of Augustine (Gen. ad litt. ii, 18) : " What truth reveals can nowise be contrary to the holy books either of the Old or of the New Testament." Hence the conclusion is evident, that any arguments alleged against the teachings of faith do not proceed logically from first principles of nature, principles of themselves known, and so do not amount to a demonstration; but are either probable reasons or sophistical; hence room is left for refuting them.
1.8 Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith

The things of sense, from whence human reason takes its beginning of knowledge, retain in
themselves some trace of imitation of God, inasmuch as they are, and are good; yet so imperfect
is this trace that it proves wholly insufficient to declare the substance of God Himself. Since
every agent acts to the producing of its own likeness, effects in their several ways bear some
likeness to their causes: nevertheless the effect does not always attain to the perfect likeness of
the agent that produces it. In regard then to knowledge of the truth of faith, which can only be
thoroughly known to those who behold the substance of God, human reason stands so
conditioned as to be able to argue some true likenesses to it: which likenesses however are not
sufficient for any sort of demonstrative or intuitive comprehension of the aforesaid truth. Still it
is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasonings, however feeble, provided there
be no presumptuous hope of perfect comprehension or demonstration. With this view the
authority of Hilary agrees, who says (De Trinitate, ii, 10), speaking of such truth: "In this belief
start, run, persist; and though I know that you will not reach the goal, still I shall congratulate
you as I see you making progress. But intrude not into that sanctuary, and plunge not into the
mystery of infinite truth; entertain no presumptuous hope of comprehending the height of
intelligence, but understand that it is incomprehensible."

1.9 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work

There is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one that can be
attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason. This truth of
things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of
our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine
things. To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative
reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming
for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to
refute his reasonings against the truth, which we may hope to do, since natural reason cannot be
contrary to the truth of faith. The special mode of refutation to be employed against an opponent
of this second sort of truth is by alleging the authority of Scripture confirmed from heaven by
miracles. There are however some probable reasons available for the declaration of this truth, to
the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the
mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they thinking that
we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak.

According then to the manner indicated we will bend our endeavor, first, to the manifestation of
that truth which faith professes and reason searches out, alleging reasons demonstrative and
probable, some of which we have gathered from the books of philosophers and saints, for the
establishment of the truth and the confutation of the opponent. Then, to proceed from what is
more to what is less manifest in our regard, we will pass to the manifestation of that truth which
transcends reason, solving the arguments of opponents, and by probable reasons and authorities,
so far as God shall enable us, declaring the truth of faith. Taking therefore the way of reason to
the pursuit of truths that human reason can search out regarding God, the first consideration that
meets us is of the attributes of God in Himself; secondly of the coming forth of creatures from
God; thirdly of the order of creatures to God as to their last end.
1.10 Of the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be proved, being a self-evident truth

This opinion rests on the following grounds:

Those truths are self-evident which are recognized at once, as soon as the terms in which they are expressed are known. Such a truth is the assertion that God exists: for by the name 'God' we understand something greater than which nothing can be thought. This notion is formed in the understanding by whoever hears and understands the name 'God,' so that God must already exist at least in the mind. Now He cannot exist in the mind only: for what is in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only; but nothing is greater than God, as the very meaning of the name shows: it follows that the existence of God is a self-evident truth, being evidenced by the mere meaning of the name.

The existence of a being is conceivable, that could not be conceived not to exist; such a being is evidently greater than another that could be conceived not to exist. Thus then something greater than God is conceivable if He could be conceived not to exist; but anything 'greater than God' is against the meaning of the name 'God.' It remains then that the existence of God is a self-evident truth.

Those propositions are most self-evident which are either identities, as 'Man is man,' or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subjects, as 'Man is an animal.' But in God of all beings this is found true, that His existence is His essence, as will be shown later (Chap. XXII); and thus there is one and the same answer to the question 'What is He?' and 'Whether He is.' Thus then, when it is said 'God is,' the predicate is either the same with the subject or at least is included in the definition of the subject; and thus the existence of God will be a self-evident truth.

Things naturally known are self-evident: for the knowledge of them is not attained by enquiry and study. But the existence of God is naturally known, since the desire of man tends naturally to God as to his last end, as will be shown further on (B. 111, Chap. XXV).

That must be self-evident whereby all other things are known; but such is God; for as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual cognition.

1.11 Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons

The above opinion arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of nature; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident. Partly also it owes its origin to the neglect of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the existence of God is self-evident, since God's essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God's essence, his existence is not self-evident relatively to us.

Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meaning of the name 'God' is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit the existence of God, that God is
something greater than which nothing can be conceived, since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal usage understands by the name 'God' something greater than which nothing can be conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater than which nothing can be conceived. For 'thing' and "notion implied in the name of the thing" must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what is declared by this name 'God' it does not follow that God exists otherwise than in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise than in the mind; and from this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the nonexistence of God goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought outrunning the greatness of any given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater.

Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfection or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our understanding, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the effects which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him.

As it is self-evident to us that the whole is greater than its part, so the existence of God is most self-evident to them that see the divine essence, inasmuch as His essence is His existence. But because we cannot see His essence, we are brought to the knowledge of His existence, not by what He is in Himself but by the effects which He works.

Man knows God naturally as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness, which is a certain likeness to the divine goodness. Thus it is not necessary that God, considered in Himself, should be naturally known to man, but a certain likeness of God. Hence man must be led to a knowledge of God through the likenesses of Him that are found in the effects which He works.

God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without His being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us.

1.12 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot he demonstrated

The falseness of this opinion is shown to us as well by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to argue causes from effects, as also by the order of the sciences, for if there be no knowable substance above sensible substances, there will be no science above physical science; as also by the efforts of philosophers, directed to the proof of the existence of God; as also by apostolic truth asserting: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i, 20). The axiom that in God essence and existence are the same is to be understood of the existence whereby God subsists in Himself, the manner of which is unknown to us, as also is His essence; not of the existence which signifies an affirmative judgement of the understanding. For in the form of such affirmative judgement the fact that there is a God falls under demonstration; as our mind is led by demonstrative reasons to form such a proposition
declaratory of the existence of God. In the reasonings whereby the existence of God is demonstrated it is not necessary to assume for a premise the essence or quiddity of God: but instead of the quiddity the effect is taken for a premise, as is done in demonstrations a posteriori from effect to cause. All the names of God are imposed either on the principle of denying of God Himself certain effects of His power, or from some habitude of God towards those effects. Although God transcends sense and the objects of sense, nevertheless sensible effects are the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. Thus the origin of our own knowledge is in sense, even of things that transcend sense.

1.13 Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God

We will put first the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove the existence of God from the consideration of motion as follows.

Everything that is in motion is put and kept in motion by some other thing. It is evident to sense that there are beings in motion. A thing is in motion because something else puts and keeps it in motion. That mover therefore either is itself in motion or not. If it is not in motion, our point is gained which we proposed to prove, namely, that we must posit something which moves other things without being itself in motion, and this we call God. But if the mover is itself in motion, then it is moved by some other mover. Either then we have to go on to infinity, or we must come to some mover which is motionless; but it is impossible to go on to infinity, therefore we must posit some motionless prime mover. In this argument there are two propositions to be proved: that everything which is in motion is put and kept in motion by something else; and that in the series of movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity.

The Philosopher also goes about in another way to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the series of efficient causes, but we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. The way is more or less as follows. In every series of efficient causes, the first term is cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is cause of the last. But if in efficient causes there is a process to infinity, none of the causes will be the first: therefore all the others will be taken away which are intermediate. But that is manifestly not the case; therefore we must posit the existence of some first efficient cause, which is God.

Another argument is brought by St John Damascene (De Fid. Orthod. I, 3), thus: It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one harmonious order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore there must be some Power by whose providence the world is governed; and that we call God.
1.14 That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation

After showing that there is a first being, whom we call God, we must inquire into the conditions of His existence. We must use the method of negative differentiation, particularly in the consideration of the divine substance. For the divine substance, by its immensity, transcends every form that our intellect can realize; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. The more we can negatively differentiate it, or the more attributes we can strike off from it in our mind, the more we approach to a knowledge of it: for we know each thing more perfectly, the fuller view we have of its differences as compared with other things; for each thing has in itself a proper being, distinct from all others. Hence in dealing with things that we can define, we first place them in some genus, by which we know in general what the thing is; and afterwards we add the differentias whereby the thing is distinguished from other things; and thus is achieved a complete knowledge of the substance of the thing. But because in the study of the divine substance we cannot fix upon anything for a genus (Chap. XXV), nor can we mark that substance off from other things by affirmative differentias, we must determine it by negative differentias. In affirmative differentias one limits the extension of another, and brings us nearer to a complete designation of the thing under enquiry, inasmuch as it makes that thing differ from more and more things. And the same holds good also of negative differentias. For example, we may say that God is not an accident, in that He is distinguished from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a body, we shall further distinguish Him from some substances; and so in order by such negations He will be further distinguished from everything besides Himself; and then there will be a proper notion of His substance, when He shall be known as distinct from all. Still it will not be a perfect knowledge, because He will not be known for what He is in Himself.

To proceed therefore in the knowledge of God by way of negative differentiation, let us take as a principle what has been shown in a previous chapter, that God is altogether immovable, which is confirmed also by the authority of Holy Scripture. For it is said: *I am the Lord and change not* (Mal. iii, 6); *With whom there is no change* (James i, 17); *God is not as man, that he should change* (Num. xxiii, 19).

1.15 That God is Eternal

The beginning of anything and its ceasing to be is brought about by motion or change. But it has been shown that God is altogether unchangeable: He is therefore eternal, without beginning or end.

Those things alone are measured by time which are in motion, inasmuch as time is an enumeration of motion. But God is altogether without motion, and therefore is not measured by time. Therefore in Him it is impossible to fix any before or after: He has no being after not being, nor can He have any not being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being, because all this is unintelligible without time. He is therefore without beginning and without end, having all His being at once, wherein consists the essence of eternity.

If at some time God was not, and afterwards was, He was brought forth by some cause from not being to being. But not by Himself, because what is not cannot do anything. But if by another,
that other is prior to Him. But it has been shown that God is the First Cause; therefore He did not begin to be: hence neither will He cease to be; because what always has been has the force of being always.

We see in the world some things which are possible to be and not to be. But everything that is possible to be has a cause: for seeing that of itself it is open to two alternatives, being and not being; if being is to be assigned to it, that must be from some cause. But we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes: therefore we must posit something that necessarily is. Now everything necessary either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or not from elsewhere, but is of itself necessary. But we cannot proceed to infinity in the enumeration of things necessary that have the cause of their necessity from elsewhere: therefore we must come to some first thing necessary, that is of itself necessary; and that is God. Therefore God is eternal, since everything that is of itself necessary is eternal.

Hence the Psalmist: But thou, O Lord, abidest for ever: thou art the self-same, and thy years shall not fail (Ps. ci, 13-28).

1.16 That in God there is no Passive Potentiality

Everything that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is in God no potentiality.

Although in order of time that which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in actuality, is in potentiality before it is in actuality, yet, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality, because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but is brought into actuality by something which is already in actuality. Everything therefore that is any way in potentiality has something else prior to it. But God is the First Being and the First Cause, and therefore has not in Himself any admixture of potentiality.

Everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. Whatever then is not all actuality, does not act by its whole self, but by something of itself. But what does not act by its whole self, is not a prime agent; for it acts by participation in something else, not by its own essence. The prime agent then, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure actuality.

We see that there is that in the world which passes from potentiality to actuality. But it does not educe itself from potentiality to actuality, because what is in potentiality is not as yet, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be some other prior thing, whereby this thing may be brought out from potentiality to actuality. And again, if this further thing is going out from potentiality to actuality, there must be posited before it yet some other thing, whereby it may be reduced to actuality. But this process cannot go on for ever: therefore we must come to something that is only in actuality, and nowise in potentiality; and that we call God.
1.18 That in God there is no Composition

In every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of things cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being in a manner tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus got together are in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, after having been potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: therefore there is not in Him any composition.

Every compound is potentially soluble in respect of its being compound, although in some cases there may be some other fact that stands in the way of dissolution. But what is soluble is in potentiality not to be, which cannot be said of God, seeing that He is of Himself a necessary Being.

1.20 That God is Incorporeal

Every corporeal thing, being extended, is compound and has parts. But God is not compound: therefore He is not anything corporeal.

According to the order of objects is the order and distinction of powers: therefore above all sensible objects there is some intelligible object, existing in the nature of things. But every corporeal thing existing in nature is sensible: therefore there is determinable above all corporeal things something nobler than they. If therefore God is corporeal, He is not the first and greatest Being. With this demonstrated truth divine authority also agrees. For it is said: God is a spirit (John iv, 24): To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, only God (1 Tim. i, 17): The invisible things of God are understood and discerned by the things that are made (Rom. i, 29). For the things that are discerned, not by sight but by understanding, are incorporeal.

Hereby is destroyed the error of the first natural philosophers, who posited none but material causes. The Gentiles also are refuted, who set up the elements of the world, and the powers therein existing, for gods; also the follies of the Anthropomorphic heretics, who figured God under bodily lineaments; also of the Manicheans, who thought God was an infinite substance of light diffused through infinite space. The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking of divine things, men came under the influence of the imagination, which can be cognizant only of bodily likeness. And therefore we must transcend imagination in the study of things incorporeal.

1.21 That God is His own Essence

In everything that is not its own essence, quiddity, or nature, there must be some composition. For since in everything its own essence is contained -- if in anything there were contained nothing but its essence, the whole of that thing would be its essence, and so itself would be its own essence. If then anything is not its own essence, there must be something in that thing besides its essence, and so there must be in it composition. Hence also the essence in compound things is spoken of as a part, as humanity in man. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. God therefore is His own essence.

That alone is reckoned to be beyond the essence of a thing, which does not enter into its definition: for the definition declares what the thing essentially is. But the accidents of a thing
are the only points about it which fall not within the definition: therefore the accidents are the only points about a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown (Chap. XXIII): therefore there is nothing in Him besides His essence.

The forms that are not predicatable of subsistent things, whether in the universal or in the singular, are forms that do not of themselves subsist singly, individualized in themselves. It is not said that Socrates or man or animal is whiteness; because whiteness is not anything subsisting singly in itself, but is individualized by the substance in which it exists. Also the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualized according to the definite matter of this or that individual, although the generic or specific quiddity includes form and matter in general: hence it is not said that Socrates or man is humanity. But the Divine Essence is something existing singly by itself, and individualized in itself, as will be shown (Chap. XLII). The Divine Essence therefore is predicated of God in such a way that it can be said: 'God is His own essence.'

1.22 That in God Existence and Essence is the same

It has been shown above (Chap. XV, n. 4) that there is an Existence which of itself necessarily is; and that is God. If this existence, which necessarily is, is contained in some essence not identical with it, then either it is dissonant and at variance with that essence, as subsistent existence is at variance with the essence of whiteness; or it is consonant with and akin to that essence, as existence in something other than itself is consonant with whiteness. In the former case, the existence which of itself necessarily is will not attach to that essence, any more than subsistent existence will attach to whiteness. In the latter case, either such existence must depend on the essence, or both existence and essence depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the existence. The former two suppositions are against the idea of a being which of itself necessarily is; because, if it depends on another thing, it no longer is necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that that essence is accidental and adventitious to the thing which of itself necessarily is; because all that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it; and thus the supposed essence will not be the essence at all. God therefore has no essence that is not His existence.

Everything is by its own existence. Whatever then is not its own existence does not of itself necessarily exist. But God does of Himself necessarily exist: therefore God is His own existence.

'Existence' denotes a certain actuality: for a thing is not said to 'be' for what it is potentially, but for what it is actually. But everything to which there attaches an actuality, existing as something different from it, stands to the same as potentiality to actuality. If then the divine essence is something else than its own existence, it follows that essence and existence in God stand to one another as potentiality and actuality. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing of potentiality (Chap. XVI), but that He is pure actuality. Therefore God's essence is not anything else but His existence.

Everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of several things is compound. But nothing in which essence is one thing, and existence another, can be except by the concurrence of several things, to wit, essence and existence. Therefore everything in which essence is one thing, and existence another, is compound. But God is not compound, as has been shown (Chap. XVIII). Therefore the very existence of God is His essence. This sublime truth was taught by the Lord to Moses (Exod. iii, 13, 14) *If they say to me, What is his name? what shall I say to them? Thus*
shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you: showing this to be His proper name, He who is. But every name is given to show the nature or essence of some thing. Hence it remains that the very existence or being of God is His essence or nature.

1.23 That in God there is no Accident

Everything that is in a thing accidentally has a cause for its being therein, seeing that it is beside the essence of the thing wherein it is. If then there is anything in God accidentally, this must be by some cause. Either therefore the cause of the accident is the Divinity itself, or something else. If something else, that something must act upon the divine substance: for nothing induces any form, whether substantial or accidental, in any recipient, except by acting in some way upon it, because acting is nothing else than making something actually be, which is by a form. Thus God will be acted upon and moved by some agent, which is against the conclusions of Chapter XIII. But if the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident supposed to be in it, then, inasmuch as it cannot possibly be the cause of it in so far as it is the recipient of it, because at that rate the same thing in the same respect would actualize itself, then this accident, supposed to be in God, needs must be received by Him in one respect and caused by Him in another, even as things corporeal receive their proper accidents by the virtue of their matter, and cause them by their form. Thus then God will be compound, the contrary of which has been above proved.

In whatever thing anything is accidentally, that thing is in some way changeable in its nature: for accident as such may be and may not be in the thing in which it is. If then God has anything attaching to Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable, the contrary of which has above been proved (Chap. XIII, XV).

A thing into which an accident enters, is not all and everything that is contained in itself: because accident is not of the essence of the subject. But God is whatever He has in Himself. Therefore in God there is no accident. The premises are proved thus. Everything is found more excellently in cause than in effect. But God is cause of all: therefore whatever is in Him is found there in the most excellent way possible. But what most perfectly attaches to a thing is the very thing itself. This unity of identity is more perfect than the substantial union of one element with another, e.g., of form with matter; and that union again is more perfect than the union that comes of one thing being accidentally in another. It remains therefore that God is whatever He has.

Hence Augustine (De Trinitate, v. 4, n. 5): "There is nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or perishable." The showing forth of this truth is the confutation of sundry Saracen jurists, who suppose certain "ideas" superadded to the Divine Essence.
Book II: God the Origin of Creatures

2.1 Connection of what follows with what has gone before.

There can be no perfect knowledge of anything unless its activity be known: for from the mode of activity proper to a thing, and the species to which it belongs, the measure and quality of its power is estimated; and the power shows the nature of the thing, for each thing is naturally active according to the nature with which it is actually endowed. But there is a twofold activity: one immanent in the agent, and a perfection of his, as feeling, understanding and willing; the other passing out to an exterior thing, and a perfection of the thing made and constituted thereby, as warming, cutting and building. Both of these acts are proper to God: the first, inasmuch as he understands, wills, rejoices and loves; the second inasmuch as He produces and brings things into being, conserves and governs them. Of the first act of God we have spoken in the previous book, treating of the divine knowledge and will. It remains now to treat of the second action, whereby things are produced and governed by God.

2.4 That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints

Human philosophy considers creatures as they are in themselves: hence we find different divisions of philosophy according to the different classes of things. But Christian faith considers them, not in themselves, but inasmuch as they represent the majesty of God, and in one way or another are directed to God, as it is said: Of the glory of the Lord his work is full: hath not the Lord made his saints to tell of his wonders? (Ecclus xlii, 16, 17.) Therefore the philosopher and the faithful Christian (fidelis) consider different points about creatures: the philosopher considers what attaches to them in their proper nature: the faithful Christian considers about creatures only what attaches to them in their relation to God, as that they are created by God, subject to God, and the like. Hence it is not to be put down as an imperfection in the doctrine of faith, if it passes unnoticed many properties of things, as the configuration of the heavens, or the laws of motion. And again such points as are considered by philosopher and faithful Christian alike, are treated on different principles: for the philosopher takes his stand on the proper and immediate causes of things; but the faithful Christian argues from the First Cause, showing that so the matter is divinely revealed, or that this makes for the glory of God, or that God's power is infinite. Hence this speculation of the faithful Christian ought to be called the highest wisdom, as always regarding the highest cause, according to the text: This is your wisdom and understanding before the nations (Deut. iv, 6). And therefore human philosophy is subordinate to this higher wisdom; and in sign of this subordination divine wisdom sometimes draws conclusions from premises of human philosophy. Further, the two systems do not observe the same order of procedure. In the system of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and from them leads on to the knowledge of God, the first study is of creatures and the last of God; but in the system of faith, which studies creatures only in their relation to God, the study is first of God and afterwards of creatures; and this is a more perfect view, and more like to the knowledge of God, who, knowing Himself, thence discerns other beings. Following this latter order, after what has been said in the first book about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the beings that come from God.

2.5 Order of Matters to be Treated
The order of our treatise will be to deal first with the production and bringing of things into being (Chapp VI-XXXVIII); secondly with the distinction of things (Chapp. XXXIX-XLV); thirdly, with the nature of things thus produced and distinct so far as it appertains to the truth of faith (Chapp. XLVI-CI).

2.6 That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence

In inferior agents it is a sign of attained perfection, when they can produce their own likeness. But God is sovereignly perfect (B.I. Chap. XXVIII). Therefore it belongs to Him to make some being like Himself in actual existence.

The more perfect any principle of activity is, the wider its sphere of action. But that pure actuality, which is God, is more perfect than actuality mingled with potentiality, such as is in us. Now actuality is the principle of action. Since then by the actuality which is in us, we are not only capable of immanent acts, such as understanding and willing, but also of acts tending to exterior things and productive of effects, much more can God, by virtue of His actuality, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect. *Who maketh great and wonderful and inscrutable works without number* (Job v.9).

2.7 That there is in God Active Power

As passive power, or passivity, follows upon being in potentiality, so active power follows upon being in actuality; for everything acts by being in actuality, and is acted upon by being in potentiality. But it belongs to God to be in actuality; and therefore there is suitably ascribed to Him active power, but not passive power.

Hence it is said: *Thou art powerful, O Lord* (Ps. lxxviii, 9); and *Thy power and thy justice, O God, are even to the highest heaven, in the wonders that thou hast made* (Ps. lxx, 18, 19).

2.8 That God's Power is His Substance

Active power belongs to the perfection of a thing. But every divine perfection is contained in God's own being (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). God's power therefore is not different from his being. But God is His own being (B. I, Chap. XXII); He is therefore His own power.

In things the powers of which are not their substance, the said powers are accidents. But there can be no accident in God (B. I, Chap. XXIII), who is therefore his own power.

2.9 That God's Power is His Action

God's power is His substance, as has been shown in the previous chapter: also His action is His substance, as has been shown of His intellectual activity (B. I, Chap. XLV), and the same argument holds of His other activities. Therefore in God power and action are not two different things.

The action of any being is a complement of its power; for it stands to power as the second actuality to the first. But the divine power, being God's very essence, has no other complement than itself. And therefore in God action and power are not distinct.
Any action that is not the agent's very substance is in the agent as an accident in its subject. But in God there can be nothing accidental. Therefore in God His action is none other than His substance and His power.

2.10 In what manner Power is said to be in God

Since the divine action is nothing else than the divine power, it is manifest that power is not said to be in God as a principle of His action (for nothing is the principle of itself), but as a principle of the thing made or done: also that when power is said to be in God in respect of the things made or done by Him, this is a predication of objective fact: but when it is said to be in Him in respect of His own action, such predication regards only our way of viewing things, inasmuch as our understanding views under two different concepts God's power and God's action. Hence if there be any actions proper to God, that do not pass into anything made or done, but are immanent in the agent, in respect of these actions there is not said to be power in God except in our way of viewing things, not in objective fact. There are such actions, namely, understanding and willing. Properly speaking, the power of God does not regard these actions, but only effects produced in the world external to Him. Intellect and will, then, are in God, not as 'faculties,' or 'powers,' but only as actions. It is also clear from the aforesaid that the multitude of actions which are attributed to God, as understanding, willing, producing creatures, and the like, are not different things, since each one of these actions in God is His own being, which is one and the same.

2.11 That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures

Since power is proper to God in respect of the effects of His production, and power ranks as a principle, and a principle is so called in relation to its derivative; it is clear that something may be predicated of God in relation to the effects of His production.

It is unintelligible how one thing can be made a subject of predication in relation to another thing, unless contrariwise the other thing be made a subject of predication in relation to it. But other beings are made subjects of predication in relation to God, as when it is said that they have their being from God and depend on Him. God therefore must be made a subject of predication in relation to creatures.

Likeness is a relation. But God, as other agents, acts to the production of His own likeness.

Knowledge is predicated in relation to the thing known. But God has knowledge of other beings.

Whatever is first and sovereign, is so in relation to others, But God is the first being and the sovereign good.

2.12 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God

These relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, Chap XXIII). Nor again can they be in the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God dependent on another being, foreign to itself.
God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.

The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respect of things that actually are, but also in respect of things that potentially are, because of them also He has knowledge, and in respect of them He is called both first being and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real relation to what is not actually but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that actually are than to things that potentially are, because he is not changed by producing anything.

To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addition must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry fresh relations are predicated of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp. XXIII, XXIV)

2.13 How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God

It cannot be said that the aforesaid relations are things existing outside of God. For since God is first of beings and highest of excellencies, we should have to consider other relations of God to those relations, supposing them to be things; and if the second relations again were things, we should have to invent again a third set of relations, and so on to infinity. Again, there are two ways in which a denomination may be predicated. A thing is denominated from what is outside it, as from place a man is said to be 'somewhere,' and from time 'once'; and again a thing is denominated from what is within it, as 'white' from whiteness. But from relation nothing is found to bear a denomination as from something outside itself, but only as from something within itself: thus a man is not called 'father' except from the paternity that is in him. It is impossible therefore for the relations, whereby God has relation to the creature, to be anything outside God. Since then it has been shown that they are not in Him really and yet are predicated of Him, the only possible conclusion is that they are attributed to Him merely by our mode of thought, inasmuch as other beings are in relation to Him: for when our understanding conceives that A is related to B, it further conceives that B is related to A, even though sometimes B is not really so related.

Hence it is also clear that the aforesaid relations are not predicated of God in the same way that other things are predicated of God: for all other things, as wisdom or will, are predicated of His essence, while the aforesaid relations are by no means so predicated, but only according to our mode of thought. And yet our thought is not at fault: for, by the very fact of our mind knowing that the relations of effects of divine power have God himself for their term it predicates some things of Him relatively.

2.14 That the Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being
It is no prejudice to the simplicity of God's being that many relations are predicated of Him, not as denoting anything affecting His essence, but according to our mode of thought. For our mind, understanding many things, may very well be related in manifold ways to a being that is in itself simple; and so it comes to view that simple being under manifold relations. Indeed the more simple anything is, the greater is its power, and the more numerous the effects whereof it is the principle; and thus it is viewed as coming into relation in more manifold ways. The fact then that many things are predicated of God relatively is an attestation of the supreme simplicity and singleness of His being.

2.15 That God is to all things the Cause of their being

Having shown (Chap VI) that God is to some things the cause of their being, we must further show that nothing out of God has being except of Him. Every attribute that attaches to anything otherwise than as constituting its essence, attaches to it through some cause, as whiteness to man. To be in a thing independently of causation is to be there primarily and immediately, as something ordinary (per se) and essential. It is impossible for any one attribute, attaching to two things, to attach to each as constituting its essence. What is predicated as constituent of a thing's essence, has no extension beyond that thing: as the having three angles together equal to two right angles has no extension beyond 'triangle,' of which it is predicated, but is convertible with 'triangle.' Whatever then attaches to two things, cannot attach to them both as constituting the essence of each. It is impossible therefore for any one attribute to be predicated of two subjects without its being predicated of one or the other as something come there by the operation of some cause: either one must be the cause of the other, or some third thing must be cause of both. Now 'being' is predicated of everything that is. It is impossible therefore for there to be two things, each having being independently of any cause; but either these things must both of them have being by the operation of a cause, or one must be to the other the cause of its being. Therefore everything which in any way is, must have being from that which is uncaused; that is, from God (B. I, Chap. XV).

What belongs to a thing by its nature, and is not dependent on any causation from without, cannot suffer diminution or defect. For if anything essential is withdrawn from or added to nature, that nature, so increased or diminished, will give place to another. If on the other hand the nature is left entire, and something else is found to have suffered diminution, it is clear that what has been so diminished does not absolutely depend on that nature, but on some other cause, by removal of which it is diminished. Whatever property therefore attaches to a thing less in one instance than in others, does not attach to that thing in mere virtue of its nature, but from the concurrence of some other cause. The cause of all effects in a particular kind will be that whereof the kind is predicated to the utmost. Thus we see that the hottest body is the cause of heat in all hot bodies, and the brightest body the cause of brightness in all bright bodies. But God is in the highest degree 'being' (B. I, Chap. XIII). He then is the cause of all things whereof 'being' is predicated.

The order of causes must answer to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes. Hence, as special effects are traced to special causes, so any common feature of those special effects must be traced to some common cause. Thus, over and above the particular causes of this or that generation, the sun is the universal cause of all generation; and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, over the officials of the kingdom, and also over
the officials of individual cities. But being is common to all things. There must then be over all causes some Cause to whom it belongs to give being.

What is by essence, is the cause of all that is by participation, as fire is the cause of all things fiery, as such. But God is being by His essence because He is pure being; while every other being is being by participation, because there can only be one being that is its own existence (B. I, Chapp. XXII, XLII). God therefore is cause of being to all other beings.

Everything that is possible to be and not to be, has some cause: because, looked at by itself, it is indifferent either way; and thus there must be something else that determines it one way. Hence, as a process to infinity is impossible, there must be some necessary being that is cause of all things which are possible to be and not to be.

God in His actuality and perfection includes the perfections of all things (B. I, Chap. XXVIII); and thus He is virtually all. He is therefore the apt producing cause of all.

This conclusion is confirmed by divine authority: for it is said: Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are therein (Ps. cxlv, 6). And, All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing (John ~, 3). And From whom are all things, by whom are all things, in (unto) whom are all things (Rom. xi, 16).

2.16 That God has brought things into being out of nothing

To every effect produced by God there is either something pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which anything is made (B. I, Chap. XVI): nor can it be any other being, distinct from God and uncaused by God (Chap. XV).

The more universal the effect, the higher the cause: for the higher the cause, the wider its range of efficiency. Now being is more universal than motion. Therefore above any cause that acts only by moving and transmitting must be that cause which is the first principle of being; and that we have shown to be God (B. I, Chap. XIII). God therefore does not act merely by moving and transmuting: whereas every cause that can only bring things into being out of pre-existing material acts merely in that way, for a thing is made out of material by movement or some change.

It is not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by movement and change: for not by movement and change is being, as such, made out of not-being, as such, but 'being this' is made out of 'not being this.' But God is the universal principle of being (Chap. XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make anything.

Every agent has a term of action like itself, for its acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. Given then an agent in actuality by some form inherent in it, and not to the whole extent of its substance, it will be proper to such an agent to produce its effect by causing a form in some way inherent in matter. But God is in actuality, not by anything inhering in Him, but to the whole extent of His
substance (B. I, Chap. XVIII). Therefore the proper mode of divine action is to produce the whole subsistent thing, and not a mere inherent thing, as is form in matter.

Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, that, though in one and the same being, which is sometimes in potentiality sometimes in actuality, potentiality is prior in time to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature), yet, absolutely speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some actual being. But matter is being in potentiality. Therefore God, first and pure actuality, must be absolutely prior to matter, and consequently cause thereof.

This truth divine Scripture confirms, saying: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth* (Gen. i,1). For to create is nothing else than to bring a thing into being without any pre-existent material.

Hereby is confuted the error of the ancient philosophers, who supposed no cause at all for matter, since in the actions of particular agents they always saw some matter pre-existent to every action. Hence they took up the common opinion, that nothing is made out of nothing, which indeed is true of the actions of particular agents. But they had not yet arrived at a knowledge of the universal agent, the active cause of all being, whose causative action does not necessarily suppose any pre-existent material.

2.17 That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change

Every movement or change is the actualization of something that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the object of the action.

The extremes of movement or change fall under the same order, being either of the same kind, as contraries are, or sharing one common potentiality of matter. But nothing of this can be in creation, to which no previous condition of things is supposed.

In every change or movement there must be something coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed to production.

2.18 Solution of Arguments against Creation

Hence appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn from the nature of movement or change -- as that creation must be in some subject, or that non-being must be transmuted into being: for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence of created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes under the category of relation: hence the subject of creation may very well be said to be the thing created. Nevertheless creation is spoken of as a 'change' according to our mode of conceiving it, inasmuch as our understanding takes one and the same thing to be now non-existent and afterwards existing. If Creation (creaturedom) is a relation, it is evidently some sort of reality; and this reality is neither uncreated, nor created by a further act of creation. For since the created effect really depends on the Creator, this relation must be a certain reality. Now every reality is brought into being by God; and therefore also this reality is brought into being by God, and yet was not created by any other creation than that of the first creature,
because accidents and forms do not exist by themselves, and therefore neither are they terms of separate creation, since creation is the production of substantial being; but as they are 'in another,' so are they created in the creation of other things.

2.19 That Creation is not Successive

Succession is proper to movement. But creation is not movement. Therefore there is in it no succession.

In every successive movement there is some medium between the extremes. But between being and not-being, which are the extremes in creation, there can be no medium, and therefore no succession.

In every making, in which there is succession, the process of being made is before the state of achieved completion. But this cannot happen in creation, because, for the process of being made to precede the achieved completion of the creature, there would be required some subject in which the process might take place. Such a subject cannot be the creature itself, of whose creation we are speaking, because that creature is not till the state of its achieved completion is realized. Nor can it be the Maker, because to be in movement is an actuality, not of mover, but of moved. And as for the process of being made having for its subject any pre-existing material, that is against the very idea of creation. Thus succession is impossible in the act of creation.

Successive stages in the making of things become necessary, owing to defect of the matter, which is not sufficiently disposed from the first for the reception of the form. Hence, when the matter is already perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instant. Thus because a transparent medium is always in final disposition for light, it lights up at once in the presence of any actually shining thing. Now in creation nothing is prerequisite on the part of the matter, nor is anything wanting to the agent for action. It follows that creation takes place in an instant: a thing is at once in the act of being created and is created, as light is at once being shed and is shining.

2.21 That it belongs to God alone to create

Since the order of actions is according to the order of agents, and the action is nobler of the nobler agent, the first and highest action must be proper to the first and highest agent. But creation is the first and highest action, presupposing no other, and in all others presupposed. Therefore creation is the proper action of God alone, who is the highest agent.

Nothing else is the universal cause of being but God (Chap. XV).

Effects answer proportionally to their causes. Thus actual effects we attribute to actual causes, potential effects to potential causes, particular effects to particular causes, and universal effects to universal causes. Now the first thing caused is 'being,' as we see by its presence in all things. Therefore the proper cause of 'being,' simply as such, is the first and universal agent, which is God. Other agents are not causes of 'being,' simply as such, but causes of 'being this,' as 'man' or 'white'; but 'being,' simply as such, is caused by creation, which presupposes nothing, because nothing can be outside of the extension of 'being,' simply as such. Other productions result in 'being this,' or 'being of this quality': for out of pre-existent being is made 'being this,' or 'being of this quality.'
Every agent that acts as an instrument completes the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself, as a saw operates to the making of a stool by cutting. If then there be any nature that operates to creation as an instrument of the prime creator, this being must operate through some action due and proper to its own nature. Now the effect answering to the proper action of an instrument is prior in the way of production to the effect answering to the principal agent; hence it is that the final end answers to the principal agent: for the cutting of the wood is prior to the form of the stool. There must then be some effect due to the proper operation of the instrument used for creation; and this effect must be prior in the way of production to 'being': for 'being' is the effect answering to the action of the prime creator. But that is impossible: for the more general is prior in the way of generation to the more particular.

Hereby is destroyed the error of certain philosophers, who said that God created the first spirit, and by it was created the second, and so in order to the last.

2.22 That God is Almighty

As creation is the work of God alone, so whatever beings are producible only by creation must be immediately produced by Him. Such are all spirits, the existence of which for the present let us suppose, and likewise all bodily matter. These several existences are immediate effects of creative power. Now power is not determined and limited to one effect, when it is productive of several effects immediately, and that not out of any pre-existent material. I say 'immediately,' because if the production were through intermediate agents, the diversity of effects might be ascribed to those intermediate causes. I say again 'not out of any pre-existent material,' because the same agent by the same action causes different effects according to the difference of material. God's power then is not determined and limited to one effect.

Every perfect active power is co-extensive with and covers all cases of its own proper effect: thus perfect building power would extend to everything that could be called a house. But the divine power is of itself the cause of being, and being is its proper effect. Therefore that power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with the idea of being: for if the divine power were available only for one particular effect, it would not be the ordinary cause of being, as such, but cause of 'this being.' Now what is inconsistent with the idea of 'being' is the opposite of 'being,' which is 'not-being.' God then can do all things that do not include in themselves the element of not-being, that is to say, that do not involve a contradiction.

Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. According then to the mode of actuality of each agent in the mode of its active power. Now God is perfect actuality, having in Himself the perfections of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII): therefore His active power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with actual being.

There are three ways in which an effect may not be in the power of an agent. In one way, because it has no affinity or likeness to the agent, for every agent acts to the production of its own likeness somehow: hence man cannot be the parent of brute or plant, though he can be parent of man, who is more than they. In another way, on account of the excellence of the effect, transcending the compass of the active power: thus the active power of matter cannot produce spirit. In a third way, on account of the material being determined to some effect, and the agent having no power over it: thus a carpenter cannot make a saw, because his art gives him no power over iron. But in none of these ways can an effect be withdrawn from the divine power: not for
the unlikeness of the effect, since every being, in so much as it has being, is like God (Chap. XV): nor again for the excellence of the effect, since God is above all in goodness and perfection (B. I, Chapp. XXVIII, XLI): nor lastly for the defect of the material, since God in His action needs no material (Chap. XVI).

This also is taught by divine Scripture as a tenet of faith. *I am God Almighty, walk before me and be perfect* (Gen. xvii, 1): *I know that thou canst do all things* (Job xlii, 2): *No word shall be impossible with God* (Luke i, 37).

Hereby is excluded the error of sundry philosophers, who have laid it down that God can do nothing except according to the course of nature. On such it is said: *As though the Almighty had no power, they reckoned of him* (Job xxii, 17).

### 2.23 That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will

The power of every necessary agent is determined and limited to one effect. That is the reason why all physical effects always come out in the same way, unless there be some interference: but acts of the will not so. But the divine power is not directed to one effect only (Chap. XXII). God then does not act by physical necessity, but by will.

Whatever does not involve a contradiction, is within the range of the divine power. But many things that do not exist in creation would still involve no contradiction if they did exist. This is most evidently the case in regard of the number and size and distances of the stars and other bodies. They would present no contradiction, no intrinsic absurdity, if they were arranged on another plan. Many things therefore lie within the range of divine power, that are not found in nature. But whoever does some and leaves out others of the things that he can do, acts by choice of will and not by physical necessity.

Since God's action is His substance (B. I, Chap. LXXIII), the divine action cannot come under the category of those acts that are 'transient' and not in the agent, but must be an act 'immanent' in the agent, such as are acts of knowing and desiring, and none other. God therefore acts and operates by knowing and willing.

A self-determined agent is prior to an agent determined from without: for all that is determined from without is reducible to what is self-determined, or we should have process to infinity. But he who is not master of his own action is not self-determined: for he acts as led by another, not as his own leader. The prime agent then must act in such a way as to remain master of his own action. But no one is master of his own action except he be a voluntary agent.

Will-action is naturally prior to physical action: for that is naturally prior which is more perfect, albeit in the individual it be posterior in time. But will-action is the more perfect, as within our experience voluntary agents are more perfect than physical. Therefore will-action must be assigned to God, the prime agent.

Where will-action and physical action go together, will-action represents the higher power and uses the other as an instrument. But the divine power is supreme, and therefore must act by will-action, not under physical necessity.
This truth also divine Scripture teaches us. All things, whatsoever he hath willed, the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6): Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will (Eph. i, 11).

2.24 That God acts by His Wisdom

The will is moved by some apprehension. But God acts by willing. Since then in God there is intellectual apprehension only, and He understands nothing otherwise than by understanding Himself, whom to understand is to be wise (B. I, Chap. LIV), it follows that God works out all things according to His wisdom.

Every agent acts in so far as it has within it something corresponding to the effect to be produced. But in every voluntary agent, as such, what corresponds to the effect to be produced is some intellectual presentation of the same. Were there no more than a mere physical disposition to produce the effect, the agent could act only to one effect, because for one physical cause there is only one physical mode of operation (ratio naturalis unius est una tantum). Every voluntary agent therefore produces its effect according to the mode of intellectual operation proper to itself. But God acts by willing, and therefore it is by the wisdom of His intellect that he brings things into being.

The function of wisdom is to set things in order. Now the setting of things in order can be effected only through a knowledge of the relation and proportion of the said things to one another, and to some higher thing which is the end and purpose of them all: for the mutual order of things to one another is founded upon their order to the end which they are to serve. But it is proper to intelligence alone to know the mutual relations and proportions of things. Again, it is proper to wisdom to judge of things as they stand to their highest cause. Thus every setting of things in order by wisdom must be the work of some intelligence. But the things produced by God bear an orderly relation to one another, which cannot be attributed to chance, since it (sit not sint) obtains always or for the most part. Thus it is evident that God, in bringing things into being, intended them in a certain order. Therefore His production of them was a work of wisdom.

All this is confirmed by divine authority, for it is said: Thou has made all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24); and the Lord in wisdom founded the earth (Prov. iii, 19).

Hereby is excluded the error of some who said that all things depend on the absolute will of God, independent of any reason.

2.25 In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty

In God there is active power, but no potentiality. Now possibility is spoken of both as involving active power and as involving potentiality. Those things then are impossible to God, the possibility of which would mean in Him potentiality. Examples: God cannot be any material thing: He cannot suffer change, nor defect, nor fatigue, nor forgetfulness, nor defeat, nor violence, nor repentance, anger, or sadness.

Again, since the object and effect of active power is some produced reality, it must be said to be impossible for God to make or produce anything inconsistent with the notion of 'reality,' or 'being,' as such, or inconsistent with the notion of a reality that is 'made,' or 'produced,' inasmuch as it is 'made,' or 'produced.' Examples: God cannot make one and the same thing together to be
and not to be. He cannot make opposite attributes to be in the same subject in the same respect. He cannot make a thing wanting in any of its essential constituents, while the thing itself remains: for instance, a man without a soul. Since the principles of some sciences, as logic, geometry, and arithmetic, rest on the formal, or abstract, constituents on which the essence of a thing depends, it follows that God cannot effect anything contrary to these principles, as that genus should not be predicable of species, or that lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference should not be equal. God cannot make the past not to have been. Some things also God cannot make, because they would be inconsistent with the notion of a creature, as such: thus He cannot create a God, or make anything equal to Himself, or anything that shall maintain itself in being, independently of Him. He cannot do what He cannot will: He cannot make Himself cease to be, or cease to be good or happy; nor can He will anything evil, or sin. Nor can His will be changeable: He cannot therefore cause what He has once willed not to be fulfilled. There is however this difference between this last impossibility on God's part and all others that have been enumerated. The others are absolute impossibilities for God either to will or do: but the things now spoken of God might will and do if His will or power be considered absolutely, but not if it be considered under the presupposition of His will to the contrary. And therefore all such phrases as, 'God cannot act contrary to what He has arranged to do,' are to be understood in sensu composito; but, understood in sensu diviso, they are false, for in that sense they regard the power and will of God considered absolutely.

2.26 That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects

Now that it has been shown (Chap. XXIII) that the divine power does not act of physical necessity, but by understanding and will, lest any one should think that God's understanding or knowledge extend only to certain fixed effects, and that thus God acts under stress of ignorance, though not under stress of physical constraint, it remains to show that His knowledge or understanding is bounded by no limits in its view of effects.

We have shown above (B. I, Chap. XLIII) the infinity of the divine essence. Now the plane of the infinite can never be reached by any piling up of finite quantities, because the infinite infinitely transcends any finite quantities however many, even though they were infinite in number. But no other being than God is infinite in essence: all others are essentially included under limited genera and species. Howsoever then and to whatsoever extent the effects of divine production are comprehended, it is ever within the compass of the divine essence to reach beyond them and to be the foundation of more. The divine understanding then, in perfectly knowing the divine essence (B. I, Chap. XLVII), transcends any infinity of actual effects of divine power and therefore is not necessarily limited to these or those effects.

If the causality of the divine understanding were limited, as a necessary agent, to any effects, it would be to those effects which God actually brings into being. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap. LXVI) that God understands even things that neither are nor shall be nor have been.

The divine knowledge stands to the things produced by God as the knowledge of an artist to the knowledge of his art. But every art extends to all that can possibly be contained under the kind of things subject to that art, as the art of building to all houses. But the kind of thing subject to the divine art is 'being' (genus subjectum divinae artis est ens), since God by His understanding is the universal principal of being (Chapp. XXI, XXIV). Therefore the divine understanding extends its causality to all things that are not inconsistent with the notion of 'being,' and is not
limited to certain fixed effects. Hence it is said: Great is our Lord, and great his power, and of his wisdom; there is no reckoning by number (Ps. cxli, 5) Hereby is excluded the position of some philosophers who said that from God's understanding of Himself there emanates a certain arrangement of things in the universe, as though He did not deal with creatures at His discretion fixing the limits of each creature and arranging the whole universe, as the Catholic faith professes. It is to be observed however that, though the divine understanding is not limited to certain effects, God nevertheless has determined to Himself fixed effects to be produced in due order by His wisdom, as it is said: Thou hast disposed all things in measure, number and weight (Wisd. xi, 21).

2.28 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God

These relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, Chap XXIII). Nor again can they be in the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God dependent on another being, foreign to itself.

God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.

The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respect of things that actually are, but also in respect of things that potentially are, because of them also He has knowledge, and in respect of them He is called both first being and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real relation to what is not actually but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that actually are than to things that potentially are, because he is not changed by producing anything.

To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addition must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry fresh relations are predicated of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp. XXIII, XXIV)

2.29 How in the Production of a Creature there may be found a debt of Justice in respect of the necessary Sequence of something posterior upon something prior

I speak here of what is prior, not in order of time merely, but by nature. The debt is not absolute, but conditional, of the form: 'If this is to be, this must go before.' According to this necessity a triple debt is found in the production of creatures. First, when the conditional proceeds from the whole universe of things to some particular part requisite for the perfection of the universe. Thus, if God willed the universe to be such as it is, it was due that He should make the sun and water and the like, without which the universe cannot be. Second, when the conditional proceeds from
one creature to another. Thus, if God willed man to be, He was obliged to make plants and animals and such like, which man needs to his perfect being: though God has made both the one and the other out of His mere will. Third, when the conditional proceeds from the existence of the individual creature to its parts and properties and accidents, on which the creature depends for its being or perfection. Thus, supposing that God wished to make man, it was due, on this supposition, that He should unite in him soul and body, senses, and other appurtenances, intrinsic and extrinsic. In all these matters, rightly considered, God is not said to be a debtor to the creature, but a debtor to the fulfillment of His own plan. On these explanations of the meaning of the term 'debt' and 'due,' natural justice is found in the universe both in respect of the creation of things and in respect of their propagation; and therefore God is said to have established and to govern all things justly and reasonably. Thus then is shut out a two-fold error: on the one hand of those who would limit the divine power, saying that God can do only as He does, because so He is bound to do; on the other, of those who say that all things follow on His sheer will, and that no other reason is to be sought or assigned in creation than that God wills it so.

2.30 How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation

Although all things depend on the will of God as their first cause, and this first cause is not necessitated in its operation except on the supposition of its own purpose, not for that however is absolute necessity excluded from creation, need we aver that all things are contingent.

There are things in creation which simply and absolutely must be. Those things simply and absolutely must be, in which there is no possibility of their not being. Some things are so brought into being by God that there is in their nature a potentiality of not being: which happens from this, that the matter in them is in potentiality to receive another form. Those things then in which either there is no matter, or, if there is any, it is not open to receive another form, have no potentiality of not being: such things then simply and absolutely must be. If it be said that things which are of nothing, of themselves tend to nothingness, and thus there is in all creatures a potentiality of not being -- it is manifest that such a conclusion does not follow. For things created by God are said to tend to nothingness only in the way in which they are from nothing; and that is only in respect of the power of the agent who has created them. Thus then creatures have no potentiality of not being: but there is in the Creator a power of giving them being or of stopping the influx of being to them.

The further a thing is distant from the self-existent, that is, from God, the nigher it is to not being; and the nigher it is to God, the further it is withdrawn from not being. Those things therefore which are nighest to God, and therefore furthest removed from not being -- in order that the hierarchy of being (ordo rerum) may be complete -- must be such as to have in themselves no potentiality of not being, or in other words, their being must be absolutely necessary. We observe therefore that, considering the universe of creatures as they depend on the first principles of all things, we find that they depend on the will (of God) -- not as necessarily arising therefrom, except by an hypothetical, or consequent necessity, as has been explained (Chap. XXVIII). But, compared with proximate and created principles, we find some things having an absolute necessity. There is no absurdity in causes being originally brought into being without any necessity, and yet, once they are posited in being, having such and such an effect necessarily following from them. That such natures were produced by God, was voluntary on His part: but that, once established, a certain effect proceeds from them, is a matter of absolute
necessity. What belongs to a thing by reason of its essential principles, must obtain by absolute necessity in all things.

2.31 That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity

If either the entire universe or any single creature necessarily exists, this necessity must arise either from the being itself or from some other being. From the being itself it cannot arise: for every being must be from the first being; and what has not being of itself, cannot necessarily exist of itself.

But if this supposed necessity arises from another being, that is, from some extrinsic cause, then, we observe, an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. Now an effect necessarily arising from an efficient cause means that the agent acts of necessity: when the agent does not act of necessity, neither is it absolutely necessary for the effect to arise. But God does not act under any necessity in the production of creatures (Chap. XXIII). So far therefore as the efficient cause is concerned, there is not any absolute necessity for any creature to be. Neither is there any such necessity in connection with the final cause. For means to an end receive necessity from their end only in so far as without them the end either cannot be at all, or cannot well be. Now the end proposed to the divine will in the production of things can be no other than God's own goodness, as has been shown (B. I, Chap. LXXV): which goodness depends on creatures neither for its being nor for its well-being (B. I, Chapp. XIII, XXVIII). There is then no absolute necessity for the being of any creature: nor is it necessary to suppose creation always to have existed.

It is not necessary for God to will creation to be at all (B. I, Chap. LXXXI): therefore it is not necessary for God to will creation always to have been.

2.32 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same

Arg. 1. Every agent that is not always in action, suffers some change when it comes to act. But God suffers no change, but is ever in act in the same way; and from His action created things come to be: therefore they always have been.

Reply (Chap. XXXV). There is no need of God suffering any change for fresh effects of His power coming to be. Novelty of effect can only indicate change in the agent in so far as it shows novelty of action. Any new action in the agent implies some change in the same, at least a change from rest to activity. But a fresh effect of God's power does not indicate any new action in God, since His action is His essence (B. I, Chap. XLV).

Arg. 2. The action of God is eternal: therefore the things created by God have been from eternity.

Reply. That does not follow. For, as shown above (Chap. XXIII), though God acts voluntarily in creation, yet it does not follow that there need be any action on His part intermediate between the act of His will and the effect of the same, as in us the action of our motor activities is so intermediate. With God to understand and will is to produce; and the effect produced follows upon the understanding and will according to the determination of the understanding and the command of the will. But as by the understanding there is determined the production of the thing, and its every other condition, so there is also prescribed for it the time at which it is to be; just as any art determines not only that a thing be of this or that character, but also that it be at
this or that time, as the physician fixes the time for giving the medicine. Thus, assuming God's will to be of itself effectual for the production of an effect, the effect would follow fresh from the ancient will, without any fresh action coming to be put forth on the part of God.

Arg. 3. Given a sufficient cause, the effect will ensue: otherwise it would be possible, when the cause was posited, for the effect either to be or not to be. At that rate, the sequence of effect upon cause would be possible and no more. But what is possible requires something to reduce it to act: we should have therefore to suppose a cause whereby the effect was reduced to act, and thus the first cause would not be sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of the production of creatures: otherwise He must be in potentiality, and become a cause by some addition, which is clearly absurd.

Reply. Though God is the sufficient cause of the production and bringing forth of creatures into being, yet the effect of His production need not be taken to be eternal. For, given a sufficient cause, there follows its effect, but not an effect alien from the cause. Now the proper effect of the will is that that should be which the will wants. If it were anything else than what the will wanted, not the proper effect of the cause would be secured, but a foreign effect. Now as the will wishes that this should be of this or that nature, so it also wishes that it should be at this or that time. Hence, for will to be a sufficient cause, it is requisite that the effect should be when the will wishes it to be. The case is otherwise with physical agencies: they cannot wait: physical action takes place according as nature is ready for it: there the effect must follow at once upon the complete being of the cause. But the will does not act according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose: and therefore, as the effect of a physical agent follows the being of the agent, if it is sufficient, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of purpose.

Arg. 4. A voluntary agent does not delay the execution of his purpose except in expectation of some future condition not yet realized. And this unfulfilled futurity is sometimes in the agent himself, as when maturity of active power or the removal of some hindrance is the condition expected: sometimes it is without the agent, as when there is expected the presence of some one before whom the action is to take place, or the arrival of some opportune time that is not yet come. A complete volition is at once carried into effect by the executive power, except for some defect in that power. Thus at the command of the will a limb is at once moved, unless there be some break-down in the motor apparatus. Therefore, when any one wishes to do a thing and it is not at once done, that must be either for some defect of power, the removal of which has to be waited for, or because of the incompleteness of the volition to do the thing. I call it 'completeness of volition,' when there is a will absolutely to do the thing, anyhow. The volition I say is 'incomplete,' when there is no will absolutely to do the thing, but the will is conditioned on the existence of some circumstance not yet present, or the withdrawal of some present impediment. But certainly, whatever God now wills to be, He has from eternity willed to be. No new motion of the will can come upon Him: no defect or impediment can have clogged His power: there can have been nothing outside Himself for Him to wait for in the production of the universe, since there is nothing else uncreated save Him alone (Chapp. VI, XV). It seems therefore necessary that God must have brought the creature into being from all eternity.

Reply. The object of the divine will is not the mere being of the creature, but its being at a certain time. What is thus willed, namely, the being of the creature at that time, is not delayed: because
the creature began to exist then exactly when God from eternity arranged that it should begin to exist.

Arg. 5. An intellectual agent does not prefer one alternative to another except for some superiority of the one over the other. But where there is no difference, there can be no superiority. But between one non-existence and another non-existence there can be no difference, nor is one non-existence preferable to another. But, looking beyond the entire universe, we find nothing but the eternity of God. Now in nothing there can be assigned no difference of instants, that a thing should be done in one instant rather than in another. In like manner neither in eternity, which is all uniform and simple (B. I, Chap. XV), can there be any difference of instants. It follows that the will of God holds itself in one unvarying attitude to the production of creatures throughout the whole of eternity. Either therefore His will is that creation never be realized at all under His eternity, or that it always be realized.

Reply. It is impossible to mark any difference of parts of any duration antecedent to the beginning of all creation, as the fifth objection supposed that we could do. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration, and the eternity of God has no parts, no before and no after. We cannot therefore refer the beginning of all creation to any severally marked points in any pre-existing measure. There are no such points for the beginning of creation to be referred to according to any relation of agreement or divergence. Hence it is impossible to demand any reason in the mind of the agent why he should have brought the creature into being in this particular marked instant of duration rather than in that other instant preceding or following. God brought into being creation and time simultaneously. There is no account to be taken therefore why He produced the creature now, and not before, but only why the creature has not always been. There is an analogy in the case of place: for particular bodies are produced in a particular time and also in a particular place; and, because they have about them a time and a place within which they are contained, there must be a reason assignable why they are produced in this place and this time rather than in any other: but in regard of the whole stellar universe (coelum), beyond which there is no place, and along with which the universal place of all things is produced, no account is to be taken why it is situated here and not there. In like manner in the production of the whole creation, beyond which there is no time, and simultaneously with which time is produced, no question is to be raised why it is now and not before, but only why it has not always been, or why it has come to be after not being, or why it had any beginning.

Arg. 6. Means to the end have their necessity from the end, especially in voluntary actions. So long then as the end is uniform, the means to the end must be uniform or uniformly produced, unless they come to stand in some new relation to the end. Now the end of creatures proceeding from the divine will is the divine goodness, which alone can be the end in view of the divine will. Since then the divine goodness is uniform for all eternity, alike in itself and in comparison with the divine will, it seems that creatures must be uniformly brought into being by the divine will for all eternity. It cannot be said that any new relation to the end supervenes upon them, so long as the position is clung to that they had no being at all before a certain fixed time, at which they are supposed to have begun to be.

Reply. Though the end of the divine will can be none other than the divine goodness, still the divine will has not to work to bring this goodness into being, in the way that the artist works to set up the product of his art, since the divine goodness is eternal and unchangeable and incapable of addition. Nor does God work for His goodness as for an end to be won for Himself, as a king
works to win a city: for God is His own goodness. He works for this end, only inasmuch as He produces an effect which is to share in the end. In such a production of things for an end, the uniform attitude of end to agent is not to be considered reason enough for an everlasting work. Rather we should consider the bearing of the end on the effect produced to serve it. The one evinced necessity is that of the production of the effect in the manner better calculated to serve the end for which it is produced.

Arg. 7. Since all things, so far as they have being, share in the goodness of God; the longer they exist, the more they share of that goodness: hence also the perpetual being of the species is said to be divine. But the divine goodness is infinite. Therefore it is proper to it to communicate itself infinitely, and not for a fixed time only.

Reply. It was proper for the creature, in such likeness as became it, to represent the divine goodness. Such representation cannot be by way of equality: it can only be in such way as the higher and greater is represented by the lower and less. Now the excess of the divine goodness above the creature is best expressed by this, that creatures have not always been in existence: for thereby it appears that all other beings but God Himself have God for the author of their being; and that His power is not tied to producing effects of one particular character, as physical nature produces physical effects, but that He is a voluntary and intelligent agent.

2.33, 36 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same

Arg. 1. There are creatures in which there is no potentiality of not being (see Chap. XXX): it is impossible for them not to be, and therefore they always must be.

Reply (Chap. XXXVI). The necessity of such creatures being is only a relative necessity, as shown above (Chap. XXX): it does not involve the creature's always having been: it does not follow upon its substance: but when the creature is already established in being, this necessity involves the impossibility of its not-being.

Arg. 3. Every change must either go on everlastingly, or have some other change preceding it. But change always has been: therefore also changeable things: therefore creatures.

Reply. It has already been shown (Chapp. XII, XVII) that without any change in God, the agent, He may act to the production of a new thing, that has not always been. But if a new thing may be produced by Him, He may also originate a process of change.

Arg. 5. If time is perpetual, motion must be perpetual, time being the record of motion. But time must be perpetual: for time is inconceivable without a present instant, as a line is inconceivable without a point: now a present instant is always inconceivable without the ending of a past and the beginning of a future instant; and thus every given present instant has before it a time preceding and after it a time succeeding, and so there can be no first or last time. It follows that created substances in motion have been from eternity.

Reply. This argument rather supposes than proves the eternity of motion. The reason why the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past is because any given phase of motion is the beginning and end of different phases. There is no showing that every instant must be of this character, unless it be assumed that every given phase of time comes between motion.
going before and motion following after, which is tantamount to assuming the perpetuity of motion. Assuming on the contrary that motion is not perpetual, one may say that the first instant of time is the beginning of the future, and not the end of any past instant. Even in any particular case of motion we may mark a phase which is the beginning only of movement and not the end of any: otherwise every particular case of motion would be perpetual, which is impossible.

Arg. 6. If time has not always been, we may mark a non-existence of time prior to its being. In like manner, if it is not always to be, we may mark a non-existence of it subsequent to its being. But priority and subsequence in point of duration cannot be unless time is; and at that rate time must have been before it was, and shall be after it has ceased, which is absurd. Time then must be eternal. But time is an accident, and cannot be without a subject. But the subject of it is not God, who is above time and beyond motion (B. I, Chapp. XIII, XV). The only alternative left is that some created substance must be eternal.

Reply. There is nothing in this argument to evince that the very supposition of time not being supposes that time is (read, Si ponitur tempus non esse, ponatur esse). For when we speak of something prior to the being of time, we do not thereby assert any real part of time, but only an imaginary part. When we say, 'Time has being after not being', we mean that there was no instant of time before this present marked instant: as when we say that there is nothing above the stellar universe, we do not mean that there is any place beyond the stellar universe, which may be spoken of as 'above' it, but that above it there is no 'place' at all.

2.34, 37: Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of the Creative Process itself, with Answers to the same

Arg. 1. It is the common opinion of all philosophers, and therefore it must be true, that nothing is made of nothing (Aristotle, Physics, B. I, Chaps. VII, VIII). Whatever is made, then, must be made of something; and that again, if it is made at all, must be made of something else. But this process cannot go on to infinity; and therefore we must come to something that was not made. But every being that has not always been must have been made. Therefore that out of which all things are first made must be something everlasting. That cannot be God, because He cannot be the material of anything. Therefore there must be something eternal outside God, namely, primordial matter.

Reply (Chap. XXXVII). The common position of philosophers, that nothing is made of nothing, is true of the sort of making that they considered. For all our knowledge begins in sense, which is of singular objects; and human investigation has advanced from particular to general considerations. Hence, in studying the beginning of things, men gave their attention to the making of particular things in detail. The making of one sort of being out of another sort is the making of some particular being, inasmuch as it is 'this being,' not as it is 'being' generally: for some prior being there was that now is changed into 'this being.' But entering more deeply into the origin of things, philosophers came finally to consider the issuing of all created being from one first cause (Chapp. XV, XVI). In this origin of all created being from God, it is impossible to allow any making out of pre-existent material: for such making out of pre-existent material would not be a making of the whole being of the creature. This first making of the universe was not attained to in the thought of the early physicists, whose common opinion it was that nothing was made of nothing: or if any did attain to it, they considered that such a term as 'making' did not properly apply to it, since the name 'making' implies movement or change, whereas in this
origin of all being from one first being there can be no question of the transmutation of one being into another (Chap. XVII). Therefore it is not the concern of physical science to study this first origin of all things: that study belongs to the metaphysician, who deals with being in general and realities apart from motion. We may however by a figure of speech apply the name of 'making' to creation, and speak of things as 'made,' whatsoever they are, the essence or nature whereof has its origin from other being.

Arg. 2. Everything that takes a new being is now otherwise than as it was before: that must come about by some movement or change: but all movement or change is in some subject: therefore before anything is made there must be some subject of motion.

Reply. The notion of motion or change is foisted in here to no purpose: for what nowise is, is not anywise, and affords no hold for the conclusion that, when it begins to be, it is otherwise than as it was before.

These then are the reasons which some hold to as demonstrative, and necessarily evincing that creatures have always existed, wherein they contradict the Catholic faith, which teaches that nothing but God has always existed, and that all else has had a beginning of being except the one eternal God. Thus then it evidently appears that there is nothing to traverse our assertion, that the world has not always existed. And this the Catholic faith teaches: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. i, 1): and, Before he made anything, from the beginning (Prov. viii, 22).

2.38 Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same

Arg. 1. God is the cause of all things (Chap. XV). But a cause must be prior in duration to the effects of its action.

Reply. That is true of things that act by motion, for the effect is not till the termination of the motion: but with causes that act instantaneously there is no such necessity.

Arg. 2. Since the whole of being is created by God, it cannot be said to be made out of any being: whence the conclusion follows that it is made out of nothing, and consequently that it has existence after not existing.

Reply. To the notion of being made out of something, if that is not admitted one must supply the contradictory notion: which contradictory notion is not being made out of anything. Observe, it is not being made out of nothing, except in the former sense of not being made out of anything.

Arg. 3. It is not possible to pass through infinity. But if the world always had been, infinity would have been passed through by this time, there being infinite days, or daily rounds of the sun, if the world always has been.

Reply. An infinite quantity, though not existing in simultaneous actual realization, may nevertheless be in succession, because every infinite, so taken, is really finite. Any given round of the sun could be passed, because so far the number of them was finite: but when they are all viewed together, on the supposition that the world had always existed, it would be impossible to fix upon any first day, and so to make any transition from that to the present day, since transition always requires two extreme points.
Arg 4. It would follow that addition is made to the infinite, because to past days, or sun-rounds, a new round is daily added.

Reply. There is nothing to hinder addition to the infinite on that side on which it is finite. Supposing time eternal, it must be infinite as preceding, but finite as succeeding, for the present is the limit of the past.

Arg. 5. It would follow in a world always existing that we should have an infinite series of efficient causes, father being cause of child, and grandfather to father, and so to infinity.

Reply. The impossibility of an infinite series of efficient causes, according to philosophers (Aristotle, *Metaph. ii, 2*), holds for causes acting together: because then the effect has to depend on an infinity of co-existent actions; and the infinity of causes there is essential, the whole infinite multitude of them being requisite for the production of the effect. But in the case of causes not acting together no such impossibility holds, in the opinion of those who suppose an endless series of generations. The infinity in this case is accidental to the causes: for to Socrates’ father, as such, it is quite an accident whether he be the son of another man or no: whereas to a stick, inasmuch as it moves a stone, it is not an accident whether it be moved by an hand: for it only moves inasmuch as it is moved.

Arg. 6. It would follow that an infinite multitude exists, to wit, the immortal souls of infinite men who have been in the past.

Reply. This objection is more difficult: nevertheless the argument is not of much use, because it supposes many things. Since these reasons, alleged by some to prove that the world has not always existed, are not necessarily conclusive, though they have a certain probability, it is sufficient to touch on them slightly, without insisting too much, that the Catholic faith may not seem to rest on empty reasonings, and not rather on the solid basis of the teaching of God.

2.41 That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents

If the diversity of things proceeds from diversity or contrariety of diverse agents, this would seem to hold especially of the contrariety of good and evil, so that all good things should proceed from a good principle, and evils from an evil principle. Now there is good and evil in all genera. But there cannot be one first principle of all evils: for the very essence of such a principle would be evil, and that is impossible. Everything that is, inasmuch as it is a being, must necessarily be good: for it loves and strives to preserve its own being, a sign whereof is this fact, that everything fights against its own destruction: now what all things seek is good. It is impossible therefore for the diversity of things to arise from two principles, one good and one evil.

What in no manner of way is, is neither good nor evil: while every thing that is, in so far as it is, is good. A thing can be evil therefore only inasmuch as it is not-being, that is, *privative* being; and the evil is precisely the privation. Now privation never comes of the ordinary action of any cause: because every cause acts inasmuch as it is endowed with 'form'; and thus the ordinary effect of its action must also be endowed with 'form,' since every agent acts to the production of its own likeness, unless it be accidentally hindered. It follows that evil does not come of the ordinary action of any cause, but is accidentally incident among the effects of ordinary causation.
There is therefore no one primary and essential principle of all evil: but the first principle of all is one primary good, among the effects of which there ensues evil incidentally.

Hence it is said: *I am the Lord, and there is none other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil: I am the Lord doing all these things* (Isa. xlv, 6, 7). And, *Good things and evil things, life and death, poverty and rank are from God* (Ecclus xi, 14). And, *Against evil is good, and against life death; so against the just man is the sinner. And so behold all the works of the Most High, two and two, and one against one* (Ecclus xxxiii, 15).

God is said to make and create evil things, inasmuch as He creates things that are good in themselves and yet hurtful to others: thus the wolf, though a good thing naturally in his kind, is evil to the sheep. Hence it is said: *Shall there be evil in the city that the Lord hath not done?* (Amos iii, 6.)

Hereby is excluded the error of those who suppose two primitive contrary principles, good and evil. This error of the early philosophers some evil-minded men have presumed to introduce into Christian teaching, the first of whom was Marcion, and afterwards the Manicheans, who have done most to spread this error.

**2.44 That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits**

Origen in his book *Peri Archôn* says that God out of mere bounty in His first production of creatures made them all equal, all spiritual and rational, and they by free will behaved in various ways, some adhering to God more or less, and others receding from Him more or less; and thus by order of divine justice various grades ensued among spiritual substances, some appearing as angels of various orders, some as human souls also of various states and conditions, some again as demons in various states. He also said that it was through this variety of rational creatures that God instituted a variety also of material creatures, so that the nobler spiritual substances should be united to the nobler bodies, and that in divers other ways the material creation might serve to express the variety of spiritual substances. According to Origen, man, sun, and stars are composed of rational substances united with corresponding bodies. Now all this opinion can be shown to be manifestly false.

The better a thing is, the higher place does it hold in the intention of the agent who produces it. But the best thing in creation is the perfection of the universe, which consists in the orderly variety of things: for in all things the perfection of the whole is preferable to the perfection of parts and details. Therefore the diversity of creatures does not arise from diversity of merits, but was primarily intended by the prime agent.

If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we should have to allow that they do not depend for their activity one on another. What arises by the concurrence of divers causes working independently of one another is matter of chance; and thus the diversity and order of creation comes by chance, which is impossible.

Since a spiritual creature, or angel, does not deserve to be degraded except for sin -- and it is degraded from its high, invisible estate, by being united with a visible body -- it seems that visible bodies have been added to these spiritual creatures because of sin; which comes near to the error of the Manicheans, who laid it down that the visible creation proceeded from an evil principle. Origen seems not to have given sufficient weight to the consideration that, when we
give, not in discharge of any debt, but out of liberality, it is not contrary to justice if we give in unequal measure: but God brought things into being under no debt, but of sheer liberality (Chap. XXVIII): therefore the variety of creatures does not presuppose variety of merits.

2.45 The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.

Since every agent intends to induce its own likeness in the effect, so far as the effect can receive it, an agent will do this more perfectly the more perfect itself is. But God is the most perfect of agents: therefore it will belong to Him to induce His likeness in creation most perfectly, so far as befits created nature. But creatures cannot attain to any perfect likeness of God so long as they are confined to one species of creature; because, since the cause exceeds the effect, what is in the cause simply and as one thing is found in the effect in a composite and manifold way, unless the effect be of the same species as the cause; which is impossible in the case before us, for no creature can be equal to God. Multiplicity therefore and variety was needful in creation, to the end that the perfect likeness of God might be found in creatures according to their measure.

As the things that are made of any material are contained in the potentiality of the material, so the things done by any agent must be in the active power of the agent. But the potentiality of the material would not be perfectly reduced to actuality, if out of the material were made only one of those things to which the material is in potentiality. Therefore if any agent whose power extends to various effects were to produce only one of those effects, his power would not be so completely reduced to actuality as by making many. But by the reduction of active power to actuality the effect attains to the likeness of the agent. Therefore the likeness of God would not be perfect in the universe, if there was only one grade of all beings.

A creature approaches more perfectly to the likeness of God by being not only good itself, but able to act for the good of others. But no creature could do anything for the good of another creature, unless there were plurality and inequality among creatures, because the agent must be other than the patient and in a position of advantage (honorable) over it.

The goodness of the species transcends the goodness of the individual. Therefore the multiplication of species is a greater addition to the good of the universe than the multiplication of individuals of one species.

To a work contrived by sovereign goodness there ought not to be lacking the height of perfection proper to it. But the good of order in variety is better than the isolated good of any one of the things that enter into the order: therefore the good of order ought not to be wanting to the work of God; which good could not be, if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures. There is then diversity and inequality between creatures, not by chance, not from diversity of elements, not by the intervention of any (inferior) cause, or consideration of merit, but by the special intention of God, wishing to give the creature such perfection as it was capable of having. Hence it is said, God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31); and this after He had said of them singly, that they were good; because while things are good singly in their several natures, all taken together they are very good, because of the order of the universe, which is the final and noblest perfection of creation.

2.46 That it was necessary for the Perfection of the Universe that there should be some Intellectual Natures
This then being the cause of the diversity among creatures, it remains now to treat of the several distinct creatures themselves as we proposed to do in the third part of this book (Chap. V). And we will show first that by the disposition of Divine Providence assigning perfection to creatures in the way best befitting them, it was consonant with reason that some intellectual creatures should be placed at the head of creation.

Nothing else moves God to the production of creatures but His own goodness, which He has wished to communicate to other beings according to the manner of their assimilation to Himself (B. I, Chap. LXXXVII). Now the likeness of one thing may be found in another in two ways: in one way in point of natural being, as the likeness of heat is found in the body heated; in another way in point of knowledge, as the likeness of fire (perceived) is in sight or touch. In order then that the likeness of God might be in creatures in such modes as were possible, it was necessary that the divine goodness should be communicated to creatures, not only by likeness in being, but also by likeness in knowing. But mind alone can know the divine goodness. Therefore there needed to be intelligent creatures.

In all comely arrangements of things, the attitude of the secondary to the last imitates the attitude of the first to all, as well secondary as last, though the imitation is not always perfect. Now God comprehends in Himself all creatures (B. I, Chapp. XXV, LI, LIV); and this is represented in material creatures, although in another way: for the higher body comprehends and contains the lower, according to quantitative extension; whereas God contains all creatures in simple mode, and not by quantitative extension. In order then that an imitation of God might not be wanting to creatures even in this mode of containing, there were made intellectual creatures to contain material creatures, not by any extension of quantity, but simply by mode of intelligence: for what is understood is in the mind that understands it, and is comprehended in its intellectual activity.

2.47 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God

These relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, Chap XXIII). Nor again can they be in the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God dependent on another being, foreign to itself.

God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.

The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respect of things that actually are, but also in respect of things that potentially are, because of them also He has knowledge, and in respect of them He is called both first being and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real relation to what is not actually but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that actually are than to things that potentially are, because he is not changed by producing anything.
To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addition must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry fresh relations are predicated of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp. XXIII, XXIV).

2.48 That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will

They must be free, if they have dominion over their own acts.

A free agent is an agent that is cause of its own action (sui causa, sibi causa agendi). Agents that are determined (moventur) and act only inasmuch as they are determined by others, are not causes of their own acts. Only self-determining agents (moventia seipsa) have liberty of action; and these alone are guided in their action by judgement. A self-determining agent is made up of two elements, one determining and another determined. The element determined is the appetite; and that is determined either by intellect, or by fantasy, or by sense: for to these powers it belongs to judge. Of such self-determining agents, those alone judge freely which determine their own judgement. But no faculty of judging determines its own judgement unless it reflects upon its own act. If then it is to determine itself to judge, it must know its own judgement; and that knowledge belongs to intellect alone. Irrational animals then have a sort of free determination, or action, but not a free judgement (sunt quodammodo liberi quidem motus, sive actionis, non autem liberi judicii): while inanimate things, being dependent for their every determination on things other than themselves, have not so much as free action, or determination. On the contrary, intelligent beings have not only free action, but also free judgement, which is having free will.

An apprehension becomes a motive according as the thing apprehended takes the form of something good or suitable. In agents that determine their own movements, the outward action goes upon some judgement pronouncing a thing good or suitable according as it is apprehended. If the agent pronouncing the judgement is to determine himself to judge, he must be guided to that judgement by some higher form or idea in his apprehension. This idea can be no other than the universal idea (ipsa ratio) of goodness or fitness, by aid whereof a judgement is formed of any given definite good, fit, or suitable thing. Therefore those agents alone determine themselves to judge, which have this general concept of goodness or fitness -- that is to say, only intelligent agents. Therefore intelligent agents alone determine themselves, not only to act, but also to judge. They therefore alone are free in judging, which is having free will.

No movement or action follows from a general concept except by the medium of some particular apprehension, as all movement and action deals with particulars. Now the understanding naturally apprehends the universal. In order then that movement or any manner of action may follow upon the intellectual apprehension, the universal concept of the understanding must be applied to particular objects. But the universal contains in potentiality many particular objects. Therefore the application of the intellectual concept may be made to many divers objects; and consequently the judgement of the understanding about things to be done is not determined to one thing only.
Some agents are without liberty of judgement, either because they have no judgement at all, as is the case with things that have no knowledge, as stones and plants, or because they have a judgement naturally determined to one effect, as irrational animals. For by natural reckoning the sheep judges that the wolf is hurtful to it, and on this judgement flies from the wolf. But whatever agents have their judgement of things to be done not determined by nature to one effect, they must have free will. Such are all intelligent agents; for the understanding apprehends, not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Hence, since it is through the idea in apprehension that the understanding moves the will; and in all things the motive, or moving power, and the object moved must be proportioned to one another; it follows that the will of an intelligent subsistent being is not determined by nature except to good in general. Whatever therefore is presented to the will under the specific notion of good (sub ratione boni), the will may incline to it, without let or hindrance from any natural determination to the contrary. Therefore all intelligent agents have free will, arising out of the judgement of the understanding; and free will is defined 'a free judgement on the matter of a specific notion, or general concept.'

2.49 That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal

If the understanding were a corporeal substance, intelligible ideas of things would be received in it only as representing individual things. At that rate, the understanding would have no conception of the universal, but only of the particular, which is manifestly false.

If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is manifestly false, for we do understand many things that are not corporeal.

There can be no infinite power in any finite body: but the power of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its logical extension.

Of no bodily substance is the action turned back upon the agent. But the understanding in its action does reflect and turn round upon itself: for as it understands an object, so also it understands that it does understand, and so endlessly. Hence Holy Scripture calls intelligent subsistent beings by the name of 'spirits,' using of them the style which it is wont to use for the incorporeal Deity, according to the text, God is a Spirit (John iv, 24). Hereby is excluded the error of the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no substance but corporeal substance: which opinion some have endeavored to foist into the Christian faith, saying that the soul is an effigy of the body, a sort of outline contour of the human body.

2.52 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence

Though subsistent intelligences are not corporeal, nor compounded of matter and form, nor existent as material forms in matter, still it must not be thought that they come up to the simplicity of the being of God: for there is found in them a certain composition, inasmuch as existence (esse) and essence (quod est) is not in them the same.

Whatsoever reality subsists of and by itself, nothing attaches to that reality except what is proper to being as being. For what is said of any reality not as such, does not belong to that reality.
otherwise than accidentally by reason of the subject: hence, considered apart from the subject in a particular case, the attribute does not belong to that reality at all. Now to be 'caused by another' does not belong to being, as being: otherwise every being would be caused by another, which is impossible (B. I, Chap. XIII) Therefore that existence which is being of itself and by itself, must be uncaused. No caused being therefore is its own existence.

The substance of every reality is a being of itself and not through another. Hence actual illumination is not of the substance of air, because it accrues to it through another. But to every created reality existence accrues through another, otherwise it would not be a creature. Therefore of no created substance is it true to say that its existence is its substance.

Hence in Exodus iii, 14, existence is assigned as the proper name of God, He who is: because it is proper to God alone that His substance is none other than His existence.

2.53 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality

In whatever being there are found two elements, the one complementary to the other, the proportion of the one element to the other is as the proportion of potential to actual: for nothing is completed except by its own actuality. But in a created intelligent subsistent being there are two elements, the substance itself and the existence thereof which is not the same thing as the substance. Now that existence is the complement of the existing substance: for everything actually exists by having existence. It follows that in every one of the aforesaid substances there is a composition of actuality and potentiality.

What is in any being, and comes of the agent that produced it, must be the actuality of that being: for it is an agent's function to make a thing be in actuality. But, as shown above (Chap. XV), all other substances have their existence of the prime agent: indeed their being created substances consists precisely in this, that they have their existence of another. Existence itself therefore is in these created substances as a sort of actualization of the same. But that in which actuality is received is potentiality: for actuality is such in relation to potentiality. In every created subsistent being therefore there is potentiality and actuality.

2.55 That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable

What ordinarily and of itself attaches to a thing, inheres in it necessarily and invariably and inseparably, as roundness ordinarily and of itself inheres in a circle, but in a bit of brass metal only incidentally. It is possible for a bit of brass metal to be other than round: it is impossible for a circle to be other than round. Now existence ordinarily follows upon the form: for we call that 'ordinary,' which the thing is inasmuch as it is itself; and everything has existence inasmuch as it has form. Substances therefore that are not pure forms may be deprived of existence inasmuch as they lose their form, as brass is deprived of roundness inasmuch as it ceases to be circular. But substances that are pure forms are never deprived of existence: thus if the ideal circle had substantial existence, that substance could never be made other than round. But subsistent intelligences are pure subsistent forms: therefore it is impossible for them ever to cease to exist.

Everything that perishes, perishes by suffering something. Destruction is a sort of suffering. But no subsistent intelligence can suffer any impression such as to lead to its destruction. For to suffer is to receive something; and whatever is received in a subsistent intelligence must be
received according to the manner of the same: that is to say, it must be received as an intelligible impression. But whatever is so received in a subsistent intelligence, goes to perfect that intelligence, not to destroy it: for the intelligible is the perfection of the intelligent. A subsistent intelligence therefore is indestructible.

The intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect: hence the understanding in the act of understanding, and its term, or object in the act of being understood, are one. What therefore belongs to the object as intelligible, must belong also to the mind as cognizant of that object; because perfection and perfectible are of the same genus. Now the intelligible object, as such, is necessary and imperishable: for things necessary, or things that must be, are perfectly cognizable to the understanding; while things contingent, that are but might not be, as such, are cognizable only imperfectly: they are not matter of science, but of opinion. Hence the understanding attains to science of perishable things, only in so far as they are imperishable -- that is to say, in so far as they become to the mind universals. Intellect therefore, as such, must be indestructible.

It is impossible for a natural desire to be void of object, for nature does nothing in vain. But every intelligence naturally desires perpetuity of being, not only perpetuity of being in the species, but in the individual: which is thus shown. The natural desire which some creatures have arises from conscious apprehension: thus the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals on which he feeds, and man naturally desires happiness. Other creatures, without any conscious apprehension, are led by the inclination of primitive physical tendencies, which is called in some 'physical appetite.' The natural desire of being is contained under both modes: the proof of which is that creatures devoid of any sort of cognitive faculty resist destructive agencies to the full strength of their natural constitution, while creatures possessed of any manner of cognitive faculty resist the same according to the mode of their cognition. Those creatures therefore, devoid of cognition, who have in their natural constitution strength enough to preserve perpetual being, so as to remain always the same numerically, have a natural appetite for perpetuity of being even in respect of sameness of number: while those whose natural constitution has not strength for this, but only for preservation of perpetuity of being in respect of sameness of species, also have a natural appetite for perpetuity. This difference then must be noted in those creatures whose desire of being is attended with cognition, that they who do not know being except in the present time, desire it for the present time, but not for ever, because they have no apprehension of everlasting existence: still they desire the perpetual being of their species, a desire unattended with cognition, because the generative power, which serves that end, is preliminary to and does not come under cognition. Those then that do know and apprehend perpetual being as such, desire the same with a natural desire. But this is the case with all subsistent intelligences. All such subsistent intelligences therefore have a natural desire of everlasting being. Therefore they cannot possibly cease to be.

All things that begin to be, and afterwards cease to be, have both their beginning and their ceasing from the same power: for the same is the power to make to be and to make not to be. But subsistent intelligences could not begin to be except through the power of the prime agent. Therefore neither is there any power to make them cease to be except in the prime agent, inasmuch as that agent may cease to pour being into them. But in respect of this power alone nothing can be called perishable; as well because things are called necessary or contingent in respect of the power that is in them, not in respect of the power of God (Chap. XXX), as also
because God, the author of nature, does not withdraw from things that which is proper to their nature; and it has been shown that it is proper to intellectual natures to be perpetual.

2.56, 69: How a Subsistent Intelligence may be united with a Body, with a Solution of the Arguments alleged to prove that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be united with a Body as its Form

A subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of combination: for combined elements, when the combination is complete, do not remain actually, but virtually only: for if they remained actually, it would not be a combination, but a mere mechanical mixture. But this combination and consequent cessation of actual existence cannot befall subsistent intelligences; for they are imperishable.

It is likewise evident that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of contact, properly so called. For contact is only of bodies: those things are in contact, the extremities of which are together, as points, or lines, or circumferences, which are the extremities of bodies.

Still there is one mode of contact whereby a subsistent intelligence may be mingled with a body. For natural bodies in touching one another involve a change, and thus are united together, not only in their quantitative extremities, but also by likeness of one same quality or form, the one in pressing its form on the other. And though, if we regard only quantitative extremities, the contact must be mutual in all cases, yet, if we consider action and passion, there will be found some cases of touching without being touched, and some cases of being touched without touching. Any cases that may be found of contact without contact in quantitative extremities must still be called instances of contact, inasmuch as they are instances of action: thus we say that he who saddens another 'touches' him. According to this mode of touch it is possible for a subsistent intelligence to be united to a body by contact: for subsistent intelligences act upon bodies and move them, being more highly actualized than bodies are.

This contact is not quantitative but virtual, and differs from bodily contact in three respects. First, because in this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible, which cannot happen in bodily contact: for only that which is indivisible can be touched by a point, whereas a subsistent intelligence, indivisible though it be, can touch a divisible quantity by acting upon it. The point and the subsistent intelligence are not indivisible in the same way. The point is indivisible as a term of quantity, and has a definite situation in a continuous surface, beyond which it cannot be thrown: whereas a subsistent intelligence is indivisible by being outside of the category of quantity altogether: hence no indivisible element of quantity is marked out for contact with it. Secondly, because quantitative contact is only with extremities, but virtual contact is with the whole subject touched: for the subject is touched inasmuch as it is acted upon and moved; but that is inasmuch as it is in potentiality; and potentiality extends to the whole, not merely to the extremities of the whole: hence the whole is touched. From this appears a third difference: because in quantitative touch, which is of extremities, the touching body must be outside of the touched, and cannot pervade it, but is stopped by it; whereas the virtual contact, which is proper to subsistent intelligences, reaching to the inmost recesses of things, makes the touching substance be within the touched and pervade it without let or hindrance. Thus then a subsistent intelligence may be united with a body by virtual contact.
Elements united by such contact are not absolutely one: they are one in action and in being acted upon, which does not involve absolute oneness of being. Such absolute oneness may be in three ways: in the way of indivisibility, in the way of continuity, and in the way of natural unity. Now out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there cannot be made an indivisible unity: it must be a compound of two things. Nor again a continuous unity, because the parts of a continuum are quantitative. It remains to be inquired whether out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there can result such a unity as means oneness of nature. But out of two permanent elements there results no being one by nature except that which results of the union of substantial form with matter: for out of substance and accident there results no being one by nature, for the nature or essence of 'man' and 'whiteness' is not the same. This question then remains to be studied, whether a subsistent intelligence can be the substantial form of any body. Looking at the matter argumentatively, it might seem that the thing is impossible.

Arg. 1. Of two actually existent substances no one being can be made: for the actuality of every being is that whereby it is distinguished from another being. But a subsistent intelligence is an actually existing substance: so likewise is a body. Apparently therefore no one being can be made of a subsistent intelligence and a body.

Arg. 2. Form and matter are contained under the same genus: for every genus is divided into actual and potential. But a subsistent intelligence and a body are of different genera.

Arg. 3. All that is in matter must be material. But if subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, the being of such intelligence must be in matter: for there is no being of the form beyond the being of the matter. It follows that a subsistent intelligence could not be immaterial, as supposed.

Arg. 4. It is impossible for anything having its being in a body to be apart from the body. But intelligence is shown to be apart from the body, as it is neither the body itself nor a bodily faculty.

Arg. 5. Whatever has being in common with the body, must also have activity in common with the body: for the active power of a thing cannot be more exalted than its essence. But if a subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, one being must be common to it and the body: for out of form and matter there results absolute unity, which is unity in being. At that rate the activity of a subsistent intelligence, united as a form to the body, will be exerted in common with the body, and its faculty will be a bodily (or organic) faculty: positions which we regard as impossible.

(Chap. LXIX). It is not difficult to solve the objections alleged against the aforesaid union.

Reply 1. The first objection contains a false supposition: for body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made one substance actually existing: for a man's body is not the same in actuality when the soul is present as when it is absent: it is the soul that gives actual being.

Reply 2. As for the second objection, that form and matter are contained under the same genus, it is not true in the sense that both are species of one genus, but inasmuch as both are elements of the same species. Thus then a subsistent intelligence and a body, which as separate existences would be species of different genera, in their union belong to one genus as elements of the same.
Reply 3. Nor need a subsistent intelligence be a material form, notwithstanding that its existence is in matter: for though in matter, it is not immersed in matter, or wholly comprised in matter.

Reply 4. Nor yet does the union of a subsistent intelligence with a body by its being that body's form stand in the way of intelligence being separable from body. In a soul we have to observe as well its essence as also its power. In point of essence it gives being to such and such a body, while in point of power it executes its own proper acts. In any activity of the soul therefore which is completed by a bodily organ, the power of the soul which is the principle of that activity must bring to act that part of the body whereby its activity is completed, as sight brings the eye to act. But in any activity of the soul that we may suppose not to be completed by any bodily organ, the corresponding power will not bring anything in the body to act; and this is the sense in which the intellect is said to be 'separate,' -- not but that the substance of the soul, whereof intellect is a power, or the intellectual soul, brings the body to act, inasmuch as it is the form which gives being to such body.

Reply 5. Nor is it necessary, as was argued in the fifth place, that if the soul in its substance is the form of the body, its every operation should be through the body, and thus its every faculty should be the actuation of some part of the body: for the human soul is not one of those forms which are entirely immersed in matter, but of all forms it is the most exalted above matter: hence it is capable of a certain activity without the body, being not dependent on the body in its action, as neither in its being is it dependent on the body.

2.57 Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body

Moved by these and the like objections, some have said that no subsistent intelligence can possibly be the form of a body. But because the nature of man of itself seemed to give the lie to this statement, inasmuch as man is seen to be composed of an intellectual soul and a body, they have thought out various ways to save the nature of man and adjust their theory to fact. Plato therefore and his followers laid it down that the intellectual soul is not united with the body as form with matter, but only as the mover is with the moved, saying that the soul is in the body as a sailor in his boat: thus the union of soul and body would be virtual contact only, of which above (Chap. LVI). But as such contact does not produce absolute oneness, this statement leads to the awkward consequence that man is not absolutely one, nor absolutely a being at all, but is a being only accidentally. To escape this conclusion, Plato laid it down that man is not a compound of soul and body, but that the soul using the body is man. This position is shown to be impossible: for things different in being cannot have one and the same activity. I call an activity one and the same, not in respect to the effect to which the activity is terminated, but as it comes forth from the agent. It is true that many men towing a boat make one action in respect of the thing done, which is one; but still on the part of the men towing there are many actions, as there are many different strains and exertions to haul the boat along: for as action is consequent upon form and power, it follows that where there are different forms and powers there must also be different actions. Now though the soul has a certain proper motion of its own, which it performs independently of the body, namely, the act of understanding, there are however other activities common to soul and body, namely, those of fear, anger, sensation, and the like; for these only come about by some change wrought in some definite part of the body; hence evidently they are conjoint activities of soul and body. Therefore out of soul and body there must result one being, and the two cannot be distinct in being.
But this reasoning may be met by the following reply on behalf of Plato's view. There is no difficulty, it will be said, in mover and moved having the same act, notwithstanding their difference in being: for motion is at once the act of the moving force, from which it is, and the act of the thing moved, in which it is. Thus then, on Plato's theory, the aforesaid activities may be common to soul and body, belonging to the soul as the moving force, and to the body as the thing moved. But this explanation cannot hold for the following reasons.

As the Philosopher proves (De Anima, II), sensation results by the sentient subject being moved or impressed by external sensible things: hence a man cannot have a sensation without some external sensible thing, as nothing can be moved without a mover. The sensory organ therefore is moved and impressed in sensation, but that is by the external sensible object. What receives the impression is the sense, as is evident from this, that senseless things do not receive any such manner of impression from sensible objects. The sense therefore is the passive power of the sensory organ. The sentient soul therefore in sensation does not play the part of mover and agent, but is that principle in the subject impressed, in virtue of which the said subject lies open to the impression. But such a principle cannot be different in being from the subject impressed. Therefore the sentient soul is not different in being from the animated body.

Though motion is the common act of moving force and object moved, still it is one activity to impart motion and another to receive motion: hence the two several categories of action and passion. If then in sensation the sentient soul stands for the agent, and the body for the patient, there will be one activity of the soul and another of the body. The sentient soul therefore will have an activity and proper motion of its own: it will have therefore its own subsistence: therefore, when the body perishes, it will not cease to be. Thus sentient souls, even of irrational animals, will be immortal; which seems improbable, although it is not out of keeping with Plato's opinion. But this will be matter of enquiry further on (Chap. LXXXII).

A body moved does not take its species according to the power that moves it. If therefore the soul is only united to the body as mover to moved, the body and its parts do not take their species from the soul: therefore, when the soul departs, the body and the parts thereof will remain of the same species. But this is manifestly false: for flesh and bone and hands and such parts, after the departure of the soul, do not retain their own names except by a façon de parler; since none of these parts retains its proper activity, and activity follows species. Therefore the union of soul and body is not that of mover with moved, or of a man with his dress.

If the soul is united with the body only as mover with moved, it will be in the power of the soul to go out of the body when it wishes, and, when it wishes, to re-unite itself with the body. That the soul is united with the body as the proper form of the same, is thus proved. That whereby a thing emerges from potential to actual being, is its form and actuality. But by the soul the body emerges from potentiality to actuality: for the being of a living thing is its life: moreover the seed before animation is only potentially alive, and by the soul it is made actually alive: the soul therefore is the form of the animated body. Again: as part is to part, so is the whole sentient soul to the whole body. But sight is the form and actuality of the eye: therefore the soul is the form and actuality of the body.

2.58 That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls
Plato lays it down that not one and the same soul is in us at once intelligent, sentient, and vegetative. In this view, granted that the sentient soul is the form of the body, it does not follow that any subsistent intelligence can be the form of a body. The untenableness of this position is thus to be shown.

Attributes of the same subject representing different forms are predicated of one another accidentally: thus 'white' is said to be 'musical' accidentally, inasmuch as whiteness and music happen both to be in Socrates. If then the intelligent, sentient, and vegetative soul are different powers or forms in us, then the attributes that we have according to these forms will be predicated of one another accidentally. But according to the intelligent soul we are called 'men,' according to the sentient 'animals,' according to the vegetative 'living.' This then will be an accidental predication, 'man is an animal,' or 'an animal is a living creature.' But on the contrary these are cases of essential predication: for man, as man, is an animal; and an animal, as an animal, is a living creature. Therefore it is from the same principle that one is man, animal, and alive.

A thing has unity from the same principle whence it has being, for unity is consequent upon being. Since then everything has being from its form, it will have unity also from its form. If therefore there are posited in man several souls, as so many forms, man will not be one being but several. Nor will the order of the forms to one another, one ensuing upon the other, suffice for the unity of man: for unity in point of orderly succession is not absolute unity: such unity of order in fact is the loosest of unities.

If man, as Plato held, is not a compound of soul and body, but is a soul using a body; either this is understood of the intelligent soul, or of the three souls, if there are three, or of two of them. If of three, or two, it follows that man is not one, but two, or three: for he is three souls, or at least two. But if this is understood of the intelligent soul alone, so that the sentient soul is to be taken for the form of the body, and the intelligent soul, using the animate and sentient body, is to be man, there will still ensue awkward consequences, to wit, that man is not an animal, but uses an animal; and that man does not feel, but uses a thing that does feel.

Of two or three there cannot be made one without anything to unite them, unless one of them stands to the other as actuality to potentiality: for so of matter and form there is made one without any external bond to bind them together. But if in man there are several souls, they do not stand to one another as matter and form, but they are all supposed to be actualities and principles of action. If then they are to be united to make one man, or one animal, there must be something to unite them. This cannot be the body, since rather the body is made one by the soul: the proof of which fact is that, when the soul departs, the body breaks up. It must be some more formal principle that makes of those several entities one; and this will be rather the soul than those several entities which are united by it. If this again has several parts, and is not one in itself, there must further be something to unite those parts. As we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come to something which is in itself one; and this of all things is the soul. There must therefore in one man, or one animal, be one only soul.

2.59 That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter

There were others who used another invention in maintaining the point, that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body as its form. They say that the intellect which Aristotle
calls 'potential,' is a spiritual being, subsisting apart by itself, and not united with us as a form. And this they endeavor to prove from the words of Aristotle, who says, speaking of this intellect, that it is "separate, unmixed with body, simple and impassible," terms which could not be applied to it, they say, if it were the form of a body. Also from the argument by which Aristotle proves that because the potential intellect receives all impressions of sensible things, and is in potentiality to them all, it must be devoid of all to begin with, as the pupil of the eye, which receives all impressions of colors, is devoid of all color; because if it had of itself any color, that color would prevent other colors from being seen; nay, nothing would be seen except under that color; and the like would be the case of the potential intellect, if it had of itself any form or nature of sensible things, as it would have were it the form of any body; because, since form and matter make one, the form must participate to some extent in the nature of that whereof it is the form. These passages moved Averroes to suppose the potential intellect, whereby the soul understands, to be separate in being from the body, and not to be the form of the body. But because this intellect would have no connection with us, nor should we be able to understand by it unless it were somehow united with us, Averroes fixes upon a mode in which it is united with us, as he thinks, sufficiently. He says that an impression actually made in the understanding is a 'form' of the potential intellect, in the same way that an actually visible appearance, as such, is a 'form' of the visual faculty; hence out of the potential intellect, and this form or impression actually made in the same, there results one being. With whatever being therefore this 'form' of the understanding is conjoined, the potential intellect is also conjoined with that being. But this 'form' is conjoined with us by means of the 'phantasm,' or image in the fantasy, which image is a sort of subject receiving in itself that 'form' of understanding.

It is easy to see how frivolous and impossible all this construction is. For what has understanding is intelligent; and that of which an intelligible impression is united with the understanding, is understood. The fact that an intelligible impression, united with a (foreign) understanding, comes somehow to be in man, will not render man intelligent; it will merely make him understood by that separately subsisting intelligence.

Besides, the impression actually in understanding is the form of the potential intellect, in the same way that the actual visible appearance is the form of the visual power, or eye. But the impression actually in understanding is to the phantasms as the actual visible appearance is to the colored surface, which is outside the soul. This similitude is used by Averroes, as also by Aristotle. Therefore the supposed union of the potential intellect (by means of the intelligible form) with the phantasm that is in us will resemble the union of the visual power with the color that is in the stone. But this union does not make the stone see, but be seen. Therefore the aforesaid union does not make us understand, but be understood. But, plainly, it is properly and truly said that man understands: for we should not be investigating the nature of understanding were it not for the fact that we have understanding. The above mode of union then is insufficient.

The intellect in the act of understanding and the object as represented in understanding are one, as also the sense in the act of sensation and the object as represented in sense. But the understanding as apt to understand and its object as open to representation in understanding are not one, as neither is sense, so far as it is apt to have sensation, one with its object, so far as that is open to be represented in sensation. The impression made by the object, so far as it lies in images of the fantasy, is not any representation in the understanding. Only by undergoing a process of abstraction from such images does the impression become one with the intellect in the
act of understanding. In like manner the impression of color is actually felt in sense, not as it is in
the stone, but as it is in the eye. Now, on the theory of Averroes, the intelligible form, or
impression in the understanding, only comes to be conjoined with us by finding place in the
images of our fantasy. Therefore it is not conjoined with us inasmuch as it is one with the
potential intellect, being its form. Therefore it cannot be the medium whereby the potential
intellect is conjoined with us: because, in so far as it is conjoined with the potential intellect, it is
not conjoined with us; and in so far as it is conjoined with us, it is not conjoined with the
potential intellect.

2.60 That Man is not a Member the Human Species by possession of Passive Intellect,
but by possession of Potential Intellect

Averroes endeavors to meet these arguments and to maintain the position aforesaid. He says
accordingly that man differs from dumb animals by what Aristotle calls the 'passive intellect,'
which is that 'cogitative power' (vis cogitativa) proper to man, in place whereof other animals
have a certain 'estimative power' (aestimativa). The function of this 'cogitative power' is to
distinguish individual ideas and compare them with one another, as the intellect, which is
separate and unmixed, compares and distinguishes between universal ideas. And because by this
cogitative power, along with imagination and memory, phantasms, or impressions of fantasy, are
prepared to receive the action of the 'active intellect,' whereby they are made actual terms of
understanding, therefore the aforesaid cogitative power is called by the names of 'intellect' and
'reason.' Doctors say that it has its seat in the middle cell of the brain. According to the
disposition of this power one man differs from another in genius, and in other points of
intelligence; and by the use and exercise of this power man acquires the habit of knowledge.
Hence the passive intellect is the subject of the various habits of knowledge. And this passive
intellect is in a child from the beginning; and by virtue of it he is a member of the human species
before he actually understands anything. So far Averroes. The falsity and perverseness of his
statements evidently appears.

Vital activities stand to the soul as second actualities to the first. Now the first actuality is prior
in time to the second in the same subject, as knowledge is prior in time to learned speculation. In
whatever being therefore there is found any vital activity, there must be some portion of soul
standing to that activity as the first actuality to the second. But man has one activity proper to
him above all other animals, namely that of understanding and reasoning. Therefore we must
posit in man some proper specific principle, which shall be to the act of understanding as the first
actuality to the second. This principle cannot be the aforesaid 'passive intellect': for the principle
of the aforesaid activity must be "impassible and nowise implicated with the body," as the
Philosopher proves, whereas evidently quite the contrary is the case with the passive intellect.
Therefore that cognitive faculty called the 'passive intellect' cannot possibly be the speciality that
differentiates the human species from other animals.

2. An incident of the sensitive part cannot constitute a being in a higher kind of life than that of
the sensitive part, as an incident of the vegetative soul does not place a being in a higher kind of
life than the vegetative life. But it is certain that fantasy and the faculties consequent thereon, as
memory and the like, are incidents of the sensitive part. Therefore by the aforesaid faculties, or
by any one of them, an animal cannot be placed in any higher rank of life than that which goes
with the sentient soul. But man is in a higher rank of life than that. Therefore the man does not
live the life that is proper to him by virtue of the aforesaid 'cogitative faculty,' or 'passive intellect.'

The 'potential intellect' is proved not to be the actualization of any corporeal organ from this consideration, that the said intellect takes cognizance of all sensible forms under a universal aspect. Therefore no faculty, the activity of which can reach to the universal aspects of all corporeal forms, can be the actualization of any corporeal organ. But such a faculty is the will: for of all of the things that we understand we can have a will, at least of knowing them. And we also find acts of the will in the general: thus, as Aristotle says (Rhet. II, 4), we hate in general the whole race of robbers. The will then cannot be the actualization of any bodily organ. But every portion of the soul is the actualization of some bodily organ, except only the intellect properly so called. The will therefore belongs to the intellectual part, as Aristotle says. Now the will of man is not extrinsic to man, planted as it were in some separately subsisting intelligence, but is in the man himself: otherwise he would not be master of his own acts, but would be worked by the will of a spirit other than himself: those appetitive, or conative, faculties alone would remain in him, the activity whereof is conjoined with passion, to wit the irascible and concupiscible in the sentient part of his being, as in other animals, which are rather acted upon than act. But this is impossible: it would be the undoing of all moral philosophy and all social and political science. Therefore there must be in us a potential intellect to differentiate us from dumb animals: the passive intellect is not enough.

A habit and the act proper to that habit both reside in the same faculty. But to view a thing intellectually, which is the act proper to the habit of knowledge, cannot be an exercise of the faculty called 'passive intellect,' but must properly belong to the potential intellect: for the condition of any faculty exercising intelligence is that it should not be an actualization of any corporeal organ. Therefore the habit of knowledge is not in the passive intellect, but in the potential intellect.

Habitual understanding, as our opponent acknowledges, is an effect of the 'active intellect.' But the effects of the active intellect are actual representations in understanding, the proper recipient of which is the potential intellect, to which the active intellect stands related, as Aristotle says, "as art to material." Therefore the habitual understanding, which is the habit of knowledge, must be in the potential intellect, not in the passive.

2.61 That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle

Aristotle defines soul, "the first actuality of a natural, organic body, potentially alive"; and adds, "this definition applies universally to every soul." Nor does he, as the aforesaid Averroes pretends, put forth this latter remark in a tentative way, as may be seen from the Greek copies and the translation of Boethius. Afterwards in the same chapter he adds that there are "certain parts of the soul separable," and these are none other than the intellectual parts. The conclusion remains that the said parts are actualizations of the body.

Nor is this explanation inconsistent with Aristotle's words subjoined: "About the intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not yet clear: but it seems to be another kind of soul." He does not hereby mean to separate the intellect from the common definition of 'soul,' but from the peculiar natures of the other parts of soul: as one who says that fowls are a different sort of animal from land animals, does not take away from the fowl the common definition of 'animal.' Hence, to
show in what respect he called it "another kind," he adds: "And of this alone is there possibility of separation, as of the everlasting from the perishable." Nor is it the intention of Aristotle, as the Commentator aforesaid pretends, to say that it is not yet clear whether intellect be soul at all, as it is clear of other and lower vital principles. For the old text has not, "Nothing has been declared," or "Nothing has been said," but "Nothing is clear," which is to be understood as referring to the peculiar properties of intellect, not to the general definition (of soul). But if, as the Commentator says, the word 'soul' is used not in the same sense of intellect and other varieties, Aristotle would have first distinguished the ambiguity and then made his definition, as his manner is: otherwise his argument would rest on an ambiguity, an intolerable procedure in demonstrative sciences.

Aristotle reckons 'intellect' among the 'faculties' of the soul. Also, in the passage last quoted, he names 'the speculative faculty.' Intellect therefore is not outside the human soul, but is a faculty thereof.

Also, when beginning to speak of the potential intellect, he calls it a part of the soul, saying: "Concerning the part of the soul whereby the soul has knowledge and intellectual consciousness."

And still more clearly by what follows, declaring the nature of the potential intellect: "I call intellect that whereby the soul thinks and understands": in which it is manifestly shown that the intellect is something belonging to the human soul.

The above tenet (of Averroes) therefore is contrary to the mind of Aristotle and contrary to the truth: hence it should be rejected as chimerical.

2.62 Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect

Upon consideration of these words of Aristotle, Alexander determined the potential intellect to be some power in us, that so the general definition of soul assigned by Aristotle might apply to it. But because he could not understand how any subsistent intelligence could be the form of a body, he supposed the aforesaid faculty of potential intellect not to be planted in any subsistent intelligence, but to be the result of some combination of elements in the human body. Thus a definite mode of combination of the components of the human body puts a man in potentiality to receive the influence of the active intellect, which is ever in act, and according to him, is a spiritual being subsisting apart, under which influence man becomes actually intelligent. But that in man whereby he is potentially intelligent is the potential intellect: hence it seemed to Alexander to follow that the potential intellect in us arises from a definite combination of elements. But this statement appears on first inspection to be contrary to the words and argument of Aristotle. For Aristotle shows (De anima, III, iv, 2-4) that the potential intellect is unmingled with the body: but that could not be said of a faculty that was the result of a combination of bodily elements. To meet this difficulty Alexander says that the potential intellect is precisely the 'predisposition' (praeparatio, epitêdeiotês) which exists in human nature to receive the influence of the active intellect; and that this 'predisposition' is not any definite sensible nature, nor is it mingled with the body, for it is a relation and order between one thing and another. But this is in manifest disagreement with the mind of Aristotle, as the following reasons show:

Aristotle assigns these characteristics to the potential intellect: to be impressed by the intelligible presentation, to receive intelligible impressions, to be in potentiality towards them (De anima,
III, iv, 11, 12): all which things cannot be said of any 'disposition,' but only of the subject predisposed. It is therefore contrary to the mind of Aristotle, that the mere 'predisposition' should be the potential intellect.

An effect cannot stand higher above the material order than its cause. But every cognitive faculty, as such, belongs to the immaterial order. Therefore it is impossible for any cognitive faculty to be caused by a combination of elements. But the potential intellect is the supreme cognitive faculty in us: therefore it is not caused by a combination of elements.

No bodily organ can possibly have a share in the act of understanding. But that act is attributed to the soul, or to the man: for we say that the soul understands, or the man through the soul. Therefore there must be in man some principle independent of the body, to be the principle of such an act. But any predisposition, which is the result of a combination of elements, manifestly depends on the body. Therefore no such predisposition can be a principle like the potential intellect, whereby the soul judges and understands.

But if it is said that the principle of the aforesaid operation in us is the intellectual impression actually made by the active intellect, this does not seem to suffice: because when man comes to have actual intellectual cognition from having had such cognition potentially, he needs to understand not merely by some intelligible impression actualizing his understanding, but likewise by some intellectual faculty as the principle of such activity. Besides, an impression is not in actual understanding except so far as it is purified from particular and material being. But this cannot happen so long as it remains in any material faculty, that is to say, in any faculty either caused by material principles or actualizing a material organ. Therefore there must be posited in us some immaterial intellectual faculty, and that is the potential intellect.

2.64 That the Soul is not a Harmony

The maintainers of this view did not mean that the soul is a harmony of sounds, but a harmony of contrary elements, whereof they saw living bodies to be composed. The view is rejected for the following reasons:

You may find such a harmony in any body, even a mere chemical compound (corpus mixtum). A harmony cannot move the body, or govern it, or resist the passions, as neither can a temperament. Also a harmony, and a temperament also, admits of degrees. All which considerations go to show that the soul is neither harmony nor temperament.

The notion of harmony rather befits qualities of the body than the soul: thus health is a harmony of humors; strength, of muscles and bones; beauty, of limb and color. But it is impossible to assign any components, the harmony of which would make sense, or intellect, or other appurtenances of the soul.

Harmony may mean either the composition itself or the principle of composition. Now the soul is not a composition, because then every part of the soul would be composed of certain parts of the body, an arrangement which cannot be made out. In like manner the soul is not the principle of composition, because to different parts of the body there are different principles of composition, or proportions of elements, which would require the several parts of the body to have so many several souls -- one soul for bone, one for flesh, one for sinew; which is evidently not the case.
2.65 That the Soul is not a Body

Living beings are composed of matter and form -- of a body, and of a soul which makes them actually alive. One of these components must be the form, and the other the matter. But a body cannot be a form, because a body is not in another as in its matter and subject. Therefore the soul must be the form: therefore it is not a body.

The act of understanding cannot be the act of anything corporeal. But it is an act of the soul. Therefore the intellectual soul at least is not a body.

It is easy to solve the arguments whereby some have endeavored to prove that the soul is a body. They point such facts as these, that the son resembles the father even in the accidents of his soul, being generated from the father by severance of bodily substance; and that the soul suffers with the body; and is separated from the body, separation supposing previous bodily contact. Against these instances we observe that bodily temperament is a sort of predisposing cause of affections of the soul: that the soul suffers with the body only accidentally, as being the form of the body: also that the soul is separated from the body, not as touching from touched, but as form from matter; although there is a certain contact possible between an incorporeal being and the body, as has been shown above (Chap. LVI).

Many have been moved to this position by their belief that what is not a material body has no existence, being unable to transcend the imagination, which deals only with material bodies. Hence this opinion is proposed in the person of the unwise: The breath of our nostrils is smoke, and reason a spark in the beating of the heart (Wisdom ii, 2).

2.66 Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same

SENSE is found in all animals, but animals other than man have no intellect: which is proved by this, that they do not work, like intellectual agents, in diverse and opposite ways, but just as nature moves them fixed and uniform specific activities, as every swallow builds its nest in the same way.

Sense is cognizant only of singulars, but intellect is cognizant of universals.

Sensory knowledge extends only to bodily things, but intellect takes cognizance of things incorporeal, as wisdom, truth, and the relations between objects.

No sense has reflex knowledge of itself and its own activity: the sight does not see itself, nor see that it sees. But intellect is cognizant of itself, and knows that it understands.

2.67 Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Fantasy

Fantasy is found in other animals besides man, the proof of which is that, as objects of sense recede from sense, these animals still shun or pursue them. But intellect is not in them, as no work of intelligence appears in their conduct.

Fantasy is only of things corporeal and singular; but intellect, of things universal and incorporeal. Intelligence is not the actualization of any bodily organ. But fantasy has a fixed bodily organ.
Hence it is said: *Who teacheth us above the beasts of the earth, and above the fowls of the air instructeth us* (Job xxxv, 11): whereby we are given to understand that there is in man a certain cognitive power, above the sense and fancy that are in other animals.

2.68 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body

If a subsistent intelligence is not united with a body merely as its mover, as Plato thought (Chap. LVII); nor is the intellect, whereby man understands, a predisposition in human nature, as Alexander said (Chap. LXII; nor a temperament, as Galen (Chap. LXIII); nor a harmony, as Empedocles (Chap. LXIV); nor a body, nor a sense, nor a fantasy (Chapp. LXV, LXVI, LXVII); it remains that the human soul is a subsistent intelligence, united with the body as its form: which may be thus made manifest.

There are two requisites for one thing to be the substantial form of another. One requisite is that the form be the principle of substantial being to that whereof it is the form: I do not mean the effective, but the formal principle, whereby a thing is and is denominated 'being.' The second requisite is that the form and matter should unite in one 'being'; namely, in that being wherein the substance so composed subsists. There is no such union of the effective principle with that to which it gives being. A subsistent intelligence, as shown in Chap. LVI, is not hindered by the fact that it is subsistent from communicating its being to matter, and becoming the formal principle of the said matter. There is no difficulty in the identification of the being, in virtue of which the compound subsists, with the form itself of the said compound, since the compound is only through the form, and neither subsist apart.

It may be objected that a subsistent intelligence cannot communicate its being to a material body in such a way that there shall be one being of the subsistent intelligence and the material body: for things of different kinds have different modes of being, and nobler is the being of the nobler substance. This objection would be in point, if that being were said to belong to that material thing in the same way in which it belongs to that subsistent intelligence. But it is not so: for that being belongs to that material body as to a recipient subject raised to a higher state; while it belongs to that subsistent intelligence as to its principle and by congruence of its own nature.

In this way a wonderful chain of beings is revealed to our study. The lowest member of the higher genus is always found to border close upon the highest member of the lower genus. Thus some of the lowest members of the genus of animals attain to little beyond the life of plants, certain shellfish for instance, which are motionless, have only the sense of touch, and are attached to the ground like plants. Hence Dionysius says: "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the higher to the beginnings of the lower." Thus in the genus of bodies we find the human body, composed of elements equally tempered, attaining to the lowest member of the class above it, that is, to the human soul, which holds the lowest rank in the class of subsistent intelligences. Hence the human soul is said to be on the horizon and boundary line between things corporeal and incorporeal, inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance and at the same time the form of a body.

Above other forms there is found a form, likened to the supramundane substances in point of understanding, and competent to an activity which is accomplished without any bodily organ at all; and this is the intellectual soul: for the act of understanding is not done through any bodily organ. Hence the intellectual soul cannot be totally encompassed by matter, or immersed in it, as
other material forms are: this is shown by its intellectual activity, wherein bodily matter has no
share. The fact however that the very act of understanding in the human soul needs certain
powers that work through bodily organs, namely, fantasy and sense, is a clear proof that the said
soul is naturally united to the body to make up the human species.

2.69 Solution of the Arguments alleged to show that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot
be united with a Body as the Form of that Body

The arguments wherewith Averroes endeavors to establish his opinion do not prove that the
subsistent intelligence is not united with the body as the form of the same.

The words of Aristotle about the potential intellect, that it is "impassible, unmixed, and
separate," do not necessitate the admission that the intellectual substance is not united with the
body as its form, giving it being. They are sufficiently verified by saying that the intellectual
faculty, which Aristotle calls the 'speculative faculty,' is not the actualization of any organ, as
exercising its activity through that organ.

Supposing the substance of the soul to be united in being with the body as the form of the body,
while still the intellect is not the actualization of any organ, it does not follow that intellect falls
under the law of physical determination, as do sensible and material things: for we do not
suppose intellect to be a harmony, or function (ratio, logos) of any organ, as Aristotle says that
sense is.

That Aristotle is saying that the intellect is 'unmingled,' or 'separate,' does not intend to exclude it
from being a part, or faculty, of the soul, which soul is the form of the whole body, is evident
from this passage, where he is arguing against those who said that there were different parts of
the soul in different parts of the body: "If the whole soul keeps together the body as a whole, it is
fitting that each part of the soul should keep together some part of the body: but this looks like an
impossibility: for it is difficult even to imagine what part of the body the intellect shall keep
together, or how."

2.73 That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men

Hence it is plainly shown that there is not one and the same potential intellect, belonging to all
men who are and who shall be and who have been, as Averroes pretends.

A.1. It has been shown that the substance of the intellect is united with the human body and is its
form (Chap. LVII). But it is impossible for there to be one form otherwise than of one matter.
Therefore there is not one intellect for all men.

A.2 and 3. It is not possible for a dog's soul to enter a wolf's body, or a man's soul any other body
than the body of a man. But the same proportion that holds between a man's soul and a man's
body, holds between the soul of this man and the body of this man. It is impossible therefore for
the soul of this man to enter any other body than the body of this man. But it is by the soul of this
man that this man understands. Therefore there is not one and the same intellect of this man and
of that.

A.4. A thing has being from that source from whence it has unity: for one and being are
inseparable. But everything has being by its own form. Therefore the unity of the thing follows
the unity of the form. It is impossible therefore for there to be one form of different individual men. But the form of any individual man is his intellectual soul. It is impossible therefore for there to be one intellect of all men.

But if it is said that the sentient soul of this man is other than the sentient soul of that, and so far forth the two are not one man, though there be one intellect of both, such explanation cannot stand. For the proper activity of every being follows upon and is indicative of its species. But as the proper activity of an animal is to feel, so the proper activity of a man is to understand. As any given individual is an animal in that he has feeling, so is he a man by virtue of the faculty whereby he understands. But the faculty whereby the soul understands, or the man through the soul, is the potential intellect. This individual then is a man by the potential intellect. If then this man has another sentient soul than another man, but not another potential intellect, but one and the same, it follows that they are two animals, but not two men.

B. To these arguments the Commentator replies by saying that the potential intellect is conjoined with us through its own form, namely, through an intelligible impression, one subject of which [is the said potential intellect, and one subject again] is the phantasm existing in us, which differs in different men; and thus the potential intellect is multiplied in different men, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form.

The nullity of this reply appears by what has been shown above (Chap. LIX), that it would be impossible for any man to have understanding, if this were the only way in which the potential intellect were conjoined with us. But suppose that the aforesaid conjunction (continuatio) were sufficient to render man intelligent, still the said answer does not solve the arguments already alleged.

B.1. According to the above exposition, nothing belonging to intellect will remain multiplied as men are multiplied except only the phantasm, or impression in fantasy; and this very phantasm will not be multiplied as it is actually understood, because, as so understood, it is in the potential intellect, and has undergone abstraction of material conditions under the operation of the active intellect; whereas the phantasm, as a potential term of intelligence, does not transcend the grade of the sentient soul.

B.2. Still the objection holds, that this man will not be differentiated from that except by the sentient soul; and the awkward consequence follows that this man and that together do not make a plurality of men.

B.3. Nothing attains its species by what it is potentially, but by what it is actually. But the impression in fantasy, as multiplied in this man and that, has only a potentially intelligible being. Therefore that impression, as so multiplied, does not put any given individual in the species of 'intelligent animal,' which is the definition of 'man.' Thus it remains true that the specific ratio of 'man' is not multiplied in individual men.

B.4. It is the first and not the second perfection that gives the species to every living thing. But the impression in fantasy is a second perfection; and therefore not from that multiplied impression has man his species.

B.6. That which puts a man in the species of man must be something abiding in the same individual as long as he remains: otherwise the individual would not be always of one and the
same species, but now of one species and now of another. But the impressions of fantasy do not remain always the same in the same man; but new impressions come, and previous impressions perish. Therefore the individual man does not attain his species by any such impression: nor is it anything in the fantasy that conjoins him with the formal principle of his species, which is the potential intellect.

C. But if it is said that the individual does not receive his species by the phantasms themselves, but by the faculties in which the phantasms are, namely, the fantasy, the memory, and the vis cogitativa which is proper to man, and which in the De anima, III, v, Aristotle calls the 'passive intellect,' the same awkward consequences still follow.

C.1. Since the vis cogitativa operates only upon particulars, the impressions of which it puts apart and puts together; and further, since it has a bodily organ through which it acts, it does not transcend the rank of the sentient soul. But in virtue of his sentient soul, as such, man is not a man, but an animal. It still therefore remains true that the element, supposed to be multiplied in us, belongs to man only in his animal capacity.

C.2. The cogitative faculty, since it acts through an organ, is not the faculty whereby we understand. But the principle whereby we understand is the principle whereby man is man. Therefore no individual is man by virtue of the cogitative faculty: nor does man by that faculty essentially differ from dumb animals, as the Commentator pretends.

C.3. The cogitative faculty is united to the potential intellect, the principle of human intelligence, only by its action of preparing phantasms for the active intellect to render them actual terms of intelligence and perfections of the potential intellect. But this preliminary activity of the cogitative faculty does not always remain the same in us. Therefore it cannot be the means whereby man is conjoined with the specific principle of the human species, or made a member of that species.

C.4. If the potential intellect of this and that man were numerically one and the same, the act of understanding would be one and the same in both which is an impossibility.

D. But if it is said that the act of understanding is multiplied according to the diversity of impressions in fantasy, that supposition cannot stand.

D.3. For the potential intellect understands a man, not as this individual man, but as man simply, according to the specific essence of the race. But this specific essence remains one, however much impressions in fantasy arc multiplied, whether in the same man or in different men. Therefore no multiplication of phantasms can be the cause of multiplication of the act of understanding in the potential intellect, considering the same species; and thus we shall still have numerically one action in different men.

D.4. The proper subject in which the habit of knowledge resides is the potential intellect. But an accident, so long as it remains specifically one, is multiplied only by coming to reside in different subjects. If then the potential intellect is one in all men, any habit of knowledge specifically the same, say, the habit of grammar, must be numerically the same in all men, which is unthinkable.
E. But to this they say that the subject of the habit of knowledge is not the potential intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative faculty (Chap. LX): which it cannot be.

E.1. For, as Aristotle shows in the *Ethics* (II, i), like acts engender like habits; and like habits reproduce like acts. Now by the acts of the potential intellect there comes to be the habit of knowledge in us; and we are competent for the same acts by possession of the habit of knowledge. Therefore the habit of knowledge is in the potential intellect, not in the passive.

E.2. Scientific knowledge is of demonstrated conclusions; and demonstrated conclusions, like their premises, are universal truths. Science therefore is in that faculty which takes cognizance of universals. But the passive intellect is not cognizant of universals, but of particular notions.

F. The error of placing the habit of scientific knowledge in the passive intellect seems to have arisen from the observation that men are found more or less apt for the study of science according to the several dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the fantasy.

F.1. But this aptitude depends on those faculties only as remote conditions: so it also depends on the complexion of the body, as Aristotle says that men of delicate touch and soft flesh are clever. But the proximate principle of the act of speculative understanding is the habit of scientific knowledge: for this habit must perfect the power of understanding to act readily at will, as other habits perfect the powers in which they are.

F.2. The dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the fantasy regard the object: they regard the phantasm, which is prepared by the efficiency of these faculties readily to become a term of actual understanding under the action of the active intellect. But habits do not condition objects: they condition faculties. Thus conditions that take the edge off terrors are not the habit of fortitude: fortitude is a disposition of the conative part of the soul to meet terrors. Hence it appears that the habit of knowledge is not in the passive but in the potential intellect.

F.3. If the potential intellect of all men is one, we must suppose that the potential intellect has always existed, if men have always existed, as Averroists suppose; and much more the active intellect, because agent is more honorable than patient, as Aristotle says (*De anima*, III, v). But if the agent is eternal, and the recipient eternal, the contents received must be eternal also. Therefore the intellectual impressions have been from eternity in the potential intellect: therefore it will be impossible for it to receive afresh any new intellectual impressions. But the only use of sense and fantasy in the process of understanding is that intellectual impressions may be gathered from them. At this rate then neither sense nor fantasy will be needed for understanding; and we come back to the opinion of Plato, that we do not acquire knowledge by the senses, but are merely roused by them to remember what we knew before.

G. But to this the Commentator replies that intellectual presentations reside in a twofold subject: in one subject, from which they have everlasting being, namely, the potential intellect; in another subject, from which they have a recurring new existence, namely, the phantasm, or impression in fantasy. He illustrates this by the comparison of a sight-presentation, which has also a twofold subject, the one subject being the thing outside the soul, the other the visual faculty. But this answer cannot stand.

G.1. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of the eternal should depend on anything temporal. But phantasms are temporal things, continually springing up afresh in us from the
experience of the senses. Therefore the intellectual impressions, whereby the potential intellect is actuated and brought to activity, cannot possibly depend on phantasms in the way that visual impressions depend on things outside the soul.

G.2. Nothing receives what it has already got. But before any sensory experience of mine or yours there were intellectual impressions in the potential intellect: for the generations before us could not have understood had not the potential intellect been reduced to act by intellectual impressions. Nor can it be said that those impressions, formerly received in the potential intellect, have ceased to be: because the potential intellect not only receives, but keeps what it receives: hence it is called the "place of ideas." Therefore, on this showing, no impressions from our phantasms are received in the potential intellect.

G.6 and 7. If the potential intellect receives no intellectual impressions from the phantasms that are in us, because it has already received them from the phantasms of those who were before us, then for the like reason we must say that it receives impressions from the phantasms of no generation of men, whom another generation has preceded. But every generation has been preceded by some previous generation, if the world and human society is eternal, as Averroists suppose. Therefore the potential intellect never receives any impressions from phantasms; and from this it seems to follow that the potential intellect has no need of phantasms to understand. But we (nos) understand by the potential intellect. Therefore neither shall we need sense and phantasm for our understanding: which is manifestly false and contrary to the opinion of Aristotle.

For the potential intellect, like every other substance, operates according to the mode of its nature. Now according to its nature it is the form of the body. Hence it understands immaterial things, but views them in some material medium; as is shown by the fact that in teaching universal truths particular examples are alleged, in which what is said may be seen. Therefore the need which the potential intellect has of the phantasm before receiving the intellectual impression is different from that which it has after the impression has been received. Before reception, it needs the phantasm to gather from it the intellectual impression, so that the phantasm then stands to the potential intellect as an object which moves it. But after receiving the impression, of which the phantasm is the vehicle, it needs the phantasm as an instrument or basis of the impression received. Thus by command of the intellect there is formed in the fantasy a phantasm answering to such and such an intellectual impression; and in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.

G.8. If the potential intellect is one for all men and eternal, by this time there must have been received in it the intellectual impressions of all things that have been known by any men whatsoever. Then, as every one of us understands by the potential intellect -- nay, as the act of understanding in each is the act of that potential intellect understanding -- every one of us must understand all that has been understood by any other men whatsoever.

H. To this the Commentator replies that we do not understand by the potential intellect except in so far as it is conjoined with us through the impressions in our fantasy, and that these phantasms are not the same nor similar amongst all men. And this answer seems to be in accordance with the doctrine that has gone before: for, apart from any affirmation of the unity of the potential intellect, it is true that we do not understand those things, the impressions whereof are in the
potential intellect, unless the appropriate phantasms are at hand. But that this answer does not altogether escape the difficulty, may be thus shown.

When the potential intellect has been actualized by the reception of an intellectual impression, it is competent to act of itself: hence we see that, once we have got the knowledge of a thing, it is in our power to consider it again when we wish: nor are we at a loss for lack of phantasms, because it is in our power to form phantasms suitable to the consideration which we wish, unless there happens to be some impediment on the part of the organ, as in persons out of their mind or in a comatose state. But if in the potential intellect there are intellectual impressions of all branches of knowledge -- as we must say, if that intellect is one and eternal -- then the necessity of phantasms for the potential intellect will be the same as in his case who already has knowledge, and wishes to study and consider some point of that knowledge, for that also he could not do without phantasms. Since then every man understands by the potential intellect so far as it is reduced to act by intellectual impressions, so every man should be able on this theory to regard, whenever he would, all the known points of all sciences: which is manifestly false, for at that rate no one would need a teacher. Therefore the potential intellect is not one and eternal.

2.74 Of the Opinion of Avicenna, who supposed Intellectual Forms not to be preserved in the Potential Intellect

The above arguments against Averroes seem to be obviated by the theory of Avicenna. He says that intellectual impressions do not remain in the potential intellect except just so long as they are being actually understood. And this he endeavors to prove from the fact that forms are actually apprehended so long as they remain in the faculty that apprehends them: thus in the act of perception both sense and intellect become identified with their objects: hence it seems that whenever sense or intellect is united with its object, as having taken its form, actual apprehension, sensible or intellectual, occurs. But the faculties which preserve forms which not actually apprehended, he says, are not the faculties that apprehend those forms, but storehouses (thesauros) attached to the said apprehensive faculties. Thus fantasy is the storehouse of forms apprehended by sense; and memory, according to him, is the storehouse of notions apprehended independently of sensation, as when the sheep apprehends the hostility of the wolf. The capacity of these faculties for storing up forms not actually apprehended comes from their having certain bodily organs in which the forms are received, such reception following close upon the (first) apprehension; and thereby the apprehensive faculty, turning to these storehouses, apprehends in act. But it is acknowledged that the potential intellect is an apprehensive faculty, and has no bodily organ: hence Avicenna concludes that it is impossible for intellectual impressions to be preserved in the potential intellect except so long as it is actually understanding. Therefore, one of three things: either

(i) these intellectual impressions must be preserved in some bodily organ, or faculty having a bodily organ: or
(ii) they must be self-existent intelligible forms, to which our potential intellect stands in the relation of a mirror to the objects mirrored: or
(iii) whenever the potential intellect understands, these intellectual impressions must flow into it afresh from some separate agent.

The first of these three suppositions is impossible: because forms existing in faculties that use
bodily organs are only potentially intelligible. The second supposition is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle rejects. Hence Avicenna concludes that, whenever we actually understand, there flow into our potential intellect intellectual impressions from the active intellect, which he assumes to be an intelligence subsisting apart. If any one objects against him that then there is no difference between a man when he first learns, and when he wishes to review and study again something which he has learnt before, he replies that to learn and con over again what we know is nothing else than to acquire a perfect habit of uniting ourselves with the (extrinsic) active intelligence, so as to receive therefrom the intellectual form; and therefore, before we come to reflect on and use our knowledge, there is in man a bare potentiality of such reception, but reflection on our knowledge is like potentiality reduced to act. And this view seems consonant with what Aristotle teaches, that memory is not in the intellectual but in the sensitive part of the soul. So it seems that the preservation of intellectual impressions does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. But on careful consideration this theory will be found ultimately to differ little or nothing from the theory of Plato. Plato supposed forms of intellect to be separately existing substances, whence knowledge flowed in upon our souls: Avicenna supposes one separate substance, the active intellect, to be the source when knowledge flows in upon our souls. Now it makes no matter for the acquirement of knowledge whether our knowledge is caused by one separate substance or by several. Either way it will follow that our knowledge is not caused by sensible things: the contrary of which conclusion appears from the fact that any one wanting in any one sense is wanting in acquaintance with the sensible objects of which that sense takes cognizance.

It is a novelty to say that the potential intellect, viewing the impressions made by singular things in the fantasy, is lit up by the light of the active intellect to know the universal; and that the action of the lower faculties, fantasy, memory, and cogitative faculty, fit and prepare the soul to receive the emanation of the active intellect. This, I say, is novel and strange doctrine: for we see that our soul is better disposed to receive impressions from intelligences subsisting apart, the further it is removed from bodily and sensible things: the higher is attained by receding from the lower. It is not therefore likely that any regarding of bodily phantasms should dispose our soul to receive the influence of an intelligence subsisting apart. Plato made a better study of the basis of his position: for he supposed that sensible appearances do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separately subsisting forms, but merely rouse the intellect to consider knowledge that has been already caused in it by an external principle: for he supposed that from the beginning knowledge of all things intellectually knowable was caused in our souls by separately existing forms, or ideas: hence learning, he said, was nothing else than recollecting.

Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory. If therefore in sensory knowledge there is some power of preserving apprehensions, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge.

This opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who says that the potential intellect is "the place of ideas": which is tantamount to saying that it is a "storehouse" of intellectual impressions, to use Avicenna's own phrase.

The arguments to the contrary are easily solved. For the potential intellect is perfectly actuated about intellectual impressions when it is actually considering them: when it is not actually considering them, it is not perfectly actuated about them, but is in a condition intermediate between potentiality and actuality. As for memory, that is located in the sentient part of the soul,
because the objects of memory fall under a definite time for there is no memory but of the past; and therefore, since there is no abstraction of its object from individualizing conditions, memory does not belong to the intellectual side of our nature, which deals with universals. This however does not bar the potential intellect's preservation of intellectual impressions, which are abstracted from all particular conditions.

2.75 Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect

Arg. 1. Apparently, every form that is specifically one and numerically multiplied, is individualized by its matter: for things specifically one and numerically many agree in form, and are distinguished according to matter. If then the potential intellect is multiplied according to number in different men, while it remains one in species, it must be multiplied in this and that man by matter -- by the matter which is that man's body the form of which it is supposed to be. But every form, individualized by matter which it actuates, is a material form: for the being of everything must depend on that on which its individuation depends: for as general constituents are of the essence of the species, so individualizing constituents are of the essence of this individual. It follows therefore that the potential intellect is a material form, and consequently that it does not receive any thing, nor do anything, except through a bodily organ: which is contrary to the nature of the potential intellect.

Reply. We confess that the potential intellect is specifically one in different men, and many according to number -- waiving the point that the constituents of man are not put into genus and species for what they are in themselves, but for what they are as constituents of the whole. Still it does not follow that the potential intellect is a material form, dependent for its being on the body. For as it is specifically proper to the human soul to be united to a certain species of body, so any individual soul differs from any other individual soul, in number only, inasmuch as it is referable to numerically another body. Thus then human souls -- and consequently the potential intellect, which is a faculty of the human soul -- are individualized according to bodies, not that the individuation is caused by the bodies.

Arg. 2. If the potential intellect were different in this man and that, the impression understood would have to be numerically different in this man, while remaining one in species: for since the proper subject of impressions actually understood is the potential intellect, when that intellect is multiplied there must be a corresponding multiplication of intellectual impressions according to the number of different individuals. But the only impressions or forms which are the same in species and different in number, are individual forms, which cannot be intellectual forms, because objects of intellect are universal, not particular. It is impossible therefore for the potential intellect to be multiplied in different individual men.

Reply. This second argument fails from neglecting to distinguish between that whereby (quo) we understand, and that which (quod) we understand. The impression received in the potential intellect is not to be taken for that which is understood. For as all arts and sciences have for their object-matter things which are understood, it would follow that the subject-matter of all sciences was impressions on the potential intellect: which is manifestly false, for no science has anything to say to such mental impressions except psychology and metaphysics: though it is true that through those mental impressions there is known the whole content of all the sciences. Therefore, in the process of understanding, the intellectual impression received in the potential
intellect is that *whereby* we understand, as the impression of color in the eye is not that *which* is seen, but that *whereby* we see. On the other hand, that *which* is understood is the nature (*ratio*) of things existing outside the soul, as also it is things existing outside the soul that are seen with the bodily sight: for to this end were arts and sciences invented, that things might be known in their natures (*naturis*).

Still it does not follow that, if sciences are of universal truths, universals should subsist by themselves outside the soul, as Plato supposed. For though for the truth of knowledge it is necessary that the knowledge should answer to the thing, still it is not necessary that the mode of the knowledge and the mode of the thing should be the same: for properties that are united in the thing are sometimes known separately. Thus one and the same thing is white and sweet: still sight takes cognizance only of the whiteness, and taste only of the sweetness. Thus again intellect understands a line drawn in sensible matter apart from that sensible matter, though it might understand it also along with the sensible matter. This difference arises according to the diversity of intellectual impressions received in the intellect, which some times are the likeness of quantity only, sometimes of a sensible quantitative substance. In like manner also, though the nature of genus and species never exists except in concrete individuals, still the intellect understands the nature of genus and species without understanding the individualizing elements; and this is the meaning of understanding universals. And so these two positions are reconciled, that universals have no subsistence outside the soul; and yet that the intellect, understanding universals, understands things which are outside the soul.

The fact of the intellect understanding the nature of genus and species stripped of its individualizing elements, arises from the condition of the intellectual impression received in understanding, which impression is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter and materializing conditions whereby a thing is individualized. And therefore the sentient faculties can take no cognizance of universals, since they cannot receive an immaterial form, seeing that they receive always in a bodily organ.

It is not therefore necessary that the intellectual impression of this and that intelligence should be numerically one: for it would follow thereupon that the act of understanding in them both was also numerically one, since activity follows form, which is the principle of species: but it is necessary, to the end that one object should be understood by both minds, that there should be a like impression of one and the same object in them both. And this is possible enough, although the intellectual impressions differ in number: for there is no difficulty in having different images of one thing; hence the contingency of one than being seen by several persons. There is nothing inconsistent then with the universalizing knowledge of the understanding in their being different intellectual impressions in different minds. Nor need it ensue, because these intellectual impressions are many in number and the same in species, that they are not actual but only potential terms of understanding, as is the case with other individual things. Mere individuality is not inconsistent with intelligibility: for we must admit the potential and active intellects themselves, if we may suppose the two to subsist apart, united to no body, but subsistent by themselves, to be individual beings and still intelligible. What is inconsistent with intelligibility is materiality: as is shown by this consideration, that for the forms of material things to become actually intelligible, abstraction has to be made from the particular matter in which they are lodged; and therefore in cases in which individuation is due to particular matter involving particular dimensions, the things so individualized are not actually intelligible. But where
individuation is not due to matter, such individual things may without difficulty be actually intelligible. Now intellectual impressions, like all other forms, are individualized by their subject, which is the potential intellect; and since the potential intellect is not material, it does not stand in the way of the actual intelligibility of the impressions individualized by it.

But though we have said that the intellectual impression, received in the potential intellect, is not that which is understood, but that whereby we understand, still it remains true that by reflection the intellect understands itself and its own intellectual act and the impression whereby it understands. Its own intellectual act it understands in two ways -- in one way, in particular, for it understands that it is now understanding; in another way, in general, inasmuch as it reasons about the said act. And likewise it understands intellect and the impression in intellect in two ways, by remarking that itself is and has an intellectual impression, which is particular knowledge; and by studying its own nature and the nature of the intellectual impression, which is knowledge of the universal. According to this latter way we treat of intellect and of the intelligible in science.

Arg. 3. The master transfuses the knowledge which he has into the scholar. Either then the knowledge transfused is the same in number, or different in number, though the same in species. The latter alternative seems impossible: because it supposes the master to cause his own knowledge in the scholar in the same way that an agent causes its own form in another being, by generating a nature specifically like its own; which seems proper to material agents. It must be then that numerically the same knowledge is caused in the scholar that was in the master; which would be impossible, were there not one potential intellect of them both.

Reply. The saying that the knowledge in master and scholar is numerically one, is partly true and partly not: it is numerically one in point of the thing known, but not in point of the intellectual impressions whereby the thing is known, nor in point of the habit of knowledge itself. It is to be observed however that, as Aristotle (Metaph. VII, ix) teaches, there are arts in whose subject matter there is not any principle active in producing the effect of the art, as is clear in the building art: for in wood and stones there is no active power moving to the erection of a house, but only a passive aptitude. But there is an art in whose subject matter there is an active principle moving in the direction of the effect of the art, as is clear in the healing art: for in the sick subject there is an active principle tending to health. And therefore the effect of the former kind of art is never produced by nature, but always by art, as every house is a work of art: but the effect of the latter kind is produced as well by art as by nature without art: for many are healed by the operation of nature without the art of medicine. In these things that can be done both by art and nature, art imitates nature: thus if one is sick of a chill, nature heals him by warming him: hence the physician also, if he is to cure him, heals him by warming. Similar is the case with the art of teaching: for in the pupil there is an active principle making for knowledge, namely, the understanding, and those primary axioms which are naturally understood; and therefore knowledge is acquired in two ways -- without teaching, by a man's own finding out, and again by teaching. The teacher therefore begins to teach in the same way that the discoverer begins to find out, by offering for the consideration of the scholar elements of knowledge already possessed by him: because all education and all knowledge starts from pre-existing knowledge, drawing conclusions from elements already in the mind, and proposing sensible examples whereby there may be formed in the scholar's soul those impressions of fantasy which are necessary or intelligence. And because the working of the teacher from without would effect nothing, unless
borne out by an internal principle of knowledge, which is within us by the gift of God, so it is said among theologians that man teaches by rendering the service of ministry, but God by working within: so too the physician is called nature's minister in healing.

A final remark. Since the Commentator makes the passive intellect the residence of habits of knowledge (Chap. LX), the unity of the potential intellect helps not at all to the numerical unity of knowledge in master and scholar: for certainly the passive intellect is not the same in different men, since it is an organic faculty. Hence, on his own showing, this argument does not serve his purpose.

2.76 That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul

We may further conclude that neither is the active intellect one in all men, as Alexander and Avicenna suppose, though they do not suppose the potential intellect to be one in all men.

Plato supposed knowledge in us to be caused by Ideas, which he took to subsist apart by themselves. But clearly the first principle on which our knowledge depends is the active intellect. If therefore the active intellect is something subsisting apart by itself, the difference will be none, or but slight, between this opinion and that of Plato, which the Philosopher rejects.

If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, its action upon us will either be continual and uninterrupted, or at least we must say that it is not continued or broken off at our pleasure. Now its action is to make the impressions on our fantasy actual terms of intelligence. Either therefore it will do this always or not always. If not always, still it will not do it at our pleasure. Either therefore we must be always in the act of understanding, or it will not be in our power actually to understand when we wish.

But it may be said that the active intellect, so far as with it lies, is always in action, but that the impressions in our fantasy are not always becoming actual terms of intelligence, but only when they are disposed thereto; and they are disposed thereto by the act of the cogitative faculty, the use of which is in our power; and therefore actually to understand is in our power; and this is why not all men understand the things whereof they have the impressions in their fantasy, because not all have at command a suitable act of the cogitative faculty, but only those who are accustomed and trained thereto.

But this answer does not appear to be altogether sufficient. That the impressions in fantasy are marshaled by the cogitative faculty to the end that they may become actual terms of understanding and move the potential intellect, does not seem a sufficient account, if it be coupled with the supposition of the potential intellect being a separately subsistent intelligence. This seems to go with the theory of those who say that inferior agents supply only predispositions to final perfection, but that final perfection is the work of an extrinsic agency: which is contrary to the mind of Aristotle: for the human soul does not appear to be worse off for understanding than inferior natures are for their own severally proper activities.

In the nature of every cause there is contained a principle sufficient for the natural operation of that cause. If the operation consists in action, there is at hand an active principle, as we see in the powers of the vegetative soul in plants. If the operation consists in receiving impressions, there is
at hand a passive principle, as we see in the sentient powers of animals. But man is the most perfect of all inferior causes; and his proper and natural operation is to understand, an operation which is not accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions, inasmuch as every understanding is determined by its object; nor again without action, inasmuch as the intellect makes potential into actual terms of understanding. There must therefore be in the nature of man a proper principle of both operations, to wit, both an active and a potential intellect, and neither of them must be separate in being (or physically distinct), from the soul of man.

If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, it is clearly above the nature of man. But any activity which a man exercises by mere virtue of a supernatural cause is a supernatural activity, as the working of miracles, prophecy, and the like effects, which are wrought by men in virtue of a divine endowment. Since then man cannot understand except by means of the active intellect, it follows, supposing that intellect a separately subsistent being, that to understand is not an operation proper and natural to man; and thus man cannot be defined as intellectual or rational.

No agent works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent of its being. But the working both of potential and of active intellect is proper to man: for man produces ideas by abstraction from phantasms, and receives in his mind those ideas; operations which it would never occur to us to think of, did we not experience them in ourselves. The principles therefore to which these operations are attributable, namely, the potential and the active intellect, must be faculties formally existing in us.

A being that cannot proceed to its own proper business without being moved thereto by an external principle, is rather driven to act than acts of itself. This is the case with irrational creatures. Sense, moved by an exterior sensible object, makes an impression on the fantasy; and so in order the impression proceeds through all the faculties till it reaches those which move the rest. Now the proper business of man is to understand; and the prime mover in understanding is the active intellect, which makes intellectual impressions whereby the potential intellect is impressed; which potential intellect, when actualized, moves the will. If then the active intellect has a separate subsistence outside man, the whole of man's activity depends on an extrinsic principle. Man then will not be his own leader, but will be led by another; and thus will not be master of his own acts, nor deserve praise nor blame; and the whole of moral science and political society will perish: an awkward conclusion. Therefore the active intellect has no subsistence apart from man.

2.77 That it is not impossible for the Potential and the Active Intellect to be united in the one Substance of the Soul

Someone perhaps may think it impossible for one and the same substance, that of our soul, to be in potentiality to receive all intellectual impressions (which is the function of the potential intellect), and to actualize those impressions (which is the function of the active intellect); since nothing acts as it is in potentiality to receive, but only as it is in actual readiness to act. But, looking at the matter rightly, no inconvenience or difficulty will be found in this view of the union of the active and potential intellect in the one substance of the soul. For a thing may well be in potentiality in one respect and in actuality in another; and this we find to be the condition of the intellectual soul in its relation to phantasms, or impressions in fantasy. For the intellectual soul has something in actuality, to which the phantasm is in potentiality; and on the other hand
the intellectual soul is in potentiality to that which is actually found in the phantasms. For the substance of the human soul has the attribute of immateriality: but it is not thereby assimilated to this or that definite thing; and yet such assimilation is requisite for our soul to know this or that thing definitely, since all cognition takes place by some likeness of the object known being stamped on the knowing mind. Thus then the intellectual soul remains in potentiality, open to the reception of definite impressions in the likeness of things that come within our observation and knowledge, which are the natures of sensible things. These definite natures of sensible things are represented to us by phantasms, which however have not yet reached the stage of being objects of intellect, seeing that they are likenesses of sensible things under material conditions, which are individualizing properties, and besides they are in bodily organs. They are therefore not actual objects of understanding; and yet since in the case of this man, whose likeness is represented by phantasms, it is possible to fix upon a universal nature stripped of all individualizing conditions, these phantasms are potentially intelligible. Thus then they have a potentially intelligible being, but an actually definite likeness to things, whereas in the intellectual soul, as we saw, the situation was the other way about. There is then in the intellectual soul a power exercising its activity upon phantasms, making them actual objects of understanding; and this power of the soul is called the active intellect. There is also in the soul a power that is potentially open to definite impressions of sensible things; and this power is the potential intellect.

But the intellectual soul does not lie open to receive impressions of the likenesses of things that are in phantasms in the way that the likeness exists in the phantasm, but according as those likenesses are raised to a higher stage, by being abstracted from individualizing material conditions and rendered actual objects, or terms, of understanding. And therefore the action of the active intellect upon the phantasms precedes their being received into the potential intellect; and thus the prime agency is not attributable to the phantasms, but to the active intellect.

There are some animals that see better by night than by day, because they have weak eyes, which are stimulated by a little light, but dazzled by much. And the case is similar with our understanding, which is "Metaph. I, Appendix): hence the little intellectual light that is connatural to us is sufficient for us to understand with. But that the intellectual light connatural to our soul is sufficient to produce the action of the active intellect, will be clear to any one who considers the necessity for positing such an intellect. Our soul is found to be in potentiality to intelligible objects as sense to sensible objects: for as we are not always having sensations, so we are not always understanding. These intelligible objects Plato assumed to exist by themselves, calling them 'Ideas': hence it was not necessary for him to posit any 'active intellect' rendering objects intelligible. But if this Platonic position were true, the absolutely better objects of intelligence should be better also relatively to us, and be better understood by us, which is manifestly not the case: for things are more intelligible to us which are nigher to sense, though in themselves they are less excellent objects of understanding. Hence Aristotle was moved to lay down the doctrine, that the things which are intelligible to us are not any self-existent objects of understanding, but are gathered from objects of sense. Hence he had to posit some faculty to do this work of making terms of understanding: that faculty is the active intellect. The active intellect therefore is posited to make terms of understanding proportionate to our capacity. Such work does not transcend the measure of intellectual light connatural to us. Hence there is no difficulty in attributing the action of the active intellect to the native light of our soul, especially as Aristotle compares the active intellect to light (De anima, III, v, 2).
2.79 That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body

Every intelligent subsisting being is imperishable (Chap. LV): but the human soul is an intelligent subsisting being.

Nothing is destroyed by that which makes its perfection. But the perfection of the human soul consists in a certain withdrawal from the body: for the soul is perfected by knowledge and virtue: now in knowledge there is greater perfection, the more the view is fixed on high generalizations, or immaterial things; while the perfection of virtue consists in a man's not following his bodily passions, but tempering and restraining them by reason. Nor is it of any avail to reply that the perfection of the soul consists in its separation from the body in point of activity, but to be separated from the body in point of being is its destruction. For the activity of a thing shows its substance and being, and follows upon its nature: thus the activity of a thing can only be perfected inasmuch as its substance is perfected. If then the soul is perfected in activity by relinquishing the body and bodily things, its substance cannot fail in being by separation from the body.

A natural craving cannot be in vain. But man naturally craves after permanent continuance: as is shown by this, that while existence is desired by all, man by his understanding apprehends existence, not in the present moment only, as dumb animals do, but existence absolutely. Therefore man attains to permanence on the part of his soul, whereby he apprehends existence absolute and for all time.

Intelligible being is more permanent than sensible being. But the substratum of material bodies (*materia prima*) is indestructible, much more the potential intellect, the recipient of intelligible forms. Therefore the human soul, of which the potential intellect is a part, is indestructible.

No form is destroyed except either by the action of the contrary, or by the destruction of the subject wherein it resides, or by the failure of its cause. Thus heat is destroyed by the action of cold: by the destruction of the eye the power of sight is destroyed; and the light of the atmosphere fails by the failure of the sun's presence, which was its cause. But the human soul cannot be destroyed by the action of its contrary, for it has no contrary, since by the potential intellect the soul is cognitive and receptive of all contraries. Nor again by the destruction of the subject in which it resides, for it has been shown above that the human soul is a form not dependent on the body for its being. Nor lastly by the failure of its cause, for it can have no cause but one which is eternal, as will be shown (Chap. LXXXVII). In no way therefore can the human soul be destroyed.

If the human soul is destroyed by the destruction of the body, it must be weakened by the weakening of the body. But the fact is that if any faculty of the soul is weakened by the body being weakened, that is only incidentally, inasmuch as that faculty of the soul stands in need of a bodily organ, as the sight is weakened by the weakening of the organ of sight, but only incidentally, as may be shown by this consideration: if any weakness fell essentially upon the faculty, the faculty would not be restored by the restoration of the organ; but now we see that however much the faculty of sight seems weakened, it is restored, if only the organ is restored. Since then the soul's faculty of understanding needs no bodily organ, the understanding itself is not weakened, neither essentially nor incidentally, either by old age or by any other weakness of body. But if in the working of the understanding there happens fatigue or hindrance through
bodily weakness, this is not due to weakness of the understanding itself, but to weakness of other faculties that the understanding has need of, to wit, the fantasy, the memory, and the cogitative faculty.

The same is evidenced by the very words of Aristotle: "Moving causes pre-exist, but formal causes are along with the things whereof they are causes: for when a man is well, then there is health. But whether anything remains afterwards, is a point to consider: in some cases there may well be something remaining: the soul is an instance, not the whole soul, but the intelligence: as for the whole soul remaining, that is perhaps an impossibility." Clearly then, in speaking of forms, he wishes to speak of the intellect, which is the form of man, as remaining after its matter, that is, after the body. It is clear also that though Aristotle makes the soul a form, yet he does not represent it as non-subsistent and consequently perishable, as Gregory of Nyssa imputes to him: for he excludes the intellectual soul from the general category of other forms, saying that it remains after the body and is a subsistent being (substantiam quandam).

Hereby is banished the error of the impious in whose person it is said: *We were born out of nothingness, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been* (Wisd. ii, 2); in whose person again Solomon says: *One is the perishing of man and beast, and even is the lot of both: as man dies, so do beasts die: all breathe alike, and man hath no advantage over beasts* (Eccles iii, 19): that he does not say this in his own person, but in the person of the ungodly, is clear from what he says at the end, as it were drawing a conclusion: *Till the dust return to the earth, from whence it came; and the spirit go back to the God who gave it* (Eccles xii, 7).

2.80, 81: Arguments of those who wish to prove that the Human Soul perishes with the Body, with Replies to the same

*Arg. 1.* If human souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, as shown above (Chap. LXXV), then when the bodies perish, the souls cannot remain in their multitude. Hence one of two conclusions must follow: either the human soul must wholly cease to be; or there must remain one soul only, which seems to suit the view of those who make that alone incorruptible which is one in all men, whether that be the active intellect alone, as Alexander says, or with the active also the potential intellect, as Averroes says.

*Reply.* Whatever things are necessarily in conjunction and proportion with one another, are made many or one together, each by its own cause. If the being of the one depends on the other, its unity or multiplication also will depend on the same: otherwise it will depend on some extrinsic cause. Form then and matter must always be in proportion with one another, and conjoined by a certain natural tie. Hence matter and form must vary together in point of multiplicity and unity. If then the form depends on the matter for its being, the multiplication of the form will depend on the matter, and so will its unity. But if the form is in no such dependence on the matter, then -- though it will still be necessary for the form to be multiplied with the multiplication of the matter -- the unity or multiplicity of the form will not depend on the matter. But it has been shown (Chap. LXVIII, and note [Chapter 79], that the human soul is a form not dependent on matter for its being. Hence it follows that, though souls are multiplied as the bodies which they inform are multiplied, still the fact of bodies being many cannot be the cause of souls being many. And therefore there is no need for the plurality of souls to cease with the destruction of their bodies.
Arg. 2. The formal nature (ratio formalis [Chapter 48 note i; Chapter 56 note i]) of things is the cause of their differing in species. But if souls remain many after the perishing of their bodies, they must differ in species, since in souls so remaining the only diversity possible is one of formal nature. But souls do not change their species by the destruction of the body, otherwise they would be destroyed too, for all that changes from species to species is destroyed in the transition. Then they must have been different in species even before they parted from their bodies. But compounds take their species according to their form. So then individual men must differ in species, an awkward conclusion consequent upon the position that souls remain a multitude after their bodies are gone.

Reply. It is not any and every diversity of form that makes a difference of species. The fact of souls separated from their bodies making a multitude follows from their forms being different in substance, inasmuch as the substance of this soul is different from the substance of that. But this diversity does not arise from the souls differing in their several essential constitutions, but from their being differently commensurate with different bodies: for one soul is commensurate with one body and not with another. These commensurations remain in souls even when their bodies perish, as the substances of the souls also remain, not being dependent on their bodies for their being. For it is by their substances that souls are forms of bodies: otherwise they would be united with their bodies only accidentally, and soul and body would not make up an essential but only an accidental unity. But inasmuch as they are forms, they must be commensurate with their bodies. Hence it is clear that their several different commensuratenesses remain in the departed souls, and consequently plurality.

Arg. 3. It seems quite impossible, on the theory of those who suppose the eternity of the world, for human souls to remain in their multitude after the death of the body. For if the world is from eternity, infinite men have died before our time. If then the souls of the dead remain after death in their multitude, we must say that there is now an actual infinity of souls of men previously dead. But actual infinity is impossible in nature.

Reply. Of supporters of the eternity of the world, some have simply allowed the impossibility, saying that human souls perish altogether with their bodies. Others have said that of all souls there remains one spiritual existence which is common to all -- the active intellect according to some, or with the active also the potential intellect according to others. Others have supposed souls to remain in their multitude after their bodies; but, not to be obliged to suppose an infinity of souls, they have said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a fixed period; and this was the opinion of the Platonists, of which hereafter (Chap. LXXXIII). Others, avoiding all the aforesaid answers, have maintained that there was no difficulty in the existence of an actual infinity of departed souls: for an actual infinity of things, not related to one another, was only an accidental infinity, in which they saw no difficulty; and this is the position of Avicenna and Algazel. Which of these was the opinion of Aristotle is not expressly set down in his writings, although he does expressly hold the eternity of the world. But the last mentioned opinion is not inconsistent with his principles: for in the Physics, III, v, his argument against an actual infinity is confined to natural bodies, and is not extended to immaterial substances. Clearly however the professors of the Catholic faith can feel no difficulty on this point, as they do not allow the eternity of the world.

Arg. 5. It is impossible for any substance to exist destitute of all activity. But all activity of the soul ends with the body, as may be shown by simple enumeration. For the faculties of the
vegetative soul work through bodily qualities and a bodily instrument; and the term of their activity is the body itself, which is perfected by the soul, is thereby nourished and developed, and comes to furnish the generative products. Also all the activities of the faculties of the sensitive soul are accomplished through bodily organs; and some of them are accompanied by (sensible) bodily change, as in the case of the passions. As for the act of understanding, although it is not an activity exercised through any bodily organ, nevertheless its objects are phantasms, which stand to it as colors to sight: hence as sight cannot see without colors, so the intellectual soul cannot understand without phantasms. The soul also needs, for purposes of understanding, the faculties which prepare the phantasms to become actual terms of intellect, namely, the cogitative faculty and the memory, of which it is certain that they cannot endure without the body, seeing that they work through organs of the body. Hence Aristotle says that "the soul by no means understands without a phantasm," and that "nothing understands without the passive intellect," by which name he designates the cogitative faculty, "which is perishable"; and that "we remember nothing" after death of the things that we knew in life. Thus then it is clear that no activity of the soul can continue after death, and therefore neither can its substance continue.

Reply. The assertion that no activity can remain in the soul after its separation from the body, we say, is incorrect: for those activities remain which are not exercised through organs, and such are understanding and will. As for activities exercised through bodily organs, as are the activities of the vegetative and sentient soul, they do not remain. But we must observe that the soul separated from the body does not understand in the same way as when united with the body: for everything acts according as it is. Now though the being of the human soul, while united with the body, is perfect (absolutum), not depending on the body, still the body is a sort of housing (stramentum) to it and subject receptive of it. Hence the proper activity of the soul, which is understanding, while independent of the body in this that it is not exercised through any bodily organ, nevertheless finds in the body its object, which is the phantasm. Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it cannot understand without a phantasm, nor remember except by the cogitative and reminiscent faculty whereby phantasms are shaped and made available (Chap. LXXIII); and therefore this method of understanding and remembering has to be laid aside when the body is laid aside. But the being of the departed soul belongs to it alone without the body: hence its intellectual activity will not be accomplished by regard to such objects as phantasms existing in bodily organs, but it will understand by itself after the manner of those intelligences that subsist totally apart from bodies (Chapp. XCI-Cl), from which superior beings it will be able to receive more abundant influence in order to more perfect understanding.

We may see some indication of this even in living men. When the soul is hampered by preoccupations about its body, it is less disposed to understand higher things. Hence the virtue of temperance, withdrawing the soul from bodily delights, helps especially to make men apt to understand. In sleep again, when men are not using their bodily senses, they have some perception of things to come, impressed upon them by superior beings, and attain to facts that transcend the measure of human reasonings. This is much more the case in states of syncope and ecstasy, as the withdrawal from the bodily senses is there greater. And that is what one might expect, because, as has been pointed out above (Chap. LXVIII), the human soul being on the boundary line between corporeal and incorporeal substances, and dwelling as it were on the horizon of eternity and time, it approaches the highest by receding from the lowest. Therefore, when it shall be totally severed from the body, it will be perfectly assimilated to the intelligences that subsist apart, and will receive their influence in more copious streams. Thus then, though the
mode of our understanding according to the conditions of the present life is wrecked with the wreck of the body, it will be replaced by another and higher mode of understanding.

But memory, being an act exercised through a bodily organ, as Aristotle shows, cannot remain in the soul after the body is gone; unless memory be taken in another sense for the intellectual hold upon things known before: this intellectual memory of things known in life must remain in the departed soul, since the intellectual impressions are indelibly received in the potential intellect (Chap. LXXIV). As regards other activities of the soul, such as love, joy, and the like, we must beware of a double meaning of the terms: sometimes they mean passions, or emotions, which are activities of the sensitive appetite, concupiscible or irascible, and as such they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle shows: sometimes they mean a simple act of will without passion, as Aristotle says that "The joy of God is one, everlasting, and absolute," and that "In the contemplation of wisdom there is admirable delight"; and again he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love of passion. But as the will is a power that uses no bodily organ, as neither does the understanding, it is evident that such acts, inasmuch as they are acts of will, may remain in the departed soul.

2.82 That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal

No activity of the sentient part can have place without a body. But in the souls of dumb animals we find no activity higher than the activities of the sentient part. That animals neither understand nor reason is apparent from this, that all animals of the same species behave alike, as being moved by nature, and not acting on any principle of art: for every swallow makes its nest alike, and every spider its web alike. Therefore there is no activity in the soul of dumb animals that can possibly go on without a body.

Every form separated from matter is actually understood. Thus the active intellect makes impressions actually understood, inasmuch as it abstracts them. But if the soul of a dumb animal remains after the body is gone, it will be a form separated from matter. Therefore it will be form actually understood. But " (De Anima, III, iv, 13). Therefore the soul of a dumb animal will have understanding, which is impossible.

In everything that is apt to arrive at any perfection, there is found a natural craving after that perfection: for good is what all crave after, everything its own good. But in dumb animals there is no craving after perpetuity of being except in the form of perpetuity of the species, inasmuch as they have an instinct of generation, whereby the species is perpetuated, and the same is found in plants. But they have not that craving consequent upon apprehension: for since the sentient soul apprehends only what is here and now, it cannot possibly apprehend perpetuity of being, and therefore has no physical craving after such perpetuity. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is incapable of perpetuity of being.

2.83, 84 : Apparent Arguments to show that the Human Soul does not begin with the Body, but has been from Eternity, with Replies to the same

Arg. 1. (A.) What will never cease to be, has a power of being always. But of that which has a power of being always it is never true to say that it is not: for a thing continues in being so far as its power of being extends. What therefore will never cease to be, will never either begin to be.
Reply. The power of a thing does not extend to the past, but to the present or future: hence with regard to past events possibility has no place. Therefore from the fact of the soul having a power of being always it does not follow that the soul always has been, but that it always will be. Besides, that to which power extends does not follow until the power is presupposed. It cannot therefore be concluded that the soul is always except for the time that comes after it has received the power.

Arg. 2. Truth of the intellectual order is imperishable, eternal, necessary. Now from the imperishableness of intellectual truth the being of the soul is shown to be imperishable. In like manner from the eternity of that truth there may be proved the eternity of the soul.

Reply. The eternity of understood truth may be regarded in two ways, in point of the object which is understood, and in point of the mind whereby it is understood. From the eternity of understood truth in point of the object, there will follow the eternity of the thing, but not the eternity of the thinker. From the eternity of understood truth in point of the understanding mind, the eternity of that thinking soul will follow. But understood truth is eternal, not in the latter but in the former way. As we have seen, the intellectual impressions, whereby our soul understands truth, come to us fresh from the phantasms through the medium of the active intellect. Hence the conclusion is, not that our soul is eternal, but that those understood truths are founded upon something which is eternal. In fact they are founded upon the First Truth, the universal Cause comprehensive of all truth. To this truth our soul stands related, not as the recipient subject to the form which it receives, but as a thing to its proper end: for truth is the good of the understanding and the end thereof. Now we can gather an argument of the duration of a thing from its end, as we can argue the beginning of a thing from its efficient cause: for what is ordained to an everlasting end must be capable of perpetual duration. Hence the immortality of the soul may be argued from the eternity of intellectual truth, but not the eternity of the soul.

Arg. 3. That is not perfect, to which many of its principal parts are wanting. If therefore there daily begin to be as many human souls as there are men born, it is clear that many of its principal parts are daily being added to the universe, and consequently that very many are still wanting to it. It follows that the universe is imperfect, which is impossible.

Reply. The perfection of the universe goes by species, not by individuals; and human souls do not differ in species, but only in number (Chap. LXXV).

(B.) Some professing the Catholic faith, but imbued with Platonic doctrines, have taken a middle course. These people, seeing that according to the Catholic faith nothing is eternal but God, have supposed human souls not to be eternal, but to have been created with the world, or rather before the visible world, and to be united with bodies recurrently as required. Origen was the first professor of the Christian faith to take up this position, and he has since had many followers. The position seems assailable on these grounds.

The soul is united with the body as the form and actualizing principle thereof. Now though actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, yet, in the same subject, it is posterior to it in time: for a thing moves from potentiality to actuality. Therefore the seed, which is potentially alive, was before the soul, which is the actuality of life.
It is natural to every form to be united to its own proper matter: otherwise the compound of matter and form would be something unnatural. Now that which belongs to a thing according to its nature is assigned to it before that which belongs to it against its nature: for what belongs to a thing against its nature attaches to it incidentally, but what belongs to it according to its nature attaches to it ordinarily; and the incidental is always posterior to the ordinary. It belongs to the soul therefore to be united to the body before being apart from the body.

Every part, separated from its whole, is imperfect. But the soul, being the form (Chap. XLVII), is a part of the human species. Therefore, existing by itself, apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect is before the imperfect in the order of natural things.

(C.) If souls were created without bodies, the question arises how they came to be united with bodies. It must have been either violently or naturally. If violently, the union of the soul with the body is unnatural, and man is an unnatural compound of soul and body, which cannot be true. But if souls are naturally united with bodies, then they were created with a physical tendency (appetitus naturalis) to such union. Now a physical tendency works itself out at once, unless something comes in the way. Souls then should have been united with bodies from the instant of their creation except for some intervening obstacle. But any obstacle intervening to arrest a physical tendency, or natural craving, does violence to the same. Therefore it would have been by violence that souls were for a period separated from their bodies, which is an awkward conclusion.

(D.) But if it be said that both states alike are natural to the soul, as well the state of union with the body as the state of separation, according to difference of times, this appears to be impossible -- because points of natural variation are accidents to the subject in which they occur, as age and youth: if then union with body and separation from a body are natural variations to the soul, the union of the soul with the body will be an accident; and man, the result of that union, will not be an ordinary, regular entity (ens per se), but a casual, incidental being (ens per accidens).

(E.) But if it is said that souls are united with bodies neither violently nor naturally, but of their own spontaneous will, that cannot be. For none is willing to come to a worse state except under deception. But the soul is in a higher state away from the body, especially according to the Platonists, who say that by union with the body the soul suffers forgetfulness of what it knew before, and is hindered from the contemplation of pure truth. At that rate it has no willingness to be united with a body except for some deceit practiced upon it. Therefore, supposing it to have pre-existed before the body, it would not be united therewith of its own accord.

(F.) But if as an alternative it is said that the soul is united with the body neither by nature, nor by its own will, but by a divine ordinance, this again does not appear a suitable arrangement, on the supposition that souls were created before bodies. For God has established everything according to the proper mode of its nature: hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31). If then He created souls apart from bodies, we must say that this mode of being is better suited to their nature. But it is not proper for an ordinance of divine goodness to reduce things to a lower state, but rather to rise them to a higher. At that rate the union of soul with body could not be the result of a divine ordinance.

(G.) This consideration moved Origen to suppose that when souls, created from the beginning of time, came by divine ordinance to be united with bodies, it was for their punishment. He
supposed that they had sinned before they came into bodies, and that according to the amount of their guilt they were united with bodies of various degrees of nobility, shut up in them as in prisons. But this supposition cannot stand for reasons alleged above (Chap. XLIV).
2.85 That the Soul is not of the substance of God

The divine substance is eternal, and nothing appertaining to it begins anew to be (B. I, Chap. XV). But the souls of men were not before their bodies (Chap.<GC2_83.HTM" LXXXIII).

Everything out of which anything is made is in potentiality to that which is made out of it. But the substance of God, being pure actuality, is not in potentiality to anything (B. I, Chap. XVI).

That out of which anything is made is in some way changed. Moreover the soul of man is manifestly variable in point of knowledge, virtue, and their opposites. But God is absolutely unchangeable (B. I, Chap. XII): therefore nothing can be made out of Him, nor can the soul be of His substance.

Since the divine substance is absolutely indivisible, the soul cannot be of that substance unless it be the whole substance. But the divine substance cannot but be one (B. I, Chap. XLII). It would follow that all men have but one intellectual soul, a conclusion already rejected (Chap. LXXV).

This opinion seems to have had three sources. Some assumed that there was no incorporeal being, and made the chiefest of corporeal substances God. Hence sprang the theory of the Manichean, that God is a sort of corporeal light, pervading all the infinities of space, and that the human soul is a small glimmer of this light. Others have posited the intellect of all men to be one, either active intellect alone, or active and potential combined. And because the ancients called every self-subsistent intelligence a deity, it followed that our soul, or the intellect whereby we understand, had a divine nature. Hence sundry professors of the Christian faith in our time, who assert the separate existence of the active intellect, have said expressly that the active intellect is God. This opinion might also have arisen from the likeness of our soul to God: for intelligence, which is taken to be the chief characteristic of Deity, is found to belong to no substance in the sublunar world except to man alone, on account of his soul.

2.86 That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation

Where the activities of active principles suppose the concurrence of a body, the origination also of such principles supposed bodily concurrence: for a thing has existence according as it has activity: everything is active according to its being. But when active principles have their activities independent of bodily concurrence, the reverse is the case: the genesis of such principles is not by any bodily generation. Now the activity of the vegetative and sentient soul cannot be without bodily concurrence (Chapp. LVII, LXVIII): but the activity of the intellectual soul has place through no bodily organ (Chap. LXIX). Therefore the vegetative and sentient souls are generated by the generation of the body, and date their existence from the transmission of the male semen, but not the intellectual soul.

If the human soul owed its origin to the transmission of the male semen, that could be only in one of two ways. Either we must suppose that the soul is actually in the male semen, being as it were accidentally separated from the soul of the generator as the semen is separated from the body: we see something of this sort in Annelid animals, that live when cut in pieces: these creatures have one soul actually and many potentially; and when the body is divided, a soul comes to be actually in every living part: or in another way it may be supposed that there is in the male semen a power productive of an intellectual soul, so that the intellectual soul may be taken to be in the
said *semen* virtually, not actually. The first of these suppositions is impossible for two reasons. First, because the intelligent soul being the most perfect of souls and the most potent, the proper subject for it to perfect is a body having a great diversity of organs apt to respond to its manifold activities: hence the intellectual soul cannot be in the male *semen* cut off from the body (*in semine deciso*), because neither are the souls of the lower animals of the more perfect sort multiplied by cutting them in pieces (*per decisionem*), as is the case with Annelid animals. Secondly, because the proper and principal faculty of the intelligent soul, the intellect, not being the actualization of any part of the body, cannot be accidentally divided with the division of the body: therefore neither can the intelligent soul. The second supposition (that the intelligent soul is virtually contained in the male *semen*) is also impossible. For the active power in the *semen* is effectual to the generation of an animal by effecting a bodily transmutation: there is no other way for a material power to take effect. But every form, which owes its being to a transmutation of matter, has being in dependence on matter: for (n. 3) every form, educed into existence by a transmutation of matter, is a form educed out of the potentiality of matter: for this is the meaning of a transmutation of matter, that something is educed into actuality out of potentiality. But an intelligent soul cannot be educed out of the potentiality of matter: for it has been shown above (Chap. LXVIII) that the intelligent soul transcends the whole power of matter, as it has an immaterial activity (Chap. LXIX). Therefore the intelligent soul is not induced into being by any transmutation of matter, and therefore not by the action of any power that is in the male *semen*.

It is ridiculous to say that any subsistent intelligence is either divided by division of the body or produced by any corporeal power. But the soul is a subsistent intelligence (Chap. LXVIII). Therefore it can neither be divided by the separation of the *semen* from the body, nor produced by any active power in the same.

If the generation of *this* is the cause of *that* coming to be, the destruction of *this* will be the cause of *that* ceasing to be. But the destruction of the body is not the cause of the human soul ceasing to be (Chap. LXXIX). Neither then is the generation of the body the cause of the soul commencing to be.

2.87 That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God

Everything that is brought into being is either generated or created. But the human soul is not generated, either by way of composition of parts or by the generation of the body (Chap. LXXXVI); and yet it comes new into existence, being neither eternal nor pre-existent (Chapp. LXXXIII, LXXXIV): therefore it comes into being by creation. Now, as has been shown above, God alone can create (Chap. XXI).

Whatever has existence as subsistent being, is also made in the way that a subsistent being is made: while whatever has no existence as a subsistent being, but is attached to something else, is not made separately, but only under condition of that having been made to which it is attached. But the soul has this peculiarity to distinguish it from other forms, that it is a subsistent being; and the existence which is proper to it communicates to the body. The soul then is made as a subsistent being is made: it is the subject of a making-process all its own, unlike other forms, which are made incidentally in the making of the compounds to which hey belong. But as the soul has no material part, it cannot be made out of any subject-matter: consequently it must be made out of nothing, and so created.
The end of a thing answers to its beginning. Now the end of the human soul and its final perfection is, by knowledge and love to transcend the whole order of created things, and attain to its first principle and beginning, which is God. Therefore from God it has properly its first origin.

Holy Scripture seems to insinuate this conclusion: for whereas, speaking of the origin of other animals, it scribes their souls to other causes, as when it says: Let the waters produce the creeping thing of living soul (Gen. i, 20): coming to man, it shows that his soul is created by God, saying: God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life (Gen. ii, 7).

2.88, 89: Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution

For the better understanding of the solutions given, we must prefix some exposition of the order and process of human generation, and of animal generation generally. First then we must know that that is a false opinion of certain persons who say that the vital acts which appear in the embryo before its final development (ante ultimum complementum), come not from any soul or power of soul existing in it, but from the soul of the mother. If that were true, we could no longer call the embryo an animal, as every animal consists of soul and body. The activities of life do not proceed from an active principle from without, but from a power within; a fact which seems to mark the distinction between inanimate and living things, it being proper to the latter to move themselves. Whatever is nourished, assimilates nourishment to itself: hence there must be in the creature that is nourished an active power of nutrition, since an agent acts to the likeness of itself. This is still more manifest in the operations of sense: for sight and hearing are attributable to a power existing in the sentient subject, not in another. Hence, as the embryo is evidently nourished before its final development, and even feels, this cannot be attributed to the soul of another.

It has been alleged that the soul in its complete essence is in the male semen from the first, its activities not appearing merely for want of organs. But that cannot be. For since the soul is united with the body as a form, it is only united with that body of which it is properly the actualization. Now the soul is the actualization of an organized body. Therefore before the organization of the body the soul is in the male semen, not actually, but virtually. Hence Aristotle says that seed and fruit have life potentially in such a way that they "gc2_88d.htm soul. it would then have a substantial form. But every substantial generation precedes and does not follow the substantial form. Any transmutations that follow the substantial form are not directed to the being of the thing generated, but to its well-being. At that rate the generation of the animal would be complete in the mere cutting off of the male semen from the body of the parent; and all subsequent transmutations would be irrelevant to generation. The supposition is still more ridiculous when applied to the rational soul, as well because it is impossible for that to be divided according to the division of the body, so as even to be in the semen cut off therefrom; as also because it would follow that in all cases of the semen being wasted, without conception ensuing, souls were still multiplied.

Nor again can it be said, as some say, that though there is not in the male semen at its first cutting off any soul actually, but only virtually, for want of organs, nevertheless, as the said semen is a bodily substance, organizable although not organized, so the active power of that semen is itself a soul, potential but not actual, proportional to the condition of the semen. The theory goes on to
say that, as the life of a plant requires fewer organs than the life of an animal, the aforesaid active power turns into a vegetative soul as soon as the semen is sufficiently organized for the life of a plant; and further that, when the organs are more perfected and multiplied, the same power is advanced to be a sentient soul; and further still that, when the form of the organs is perfect, the same becomes a rational soul, not indeed by the action of the power of the semen itself, but only by the influence of some exterior agent: and this the advocates of this theory take to be the reason why Aristotle said (De gen. animal., II, iii) that the intellect is from without.

Upon this view it would follow that numerically the same active power was now a vegetative soul only, and afterwards a sentient soul; and so the substantial form itself was continually more and more perfected: it would further follow that a substantial form was educed from potentiality to actuality, not instantaneously, but successively; and further than generation was a continuous change, as is alteration -- all so many physical impossibilities. There would ensue even a still more awkward consequence, that the rational soul was mortal. For no formal constituent added to a perishable thing makes it naturally imperishable: otherwise the perishable would be changed into the imperishable, which is impossible, as the two differ in kind. But the substance of the sentient soul, which is supposed to be incidentally generated when the body is generated in the process above described, is necessarily perishable with the perishing of the body. If therefore this soul becomes rational by the bringing in of some manner of light from without to be a formal constituent of the soul, it necessarily follows that the rational soul perishes when the body perishes, contrary to which has been shown (Chap. LXXIX) and to the teaching of Catholic faith.

Therefore the active power which is cut off, or emitted, with the male semen from the body, and is called 'formative,' is not itself the soul, nor ever becomes the soul in the process of generation. But the frothy substance of the male semen contains gas (spiritus), and this gas is the subject on which the formative power rests, and in which it is inherent. So the formative power works out the formation of the body, acting in virtue of the soul of the father, the prime author of generation, not in virtue of the soul of the offspring, even after the offspring comes to have a soul: for the offspring does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. This is clear by enumeration of the several powers of the soul. The formation is not attributable to the soul of the embryo itself on the score of that soul's generative power: for that power puts forth no activity till the work of nutrition and growth is complete; and besides, its work is not directed to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor can it be assigned to the embryo's nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourishment to the body nourished; for in this case there is no room for such a work; since nourishment taken while the body is in formation is not applied to assume the likeness of a pre-existent body, but goes to the production of a more perfect form and a nearer approach to the likeness of the father. Nor is the development of the embryo attributable to its own power of growth: for to power of growth there does not belong change of form, but only change in bulk. And as for the sensitive and intellectual powers, it is clear that theirs is no office bearing on such a development. It follows that the formative power acting in virtue of the generative soul of the father, the work of which is to make another like in species to the progenitor. This formative power therefore remains the same in the subject aforesaid from the beginning of the formation even to the end. But the appearance of the being under formation does not remain the same: for first it has the appearance of semen, afterwards of blood, and so on until it arrives at its final completeness.
Nor need we be uneasy in admitting the generation of an intermediate product, the existence of which is presently after broken off, because such transitional links are not complete in their species, but are on the way to a perfect species; and therefore they are not engendered to endure, but as stages of being, leading up to finality in the order of generation. The higher a form is in the scale of being, and the further it is removed from a mere material form, the more intermediate forms and intermediate generation must be passed through before the finally perfect form is reached. Therefore in the generation of animal and man -- these having the most perfect form -- there occur many intermediate forms and generations, and consequently destructions, because the generation of one being is the destruction of another. The vegetative soul therefore, which is first in the embryo, while it lives the life of a plant, is destroyed, and there succeeds a more perfect soul, which is at one nutrient and sentient, and for that time the embryo lives the life of an animal: upon the destruction of this, there succeeds the rational soul, infused from without, whereas the preceding two owed their existence to the virtue of the male semen.

With these principles recognized, it is easy to answer the objections.

Arg. 1. Man being an animal by the possession of a sentient soul, and the notion of 'animal' befitting man in the same sense as it befits other animals, it appears that the sentient soul of man is of the same kind as the souls of other animals. But things of the same kind have the same manner of coming to be. Therefore the sentient soul of man, as of other animals, comes to be by the active power that is in the male semen. But the sentient and the intelligent soul in man is one in substance (Chap. LVIII). It appears then that even the intelligent soul is produced by the active power of the semen.

Reply. Though sensitive soul in man and brute agree generically, yet they differ specifically. As the animal, man, differs specifically from other animals by being rational, so the sentient soul of a man differs specifically from the sentient soul of a brute by being also intelligent. The soul therefore of a brute has sentient attributes only, and consequently neither its being nor its activity rises above the order of the body: hence it must be generated with the generation of the body, and perish with its destruction. But the sentient soul in man, over and above its sentient nature, has intellectual power: hence the very substance of this soul must be raised above the bodily order both in being and in activity; and therefore it is neither generated by the generation of the body, nor perishes by its destruction.

Arg. 2. As Aristotle teaches, in point of time the fetus is an animal before it is a man. But while it is an animal and not yet a man, it has a sentient and not an intelligent soul, which sentient soul beyond doubt is produced by the active power of the male semen. Now that self-same sentient soul is potentially intelligent, even as that animal is potentially a rational animal: unless one chooses to say that the intelligent soul which supervenes is another substance altogether, a conclusion rejected above (Chap. LVIII). It appears then that the substance of the intelligent soul comes of the active power that is in the semen.

Reply. The sentient soul, whereby the human fetus was an animal, does not last, but its place is taken by a soul that is at once sentient and intelligent.

Arg. 3. The soul, as it is the form of the body, is one being with the body. But unity of thing produced, unity of productive action, and unity of producing agent, all go together. Therefore the one being of soul and body must be the result of one productive action of one productive agent.
But confessedly the body is produced by the productive action of the power that is in the male 
semen. Therefore the soul also, as it is the form of the body, is produced by the same productive 
action, and not by any separate agency.

Reply. The principle of corresponding unity of produced, production, and producer, holds good 
to the exclusion of a plurality of productive agents not acting in co-ordination with one another. Where they are co-ordinate, several agents have but one effect. Thus the prime efficient cause 
acts to the production of the effect of the secondary efficient cause even more vigorously than 
the secondary cause itself; and we see that the effect produced by a principal agent through the 
agency of an instrument is more properly attributed to the principal agent than to the instrument. Sometimes too the action of the principal agent reaches to some part of the thing done, to which 
the action of the instrument does not reach. Since then the whole active power of nature stands to 
God as an instrument to the prime and principal agent, we find no difficulty in the productive 
action of nature being terminated to a part only of that one term of generation, man, and not to 
the whole of what is produced by the action of God. The body then of man is formed at once by 
the power of God, the principal and prime agent, and by the power of the semen, the secondary 
agent. But the action of God produces the human soul, which the power of the male semen 
cannot produce, but only dispose thereto.

Arg. 4. Man generates his own specific likeness by the power that is in the detached semen, 
which generation means causing the specific form of the generated. The human soul therefore, 
the specific form of man, is caused by the power in the semen.

Reply. Man generates his specific likeness, inasmuch as the power of his semen operates to 
pREPare for the coming of the final form which gives the species to man.

Arg. 5. If souls are created by God, He puts the last hand to the engendering of children born 
sometimes of adultery.

Reply. There is no difficulty in that. Not the nature of adulterers is evil, but their will: now the 
effect which their semen produces is natural, not voluntary: hence there is no difficulty in God's 
co-operating to that effect and giving it completeness.

In a book ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa there are found further arguments, as follows:

Arg. 6. Soul and body make one whole, that is, one man. If then the soul is made before the 
body, or the body before the soul, the same thing will be prior and posterior to itself. Therefore 
body and soul are made together. But the body begins in the cutting off, or emission, of the 
semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being by the same.

Reply. Allowing that the human body is formed before the soul is created, or conversely, still it 
does not follow that the same man is prior to himself: for man is not his body or his soul. It only 
follows that one part of him is prior to another part; and in that there is no difficulty: for matter is 
prior in time to form -- matter, I mean, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form, not inasmuch as 
it is actually perfected by form, for so it is together with form. The human body then, inasmuch 
as it is in potentiality to soul, as not yet having the soul, is prior in time to the soul: but, for that 
time, it is not actually human, only potentially so: but when it is actually human, as being 
perfected by a human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the soul, but together with it.
Arg. 7. An agent's activity seems to be imperfect, when he does not produce and bring the whole thing into being, but only half makes it. If then God brought the soul into being, while the body was formed by the power of the male semen, body and soul being the two parts of man, the activities of God and of the seminal power would be both imperfect. Therefore the body and soul of man are both produced by the same cause. But certainly the body of man is produced by the power of the semen: therefore also the soul.

Reply. Body and soul are both produced by the power of God, though the formation of the body is of God through the intermediate instrumentality of the power of the natural semen, while the soul He produces immediately. Neither does it follow that the action of the power of the semen is imperfect, since it fulfils the purpose of its existence.

Arg. 8. In all things that are engendered of seed, the parts of the thing engendered are all contained together in the seed, though they do not actually appear: as we see that in wheat or in any other seed the green blade and stalk and knots and grains and ears are virtually contained in the original seed; and afterwards the seed gathers bulk and expansion by a process of natural consequence leading to its perfection, without taking up any new feature from without. But the soul is part of man. Therefore in the male semen of man the human soul is virtually contained, and it does not take its origin from any exterior cause.

Reply. In seed are virtually contained all things that do not transcend corporeal power, as grass, stalk, knots, and the like: from which there is no concluding that the special element in man which transcends the whole range of corporeal power is virtually contained in the seed.

Arg. 9. Things that have the same development and the same consummation must have the same first origin. But in the generation of man we find the same development and the same consummation: for as the configuration and growth of the limbs advances, the activities of the soul show themselves more and more: for first appears the activity of the sentient soul, and last of all, when the body is complete, the activity of the intelligent soul. Therefore body and soul have the same origin. But the first origin of the body is in the emission of the male semen: such therefore also is the origin of the soul.

Reply. All that this shows is that a certain arrangement of the parts of the body is necessary for the activity of the soul.

Arg. 10. What is conformed to a thing, is set up according to the plan of that to which it is conformed, as wax takes the impress of a seal. But the body of man and of every animal is conformed to its own soul, having such disposition of organs as suits the activities of the power to be exercised through those organs. The body then is formed by the action of the soul: hence also Aristotle says that the soul is the efficient cause of the body. This could not be, if the soul were not in the male semen: for the body is formed by the power that is in that semen: therefore the soul has its origin in that emission of it.

Reply. That the body is conformed and fashioned according to the soul, and that therefore the soul prepares a body like unto itself, is a statement partly true and partly false. Understood of the soul of the generator, it is true: understood of the soul of the generated, it is false. The formation of the body in its prime and principal parts is not due to the soul of the generated, but to the soul of the generator, as has been shown.
Arg. 11. Nothing lives except by a soul. But the male semen is alive, of which fact there are three indications. In the first place, the semen is cut off and detached from a living being: secondly, there appears in it vital heat and activity: thirdly, the seeds of plants, committed to earth, could never warm to life from the lifeless earth, had they not life in themselves.

Reply. The semen is not alive actually, but potentially, and has a soul, not actually, but virtually. In the process of generation the embryo comes to have a vegetative and a sentient soul by the virtue of the semen, which souls do not endure, but pass away and are succeeded by a rational soul.

Arg. 12. If the soul is not before the body (Chap. LXXXIII), nor begins with the liberation of the semen, it follows that the body is first formed, and afterwards there is infused into it a soul newly created. But if this is true, it follows further that the soul is for the body: for what is for another appears after it, as clothes are for men and are made after them. But that is false: rather the body is for the soul, as the end is ever the more noble. We must say then that the origin of the soul is simultaneous with the emission of the semen.

Reply. There are two ways of one thing being 'for another.' A thing may be to serve the activity, or secure the preservation, or otherwise promote the good of another, presupposing its being; and such things are posterior to that for which they are, as clothes for the person, or tools for the mechanic. Or a thing may be 'for another' in view of that other's being: what is thus 'for another' is prior to it in time and posterior to it in nature. In this latter way the body is for the soul, as all matter is for its form. The case would be otherwise, if soul and body did not make one being, as they say who take the soul not to be the form of the body.

2.91 That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies

When human bodies perish in death, the substance of the intelligence remains in perpetuity (Chap. LXXIX). Now if the substance of the intelligence that remains is one for all, as some say, it follows necessarily that it has being apart from body; and thus our thesis is proved, that some subsistent intelligence exists apart from a body. But if a multitude of intelligent souls remain after the destruction of their bodies, then some subsistent intelligences will have the property of subsisting without bodies, all the more inasmuch as it has been shown that souls do not pass from one body to another (Chap LXXXIII). But the property of subsisting apart from bodies is an incidental property in souls, since naturally they are the forms of bodies. But what is ordinary must be prior to what is incidental. There must then be some subsistent intelligences naturally prior to souls; and to these intelligences the ordinary property must attach of subsisting without bodies.

The higher nature in its lowest manifestation touches the next lower nature in its highest. But intelligent nature is higher than corporeal, and at the same time touches it in some part, which is the intelligent soul. As then the body perfected by the intelligent soul is highest in the genus of bodies, so the intelligent soul united to the body must be lowest in the genus of subsistent intelligences. There are then subsistent intelligences not united with bodies, superior in the order of nature to the soul.

The substance of a thing must be proportionate to its activity, because activity is the actualization and perfection of an active substance. But understanding is the proper activity of an intelligent
substance. Therefore an intelligent substance must be competent for such activity. But understanding is an activity not exercised through any bodily organ, and not needing the body except in so far as objects of understanding are borrowed from objects of sense. But that is an imperfect mode of understanding: the perfect mode of understanding is the understanding of those objects which are in themselves intelligible: whereas it is an imperfect mode of understanding when those things only are understood, which are not of themselves intelligible, but are rendered intelligible by intellect. If then before everything imperfect there must be something perfect in that kind, there must be antecedently to human souls, which understand what they gather from phantasms, sundry subsistent intelligences which understand things in themselves intelligible, not gathering their knowledge from sensible objects, and therefore in their nature separate from anything corporeal.

2.98 That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species

Intelligences subsisting apart are subsistent essences. Now the definition of a thing being the mark of its essence, is the mark of its species. Subsistent essences therefore are subsistent species.

Difference in point of form begets difference of species, while difference in point of matter begets difference in number. But intelligences subsisting apart have nothing whatever of matter about them. Therefore it is impossible for them to be several in one species.

The multiplication of species adds more nobility and perfection to the universe than the multiplication of individuals in the same species. But the perfection of the universe consists principally in intelligences subsisting apart. Therefore it makes more for the perfection of the universe that there should be many intelligences different in species than many different in number in the same species.

2.94 That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species

A different type of being makes a different species. But the being of the human soul and of an intelligence subsisting apart is not of one type: the body can have no share in the being of a separately subsisting intelligence, as it can have in the being of the human soul, united with the body as form with matter.

What makes a species by itself cannot be of the same species with that which does not make a species by itself, but is part of a species. Now a separately subsisting intelligence makes a species by itself, but a soul not, it is part of the human species.

The species of a thing may be gathered from the activity proper to it: for activity shows power, and that is an indication of essence. Now the proper activity of a separately subsisting intelligence and of an intelligent soul is understanding. But the mode of understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is quite different from that of the soul. The soul understands by taking from phantasms: not so the separately subsisting intelligence, that has no bodily organs in which phantasms should be.

2.96 That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense
A higher power must have a higher object. But the intellectual power of a separately subsisting intelligence is higher than the intellectual power of the human soul, the latter being lowest in the order of intelligences (Chap. LXXVII). Now the object of the intelligence of the human soul is a phantasm (Chap. LX), which is higher in the order of objects than the sensible thing existing outside and apart from the soul. The object therefore of a separately subsisting intelligence cannot be an objective reality (res) existing outside the soul, as though it could get knowledge immediately from that; nor can it be a phantasm: it must then be something higher than a phantasm. But nothing is higher than a phantasm in the order of knowable objects except that which is an actual term of intelligence. Intelligences subsisting apart therefore do not gather their intellectual knowledge from objects of sense, but understand objects which are of themselves terms of intelligence.

According to the order of intelligences is the order of terms of intelligence. But objects that are of themselves terms of intelligence are higher in order than objects that are terms of intelligence only because we make them so. Of this latter sort are all terms of intelligence borrowed from sensible things: for sensible things are not of themselves intelligible: yet these sensible things are the sort of intelligible things that our intellect understands. A separately subsisting intelligence therefore, being superior to our intelligence, does not understand the intellectual aspects of things by gathering them from objects of sense: it seizes upon those aspects as they are in themselves.

The manner of activity proper to a thing corresponds to the manner and nature of its substance. But an intelligence subsisting apart is by itself, away from any body. Therefore its intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based upon anything corporeal.

From these considerations it appears that in intelligences subsisting apart there is no such thing as active and potential intellect, except perchance by an improper use of those terms. The reason why potential and active intellect are found in our intelligent soul is because it has to gather intellectual knowledge from sensible things: for the active intellect it is that turns the impressions, gathered from sensible things, into terms of intellect: while the potential intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all forms of sensible things. Since then separately subsisting intellects do not gather their knowledge from sensible things, there is in them no active and potential intellect.

Nor again can distance in place hinder the knowledge of a disembodied soul (animae separatae). Distance in place ordinarily affects sense, not intellect, except incidentally, where intellect has to gather its data from sense. For while there is a definite law of distance according to which sensible objects affect sense, terms of intellect, as they impress the intellect, are not in place, but are separate from bodily matter. Since then separately subsistent intelligences do not gather their intellectual knowledge from sensible things, distance in place has no effect upon their knowledge.

Plainly too neither is time mingled with the intellectual activity of such beings. Terms of intellect are as independent of time as they are of place. Time follows upon local motion, and measures such things only as are in some manner placed in space; and therefore the understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is above time. On the other hand, time is a condition of our intellectual activity, since we receive knowledge from phantasms that regard a fixed time. Hence to its judgements affirmative and negative our intelligence always appends a fixed time, except when it understands the essence of a thing. It understands essence by abstracting terms of
understanding from the conditions of sensible things: hence in that operation it understands irrespectively of time and other conditions of sensible things. But it judges affirmatively and negatively by applying forms of understanding, the results of previous abstraction, to things, and in this application time is necessarily understood as entering into the combination.

2.97 That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding

What is sometimes in actuality, sometimes in potentiality, is measured by time. But the mind of an intelligence subsisting apart is above time (Chap. XCVI). Therefore it is not at times in the act of understanding and at times not.

Every living substance has by its nature some actual vital activity always going on in it, although other activities are potential: thus animals are always repairing waste by assimilation of nourishment, though they do not always feel. But separately subsisting intelligences are living substances, and have no other vital activity but that of understanding. Therefore by their nature they must be always actually understanding.

2.98 How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another

As separately subsisting intelligences understand proper terms of intellect; and the said intelligences are themselves such terms, for it is independence of matter that makes a thing be a proper term of intellect; it follows that separately subsisting intelligences understand other such intelligences, finding in them their proper objects. Every such intelligence therefore will know both itself and its fellows. It will know itself, but in a different way from that in which the human potential intellect knows itself. For the potential intellect is only potentially intelligible, and becomes actually such by being impressed with an intellectual impression. Only by such an impression does it become cognizant of itself. But separately subsisting intelligences by their nature are actually intelligible hence every one of them knows himself by his own essence, not by any impression representative of another thing.

A difficulty: Since all knowledge, as it is the knowing mind, is a likeness of the thing known, and one separately subsistent intelligence is like another generically, but differs from it in species (Chap. XCIII), it appears that one does not know another in species, but only so far as the two meet in one common ratio, that of the genus.

Reply. With subsistent beings of a higher order than we are, the knowledge contained in higher generalities is not incomplete, as it is with us. The likeness in the mind of 'animal,' whereby we know a thing generically only, yields us a less complete knowledge than the likeness of 'man,' whereby we know an entire species. To know a thing by its genus is to know it imperfectly and, as it were, potentially; to know it by its species is to know it perfectly and actually. Holding as it does the lowest rank among subsistent intelligences, our intellect stands in such pressing need of particular detailed likenesses, that for every distinct object of its knowledge it requires a distinct likeness in itself: hence the likeness of 'animal' does not enable it to know 'rational,' consequently not 'man' either, except imperfectly. But the intellectual presentation in an intelligence subsisting apart is of a higher power, apt to represent more, and leads to a knowledge, not less perfect, but more perfect. By one presentation such an intelligence knows both 'animal' and the several specific differentias which make the several species of animals: this knowledge is more or less
comprehensive according to the hierarchical rank of the intelligence. We may illustrate this truth by contrasting the two extremes, the divine and human intellect. God knows all things by the one medium of His essence; man requires so many several likenesses, images or presentations in the mind, to know so many several things. Yet even in man the higher understanding gathers more from fewer presentations: slow minds on the other hand need many particular examples to lead them to knowledge. Since a separately subsistent intelligence, considered in its nature, is potentially open to the presentations whereby 'being' in its entirety (totum ens) is known, we cannot suppose that such an intelligence is denuded of all such presentations, as is the case with the potential intellect in use ere it comes to understand. Nor again can we suppose that this separately subsistent intelligence has some of these presentations actually, and others, potentially only. For separate intelligences do not change (Chap. XCVII); but every potentiality in them must be actualized. Thus then the intellect of the separately subsistent intelligence is perfected to the full extent of its capacity by intelligible forms, so far as natural knowledge goes.

2.99 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Material Things, that is to say, the Species of Things Corporeal

Since the mind of these intelligences is perfect with all natural endowments, as being wholly actualized, it must comprehend its object, which is intelligible being, under all its aspects. Now under intelligible being are included the species also of things corporeal.

Since the species of things are distinguished like the species of numbers, whatever is in the lower species must be contained somehow in the higher, as the larger number contains the smaller. Since then separately subsistent intelligences rank higher than corporeal substances, all properties that in a material way are in corporeal substances must be in these separately subsistent intelligences in an intelligible and spiritual way: for what is in a thing is in it according to the mode of the thing in which it is.

2.100 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things

Inasmuch as the likenesses representative of things in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence are more universal than in our mind, and more effectual means of knowledge, such intelligences are instructed by such likenesses of material things not only to the knowledge of material things generically or specifically, as would be the case with our mind, but also to the knowledge of individual existences.

The likeness or presentation of a thing in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence is of far-reaching and universal power, so that, one as that presentation is and immaterial, it can lead to the knowledge of specific principles, and further to the knowledge of individualizing or material principles. Thereby the intelligence can become cognizant, not only of the matter of genus and species, but also of that of the individual.

What a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but in a more excellent way. Hence where the lower power operates through many agencies, the higher power operates through one only: for the higher a power is, the more it is gathered together and unified, whereas the lower is scattered and multiplied. But the human soul, being of lower rank than the separately subsistent intelligence, takes cognizance of the universal and of the singular by two principles, sense and
intellect. The higher and self-subsistent intelligence therefore is cognizant of both in a higher way by one principle, the intellect.

Intelligible impressions of things come to our understanding in the opposite order to that in which they come to the understanding of the separately subsisting intelligence. To our understanding they come by way of analysis (*resolutio*), that is, by abstraction from material and individualizing conditions: hence we cannot know individual things by aid of such intelligible or universal presentations. But to the understanding of the separately subsisting intelligence intelligible impressions arrive by way of synthesis (*compositio*). Such an intelligence has its intelligible impressions by virtue of its assimilation to the original intelligible presentation of the divine understanding, which is not abstracted from things but productive of things -- productive not only of the form, but also of the matter, which is the principle of individuation. Therefore the impressions in the understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence regard the whole object, not only the specific but also the individualizing principles. The knowledge of singular and individual things therefore is not to be withheld from separately subsistent intelligences, for all that our intellect cannot take cognizance of the singular and individual.

2.101 Whether to Separately Subsisting Intelligences all Points of their Natural Knowledge are Simultaneously Present

Not everything is actually understood, of which there is an intellectual impression actually in the understanding. For since a subsistent intelligence has also a will, and is thereby master of his own acts, it is in his power, when he has got an intellectual impression, to use it by actually understanding it; or, if he has several, to use one of them. Hence also we do not actually consider all things whereof we have knowledge. A subsistent intelligence therefore, knowing by a plurality of impressions, uses the one impression which he wishes, and thereby actually knows at once all things which by one impression he does know. For all things make one intelligible object inasmuch as they are known by one presentation -- as also our understanding knows many things together, when thy are as one by composition or relation with one another. But things that an intelligence knows by different impressions, it does not take cognizance of together. Thus, for one understanding, there is one thing at a time actually understood. There is therefore in the mind of a separately subsisting intelligence a certain succession of acts of understanding; not however movement, properly so called: since it is not a case of actuality succeeding potentiality, but of actuality following upon actuality. But the divine mind, knowing all things by the one medium of its essence, and having its act for its essence, understands all things simultaneously: hence in its understanding there is incident no succession, but its act of understanding is entire, simultaneous, perfect, abiding, world without end. Amen.