THE AFRICAN PHILOSOPHER KWAME GYEKYE explores how the Akan people of Ghana conceive of a person. He uses this exploration to argue that there is an African philosophy, and that African philosophy can be found in part in the traditions of the cultures of African people. His enterprise represents one of the approaches in African philosophy, which is to examine and recapture some of the traditional conceptions and worldviews of different cultures of Africa. It must be noted that this approach has been criticized, in that it does not represent how philosophy is seen in the West. Gyekye addresses the skepticism that is displayed when there is talk about African philosophy. He notices that such does not come up when there is talk about African art, music, history, religion, and anthropology. It is generally thought that African philosophy is nonexistent because Africans lack a written tradition and documented ideas, and that philosophy is a special province of other people that Africans lack. He argues that no one denies the existence of Socratic philosophy even though he did not write. So, to deny Africans a philosophy is to imply that they could not conceptualize or make philosophical sense of their experiences, which is to deny them their humanity. He sees philosophy as the intellectual foundation for people’s thought, actions, and the totality of their life.

Gyekye argues that African philosophic thought exists in the form of oral traditions, folksongs, myths, proverbs, beliefs, and rituals; thus it is reflected in people’s attitudes. It should not be difficult for a philosopher to see the philosophical relevance of these materials, which are similar to the philosophical ideas that exist in the Western and Eastern traditions. He relies on such materials in Akan cultures as a basis for reconstructing and interpreting their conception of a person. According to the anthropological account, the Akans see a person as consisting of three elements, which are okra, sun-sum, and honam. The okra is the very inner self, which derives from God and provides the principle and source of life, energy, and vital force for an individual. This may be considered equivalent to the concept of the soul in other metaphysical systems. When a person is dead and has lost all vital
functions, he is said to have had his okra withdrawn; that is, the person has lost his life force. The sunsum may be seen as the spiritual aspect of the person that is not identical with the soul. The anthropological account, which says that the sunsum derives from one’s father and is not divine such that it perishes with the body, is wrong, he argues. This account implies that the sunsum is physical in nature. He argues that the notion of sunsum is a source of confusion and is difficult to analyze in Akan metaphysics. To appreciate that the nature of sunsum cannot be understood as mortal, physical, and derived from one’s father, one must understand its functions and activities. The sunsum is the determinant of one’s distinctive personality, character, dispositions, and behavioral or psychological attributes. If this is the case, it follows that sunsum as the subject of cognitive attributes cannot be material in nature; it must be divine and immortal.

Gyekye argues that we can understand the nature of the sunsum by understanding how the Akans explain the phenomenon of dreaming. It is believed that the sunsum is the actor during dreams; it involves a situation where it is released from the body. This account further illustrates the distinction that the Akans make between the body (honam), the physical aspect of a person, and the spirit (sunsum). In a dream state, the body is inactive but the spirit is active and can do things; the spirit can leave the body and come back to it. On the tripartite account of Akan’s conception of a person, the soul is immaterial, the spirit is immaterial, but the body is material. This picture represents a dualistic metaphysics where a person consists of material and immaterial elements. This raises the question of the nature of the relationship between these two fundamental elements. But one also needs to understand how the soul and the spirit are related or whether they mean the same thing in Akan thought system. He says that there are some views among the Akans that okra and sunsum are identical. This means that what can be said about one can also be said about the other. He indicates that the Akans say some things of the okra which cannot be said of the sunsum: they have different predicates and attributes, or there is at least one predicate which does not logically apply to both. As such, they are not identical, hence, there is the need to reconstruct the relation between them.

Gyekye suggests that while okra and sunsum are logically and functionally distinct, they are not ontologically distinct. They do not have separate existences held together by some external bond; they are not two entities that are related. Instead, the sunsum may be said to be a state of the okra: they are a unity in duality. While the okra is the principle of life in general, this prin-
ciple may be instantiated or manifested in different psychological or personality traits. The sunsum is the active force; it is the source of moral agency, hence moral predicates are ascribed to it. According to the Akans’ conception of a person, the soul (okra) is a spiritual entity or a substratum and not simply, as in David Hume’s view, a bundle of qualities. The Akans believe that the soul can subsist or survive in a disembodied state, which will not be possible according to the bundle view. The Akan view suggests that when a person dies in bodily form, he is really not dead in a spiritual form: he (the spiritual substance, okra) survives the bodily death. The soul is believed to have the form of God and is lodged in the head; this explains the belief in a two-way interactionist relation between the body and soul. Any condition of the soul affects the condition of the body and vice versa. This view has relevance to the Akans’ practice of holistic medicine, which requires bringing about concomitant healing in both the soul and the body.

As you read Gyekye, consider and reflect on the following questions: What is Gyekye’s view of philosophy? Why is it unfair to deny Africans a philosophy? What are the functions and nature of the three elements of a person? How is the anthropological Akan view of a person different from Gyekye’s philosophical view? What is the nature of the relation between the soul and spirit? What is the nature of the relation between the spiritual and material aspects of a person?

INTRODUCTION

A number of scholars, including philosophers, tend to squirm a little at the mention of “African philosophy,” though they do not do so at the mention of African art, music, history, anthropology, religion, etc. While the latter cluster of disciplines is being cultivated or pursued in the various Centres or Institutes of African Studies in universities round the world, African philosophy as such is relegated to limbo because it is considered to be non-existent. Philosophy is thus assumed to be a special relish of the peoples of the West and the East. To a very great extent the lack of writing in Africa’s historical past, leading in turn to the absence of a doxographic tradition, that is, a tradition of recorded opinions, has been responsible for the assumption that there is no such thing as African philosophy.

We do not ask the question whether there is European philosophy or Greek philosophy simply because there are the classic *Dialogues, Treatises, Essays, Philosophical Investigations*, which one can immediately delve into if he wants to study European or Greek philosophy. In Africa, traditionally, there has been a dearth of such philosophical classics. Yet this fact does not in any way argue the non-existence of African philosophy. For it is known that Socrates, the celebrated ancient Greek philosopher, did not write anything, although he inherited a written culture; but it is known that he *philosophized*. In India “the Upanishads which are imbued with philosophy . . . were not written down for centuries . . .” An eminent Indian philosopher wrote: “The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity . . . When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing prevalent in India.” (The Vedas constitute the religious and philosophical classics of India. The Upanishads form the concluding portions of the Vedas.) And I learn that Buddha, the ancient Indian philosopher and religious thinker, “wrote no book, but taught orally.” Thus African philosophy is none the worse for the absence, traditionally, of written philosophical literature. To deny to African peoples philosophical thought is to imply that they are unable to make philosophical sense of, or to conceptualize, their experiences; it is in fact to deny them their humanity. For philosophy of some kind is behind the thought and action of every people. It constitutes the intellectual sheet-anchor of their life in its totality.

African philosophic thought not only forms part of the oral literature of the peoples; it is also expressed or reflected in real and vital attitudes. In Africa a great deal of philosophical material is embedded in the proverbs, myths and folk-tales, folk-songs, rituals, beliefs, customs and traditions of the peoples. The interested and careful philosopher can perceive the philosophical relevance of such material and may come across ideas or doctrines or problems that may have some affinity with those of the West or the East, but which originated from the peoples themselves.

After these dialectical preambles, I wish now to turn to a discussion of the Akan concept of a person, in which I shall attempt to interpret, reconstruct, and sort out in a more sophisticated way the elements of the Akan collective thought on the nature of a person, and provide the necessary conceptual or theoretical trimming such as is required by the anthropological and sociological accounts.
I. OKRA (SOUL)

We are given to understand from anthropological accounts that the Akans hold a tripartite conception of a person, considering a human being to be constituted by three elements: okra, sunsum, and honam (or nipayu: body).

The okra is considered to be that which constitutes the very inner self of the individual, the principle of life of that individual, and the embodiment and transmitter of his destiny (fate: nkrabea). It is thought to be a spark of God (Onyame) in man. It is thus divine and has an ante-mundane existence with God; it derives directly from God. The okra, therefore, might be considered as the equivalent of the concept of the soul in other metaphysical systems.

The presence of this divine principle in a human being may have been the basis of the Akan proverb Nnipa nyinaa ye Onyame mma, obiara nye asase ba (“All men are the children of God; no one is a child of the Earth”).

The conception of the okra as the life principle in a person, his vital force, the source of his energy, is linked closely with another concept, namely honhom. Honhom means “breath”; it is the noun form home, to breathe. When a man is dead it is said: ne honhom ko (“his breath is gone”) or ne ‘kra afi ne ho (“his soul has withdrawn from his body”). The two sentences, one with honhom as subject and the other with okra as the subject, do, in fact, say the same thing; they express the same thought, the death-of-the-person. The departure of the soul from the body means the death of a person, and so does ceasing to breathe. Yet this does not mean that the honhom (breath) is the okra (soul). The okra is that which “causes” the breathing. Thus, the honhom is the tangible manifestation or evidence of the okra. (I must say, however, that in some dialects of the Akan language honhom has come to be used interchangeably with sunsum, so that the phrase honhom bone has come to mean the same thing as sunsum bone, i.e. evil “spirit.” The identification of the honhom with the sunsum seems to me to be a recent idea and may have resulted from the translation of the Bible into the various Akan dialects: honhom must have been used to translate the Greek pneuma, breath, spirit. The clarification of the concepts of okra, honhom and sunsum (spirit) is the burden of this paper.)

II. SUNSUM (SPIRIT)

Sunsum is another of the constituent elements of a person. It has usually been rendered in English as “spirit.” In some of the literature on Western metaphysics “spirit” appears to be a generic or comprehensive concept under
which are subsumed specific concepts such as soul, mind, self, consciousness—all of which are, however, considered to be identical. But some Western philosophers distinguish the mind from the soul, for, while they are prepared to admit that a human being has a mind (which they would identify with the brain or a brain state), they deny the existence of the soul mainly because of the immortality attribute that has traditionally been claimed for it. In the Akan metaphysics of the person, however, “spirit” is a specific concept. (I shall show in a later publication on Akan ontology that the concept is also used generically in other contexts.) It appears from the anthropological accounts that even when it is used as a specific concept “spirit” (sunsum) is not identical with the soul (okra) as they do not refer to the same thing. However, the anthropological accounts of the sunsum involve some conceptual blunders, as I hope to show presently. As for the mind (when it is not identified with the soul) it might be rendered also by sunsum, judging from the functions that are attributed by the Akans to the latter (see below).

On the surface it might appear that “spirit” is not appropriate rendition for sunsum; but after clearing some misconceptions engendered by some anthropological writings, I shall show that it is an appropriate rendition but that its real nature requires some clarification. Anthropologists and sociologists have held, (i) that the sunsum derives from the father,8 (ii) that it is not divine,9 and (iii) that it perishes with the disintegration of the honhom,10 that is, the material component of a person. It seems to me, however, that all these three characterizations of the sunsum are incorrect.

Let us first take up the third characterization of the sunsum, namely, that it is something that perishes with the perishing of the body. Now, if a body, a physical object, perishes along with the sunsum, then it would follow that the sunsum also is something physical or material. As a matter of fact Danquah in his philosophical analysis concludes that “sunsum is, in fact, the matter or the physical basis of the ultimate ideal of which okra (soul) is the form and the spiritual or mental basis.”11 Elsewhere he speaks of an “interaction of the material mechanism (sunsum) with the soul,” and assimilates the sunsum to the “sensible form” of Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance and the okra to the “intelligible form.”12 One would conclude from these statements that Danquah also conceived the sunsum as material (although some other statements of his would seem to contradict this). (See below:) The relationship between the honam (body) and the sunsum (supposedly bodily), however, is left unexplained. Thus philosophical, sociological, and anthropological
accounts of the nature of a person have given us the impression that the Akans held a tripartite conception of a human being:

- okra (soul)—immaterial
- sunsum (“spirit”)—material
- honam (body)—material

As we shall see presently, however, this account or analysis of a person, particularly the characterization of the sunsum (“spirit”) as material, is not satisfactory. I must admit at this point that the real nature of the sunsum presents some difficulty for the Akan metaphysics of a person and has been a source of confusion for scholars. The difficulty is not insoluble, however.

There are many things said regarding the functions or activities of the sunsum which indicate that it surely is neither material (physical), nor mortal, nor derived from the father. Busia says that the sunsum “is what moulds the child’s personality and disposition. It is that which determines his character and individuality.” Danquah says: “But we now know the notion which corresponds to the Akan ‘sunsum,’ namely, not ‘spirit’ as such but ‘personality’ which covers the relation of the ‘body’ to the ‘soul’ (okra).” That the sunsum constitutes the personality and character of a person is stated by Danquah in several pages of his book. Rattray also observed that the sunsum is the basis of character and personality. There are indeed some sentences in the Akan language in which the expression sunsum is used in obvious reference to personality (or qualities or traits in a person’s character). Thus, for “he has a strong personality” the Akans would say “ne sunsum ye duru” (i.e. his sunsum is “heavy” or “weighty”). When a man is generous they say that he has a good sunsum (owo sunsum pa). When a man has an impressive or imposing personality they say that he has an overshadowing sunsum (ne sunsum hye me so). In fact sometimes in describing a dignified person they would simply say, owo sunsum, that is, he has a commanding presence. And a man may be said to have a “gentle” sunsum, a “forceful” sunsum, a “submissive” or “weak” sunsum. Thus, the concept of the sunsum would correspond in some ways to what is meant by personality, as was observed by some earlier investigators.

Thus, it is now clear that in Akan conceptions the sunsum (“spirit”) is the basis of a man’s personality, his distinctive character and, in the words of Busia, “his ego.” Personality, of course, is a word that has been given various definitions by psychologists. But I believe that whatever else that concept may involve, it certainly involves the idea of a set of characteristics as shown in a person’s behavior—his thoughts, feelings, actions, etc. (I do not
think that it refers exclusively to a person’s physical appearance.) Thus, if the sunsum is that which embodies a man’s personality, it just cannot be a physical thing, for qualities of personality such as courage, generosity, jealousy, gentleness, forcefulness, meekness, dignity are not sensible or physical qualities; they are psychological. The jealous man feels ill or unhappy because of a possible or actual loss of position, status, expectations, or because of the better fortune of others; a courageous man is able to control fear in the face of danger, pain, misfortune, etc.; the ambitious man has strong desire to achieve something. The expressions feel, fear, and desire are of course psychological (psychological), not physicalistic, expressions. (In Akan metaphysics there is no room for materialism, the doctrine held by some philosophers in the West that a person is fundamentally a physical entity and that what is referred to as mind or soul is in fact identifiable with a person’s brain, which is a physical organ.) Thus, if in fact personality is the function of the sunsum, then the latter cannot conceptually be held to be physical or material; it must surely be something (ade) immaterial, i.e. spiritual.

We have already noted certain statements of Danquah which suggest a physicalistic interpretation of the sunsum. On the other hand, he also maintains that “it is the sunsum that experiences,” and that it is through it that “the okra or soul manifests itself in the world of experience.” Elsewhere he says of the sunsum: “It is the bearer of conscious experience, the unconscious or subliminal self remaining over as the okra or soul.” It is not clear what Danquah means by the “bearer” of experience. Perhaps what he means is that the sunsum is the subject of experience; that which experiences.

This being so, I would think, at least provisionally, that the subject of experience cannot be physical. If, as he thought, it is the sunsum which makes it possible for the destiny (nkraebea: fate) of the soul to be “realized” or “carried out” on earth, then, like the okra (soul), an aspect of whose function it was going to perform, the sunsum also must be considered as something, spiritual, not physical. Danquah’s position on the concept of the sunsum is ambivalent. And so is Busia’s. Busia says that one part of a man is “the personality that comes indirectly from the supreme Being,” that is, God. By “personality” Busia must, on his own showing, be referring to the sunsum of a man, which must, according to my analysis of that concept, derive directly from God, and not from the father. It must, therefore, be divine and immortal, contrary to what he and others thought.

The explanation the Akans give of the phenomenon of dreaming also indicates that the sunsum is something special. For the Akans, as for Sig-
mund Freud, dreams are not somatic but psychic phenomena. They believe that in a dream it is the person’s *sunsum* that is the “actor.” In sleep the *sunsum* is said to be released from the fetters of the body. It, as it were, fashions for itself a new world of forms with the materials of its waking experience. Thus, although the person is deeply asleep, his body (*honam*) lying in bed, yet he may “see” himself standing on the top of a mountain or driving a car or fighting with someone. The actor in any of these actions is thought to be the *sunsum*, which thus can leave the body and return to it.

As the basis or determinant of personality traits—which are non-sensible—as a co-performer of the activities or functions of the *okra* (soul), undoubtedly thought to be a spiritual entity, and as the *dramatis persona* of the spiritual or psychical phenomenon of dreaming, the *sunsum* must be something spiritual (immaterial). This is the reason for my earlier assertion that “spirit” might not be an inappropriate translation for *sunsum*, that is to say, the *sunsum* is something spiritual.

On my analysis, then, we would have the following picture:

\[
\begin{align*}
Okra \text{ (soul)} & \quad \text{—immaterial (spiritual)} \\
Sunsum \text{ (spirit)} & \quad \text{—immaterial (spiritual)} \\
Honam \text{ (body)} & \quad \text{—material (physical)}.
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, the Akans hold a dualistic conception of a person: a person is constituted by two principle substances, one spiritual (immaterial) and the other physical (material).

**Relation of Okra and Sunsum**

Now having shown that the *sunsum* is in fact something spiritual (and for this reason I shall henceforth use the word “spirit” or “spiritual” in reference to *sunsum* without quotes), we must go on to examine whether the expressions *sunsum* (spirit) and *okra* (soul) denote the same object in Akan metaphysics and philosophical psychology. In the course of my field research I was informed by a number of elderly people I interviewed that the *sunsum*, *okra*, and *honhom* (“breath”) are identical; it is one entity that goes under three names. I have already shown that while there is a close link between the *okra* and the *honhom*, the two cannot, nevertheless, be identified. What about the *sunsum* and the *okra*? Can they be identified?

To say that the two can be identified would logically mean that whatever can be asserted of one can or must be asserted of the other. Yet there are some things the Akans say about the *sunsum* which are not said of the
okra; the predicates or attributes of the two are different. Thus, the need for a reconstruction of the relation between the okra and the sunsum. The Akans say:

1) *ne ‘kra di awerehow* (“his kra is sad”: never, “his sunsum is sad”).
2) *ne ‘kra teete* (“his kra is worried or disturbed”).
3) *ne ‘kra adwane* (“his kra has run away,” an expression they use when someone is scared to death).
4) *ne kra ye* (“his kra is good”—a sentence they use when they want to say that a person is lucky or fortunate).
5) *ne kra afi ne ho* (“his kra has withdrawn from his body”).
6) *ne kara dii n’akyi, anka owui* (“but for his kra that followed him, he would have died”).
7) *ne kra aniagye* (“his kra is happy”).

In all such statements, the attributions are made to the okra (kra; soul), never to the sunsum. On the other hand, the Akans say:

1) *owo sunsum* (“he has sunsum,” an expression they use when they want to refer to someone as dignified and having a commanding presence. Here they never say *owo (o) kra* (“he has okra,” soul, for it is believed that every human being has a soul, the principle of life, but the nature of the sunsum differs from person to person; thus they speak of “gentle sunsum,” “forceful sunsum,” “weak or strong sunsum,” etc.).
2) *ne sunsum ye duru* (“his sunsum is heavy or weighty,” i.e. he has a strong personality).
3) *ne sunsum hye (or to) me so* (“his sunsum overshadows mine”).
4) *obi sunsum so kyen obi dee* (“someone’s sunsum is bigger or greater than another’s”).
5) *owo sunsum pa* (“he has a good spirit,” i.e. he is a generous person).

In all such statements the attributions are made to the sunsum, never to the okra.

Now, given x and y, if whatever is asserted of x can be asserted of y, then x can be said to be identical with y. If there is at least one predicate, which x has but y does not have, then x and y are not identical. On this showing, to the extent that things that are asserted or predicated of the okra do not apply to the sunsum, the two cannot logically be identified. But while they are log-
ically and functionally distinct, they are not ontologically distinct. That is to say, they are not separate existences held together by an external bond. They are a unity in duality, a duality in unity. The distinction is not a relation between two independent entities. And the sunsum may, perhaps more accurately, be characterized as a state of the okra (soul). As mentioned earlier, the okra is the principle of life of a person and the embodiment and transmitter of his destiny (nkrahe). Personality and character traits of a person are the function of the sunsum. The sunsum appears to be the source of dynamism of a man, the really active part or force of the psychological system of man. It is said to have extra-sensory powers; it is that which thinks, desires, etc. It is not in any way identical with the brain. Rather it acts upon the brain (adwen); it is that which makes the adwen (brain) work. In short, it is upon the sunsum that man’s health, worldly power, influence, position, success, etc. would depend.

Moreover, moral predicates are generally ascribed to the sunsum. Lystad is, thus, wrong when he says: “in many respects the sunsum or spirit is so identical with the okra or soul in its functions that it is difficult to distinguish between them.”

In the Akan conception of a person, the soul (okra) is held to be a mental or spiritual entity (substance). It is not a bundle of qualities or perceptions, as is held in some western philosophies. The basis for this assertion is the Akan belief in disembodied survival. A bundle theory of substance implies the elimination of the notion of substance, for if a substance is held to be a bundle or collection of qualities or perceptions it would mean that when the qualities or perceptions are removed nothing would be left; there would then be no substance, i.e. no substratum or “owner” of those qualities. Thus, if the soul or mind is held to be a bundle of perceptions, as in Hume, it would be impossible to talk of disembodied survival in the form of a soul or self since the bundle itself is an abstraction. One Akan maxim, expressed epigrammatically, is that “when a man dies he is not (really) dead” (onipa wu a na onwui). What they imply by this is that there is something in a human being which is eternal and indestructible, and which continues to exist in the world of spirits (asamandow). An Akan motif expresses the following thought: “Could God die, I will die” (Onyame bewu na m’awu). In Akan metaphysics God is held to be eternal, immortal (Odomankoma), and what is being asserted in the above thought is that since God will not die, a person, that is, his okra (soul), conceived as a spark of God in a person, will not die either. That is to say, the soul of man
is immortal. But—and this is the point I want to make—the attributes of immortality and eternity make sense if, and only if, the soul is held to be a substance, and not a bundle of qualities or perceptions.

But where in a human being is this mental or spiritual substance located? Descartes thought that the soul is in the pineal gland. The Akans also seem to hold that the soul (okra) is lodged in the head of a person, although they do not mention any specific part of the head where it is. But although it is in the head “you can not see it with your natural eyes,” as they would put it, since it is an immaterial substance.

That the soul is in the head (eti, ti), may be inferred from the following expressions of the Akans: When they want to say that a person is lucky or fortunate they would say ne ti ye (“his head is well”) or ne ‘kra ye (“his soul is well”). Both sentences express the same thought. And when a person is constantly afflicted with misfortunes he would say me ti nnye” (“my head is not well”) or “me ‘kra nnye” (“my soul is not well”). It may be inferred from such expressions that there is some kind of connection between the head and the soul. And although they cannot point to a specific part of the head as the “residence” of the soul, it may be conjectured that it is in the region of the brain (adwen), which, as stated earlier, receives its activism from the sunsum (spirit), a state of the soul (okra). That is, the mind (or, soul) acts on the brain in a specific locality, not that it is itself actually localized.

The Akan conception of a person, as it appears in my analysis, is thoroughly dualistic, not tripartite. A dualistic conception of a person does not necessarily carry with it a belief in a causal relation or interaction between the two parts of the person, soul and body. For instance, some dualistic philosophers in the West maintain a doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, which completely denies causal interaction between body and soul. Others, also dualists, maintain a doctrine of epiphenomenalism which, while not completely rejecting causal interaction, holds that the causal direction goes in one way only, namely, from body to mind; such a doctrine is thus not an interactionist doctrine. The Akans, however, maintain a thorough interactionist position on the relation between soul and body. They believe that not only does the body have a causal influence on the soul but also the soul has a causal influence on the body (honam). What happens to the soul (okra) takes effect or reflects on the condition of the body. Similarly, what happens to the body reflects on the condition of the soul.

It is the actual bodily or physical behaviour of a person that gives some idea of the condition of the soul. Thus, if the physical behaviour of a person
suggests that he is happy they would say ne ‘kra ani agye (“his soul is happy”); if unhappy or morose they would say ne ‘kra di awershow (“his soul is sorrowful”). When the okra (soul) is enfeebled or injured by evil spirits ill health results; and the poor conditions of the body also affect the condition of the soul. That is, the condition of the soul depends on the condition of the body. As a matter of fact the belief in psycho-physical causal interaction is the whole basis of spiritual or psychical, healing. There are certain diseases which are believed to be “spiritual diseases” (sunsum yare) and cannot be healed by the application of physical therapy. In such diseases attention is paid to both physiological and spiritual aspects of the person. Unless the soul is healed the body will not respond to any physical treatment. The removal of a disease of the soul is the activity of the diviners or the “medicine men” (adunsifo).

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The Akans constitute about two-thirds of the peoples of Ghana.


Ibid., p. 116.

Busia, *op. cit.*, p. 197.


E. g., pp. 67, 75, 83, 205.


*Loc. cit.*

Danquah, *op. cit.*, p. 112.


*Loc. cit.* in note 16.

See above.

Lystad, *op. cit.*, p. 158.