“History moves in measures both continuous and discontinuous,” writes Ihab Hassan in his well-known piece, “Postface 1982: Toward a Concept of Postmodernism.” In an effort to account for artistic, epistemic, and social trends and changes of the late twentieth-century, he discusses the relation of postmodernism—a new cultural, philosophical, and literary “phenomenon,” as he calls it—to the historical avant-garde and the high modernism of the 1920s. To paraphrase his statement on history, we should keep in mind that while, to put it simply, the ideas and institutions of the past shape the present, their interpretations are constantly reconfigured and reconceived by ever-evolving social attitudes and conceptions. Hassan thus claims that contemporary heterogenous cultural tendencies, or what he terms postmodernism, “appear as a significant revision, if not an original épistémè, of the twentieth-century Western societies.”

Hassan introduces a neologism, “indetermanence,” to denote what he believes are two central tendencies in postmodernism: indeterminacy and immanence. “Indeterminacy” signifies notions of ambiguity, discontinuity, displacement, difference, plurality, deformation, delegitimation, and revolt. They are the terms of “unmaking” which imply the mode of questioning “the entire realm of discourse in the West,” as he claims. This unmaking may be understood as a mode which marks the breakdown of authority of Western humanism. On literary grounds, this mode of questioning has led to problematizing such traditional notions as author, audience, reading, writing, and genre. “Immanence,” on the other hand, employed “without religious echo,” as Hassan asserts, refers to the “noetic tendency,” namely to the fact that the human subject is interdependent upon language and its social, epistemic, and political forces. These notions are useful to our understanding of postmodernism because, as he argues, postmodernism often “veers toward open, playful, optative, provisional, disjunctive, or indeterminate forms.” Moreover, the fusion between indeterminacy and immanence—indetermanence—implies an interplay between the two tendencies that does not strive toward synthesis, but rather “suggests the action of an ambilectic.” That is, this
interplay foregrounds the logic of “both/and” rather than the exclusionary logic of “either/or.”

Hassan also addresses several conceptual problems that constitute what we now call postmodernism. Undoubtedly, postmodernism evokes modernism as the signifier “post” suggests the desire to surpass modernism. Therefore, the term itself “contains its enemy within,” as he writes, and it also suffers from a “semantic instability” since there is no clear consensus about the meaning of postmodernism among scholars. Wishing to historicize the term, Hassan distinguishes between three artistic modes of the twentieth century: avant-garde, modernism, and postmodernism. Postmodernism, he believes, aligns itself more with the rebellious spirit of the avant-garde because, contrary to the more formalist-oriented modernism, it “strikes us as playful, paratactical, and deconstructionist.” Hence, postmodernism, especially in its alliances with popular culture, is sometimes identified as neo-avant-garde—favoring innovation, renovation, and change. Additionally, in order to further the distinction between modernism and postmodernism, Hassan builds a dichotomous scheme to mark the conceptual differences. For example, he juxtaposes such categories as centering/dispersal, origin/difference, purpose/play, finished work/performance, signified/signifier, metaphysics/irony, and fixed interpretation/fluid interpretation. However, these dichotomies, he cautions, should not be read as binaristic because they are unstable, shifting, and bidirectional.

As you read this selection, consider these three questions: Explore Hassan’s statement that the discourses of postmodernism “appear as a significant revision, if not an original épistémè, of the twentieth-century Western societies.” In what ways is the notion of “indeterminance” significant in Hassan’s discussion of postmodernity? Analyze Hassan’s belief that postmodernism is intricately linked to the philosophical “unmaking” of the “discourse in the West.”

The strains of silence to which I attend in this work, from Sade to Beckett, convey complexities of language, culture, and consciousness as these contest themselves and one another. Such eerie music may yield an

experience, an intuition, of postmodernism but no concept or definition of it. Perhaps I can move, in this Postface, toward such a concept by putting forth certain queries. I begin with the most obvious: can we really perceive a phenomenon, in Western societies generally and in their literatures particularly, that needs to be distinguished from modernism, needs to be named? If so, will the provisional rubric “postmodernism” serve? Can we then—or even should we at this time—construct of this phenomenon some probative scheme, both chronological and typological, that may account for its various trends and counter-trends, its artistic, epistemic, and social character? And how would this phenomenon—let us call it postmodernism—relate itself to such earlier modes of change as turn-of-the-century avant-gardes or the high modernism of the twenties? Finally, what difficulties would inhere in any such act of definition, such a tentative heuristic scheme?

I am not certain that I can wholly satisfy my own questions, though I can assay some answers that may help to focus the larger problem. History, I take it, moves in measures both continuous and discontinuous. Thus the prevalence of postmodernism today, if indeed it prevails, does not suggest that ideas or institutions of the past cease to shape the present. Rather, traditions develop, and even types suffer a seachange. Certainly, the powerful cultural assumptions generated by, say, Darwin, Marx, Baudelaire, Nietzsche, Cézanne, Debussy, Freud, and Einstein still pervade the Western mind. Certainly those assumptions have been reconceived, not once but many times—else history would repeat itself, forever same. In this perspective, postmodernism may appear as a significant revision, if not an original épistémè, of twentieth-century Western societies.

Some names, piled here pell-mell, may serve to adumbrate postmodernism, or at least suggest its range of assumptions: Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard (philosophy), Michel Foucault, Hayden White (history), Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, R. D. Laing, Norman O. Brown (psychoanalysis), Herbert Marcuse, Jean Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas (political philosophy), Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend (philosophy of science), Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Wolfgang Iser, the “Yale Critics” (literary theory), Merce Cunningham, Alwin Niklais, Meredith Monk (dance), John Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez (music), Robert Rauschenberg, Jean Tinguely, Joseph Beuys (art), Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, Brent Bolin (architecture), and various authors from Samuel Beckett, Eugène Ionesco, Jorge Luis Borges, Max Bense, and Vladimir Nabokov to Harold Pinter, B. S. Johnson, Rayner Heppenstall, Christine Brooke-Rose, Helmut Heissenbu-
tel, Jürgen Becker, Peter Handke, Thomas Bernhardt, Ernst Jandl, Gabriel García Márquez, Julio Cortázar, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Michel Butor, Maurice Roche, Philippe Sollers, and, in America, John Barth, William Burroughs, Thomas Pynchon, Donald Barthelme, Walter Abish, John Ashbery, David Antin, Sam Shepard, and Robert Wilson. Indubitably, these names are far too heterogenous to form a movement, paradigm, or school. Still, they may evoke a number of related cultural tendencies, a constellation of values, a repertoire of procedures and attitudes. These we call postmodernism.

Whence this term? Its origin remains uncertain, though we know that Federico de Onís used the word _postmodernismo_ in his _Antología de la poesía española e hispanoamericana_ (1882–1932), published in Madrid in 1934; and Dudley Fitts picked it up again in his _Anthology of Contemporary Latin-American Poetry_ of 1942. Both meant thus to indicate a minor reaction to modernism already latent within it, reverting to the early twentieth century. The term also appeared in Arnold Toynbee’s _A Study of History_ as early as D. C. Somervell’s first-volume abridgement in 1947. For Toynbee, Post-Modernism designated a new historical cycle in Western civilization, starting around 1875, which we now scarcely begin to discern. Somewhat later, during the fifties, Charles Olson often spoke of postmodernism with more sweep than lapidary definition.

But prophets and poets enjoy an ample sense of time, which few literary scholars seem to afford. In 1959 and 1960, Irving Howe and Harry Levin wrote of postmodernism rather disconsolately as a falling off from the great modernist movement. It remained for Leslie Fiedler and myself, among others, to employ the term during the sixties with premature approbation, and even with a touch of bravado. Fiedler had it in mind to challenge the elitism of the high modernist tradition in the name of popular culture. I wanted to explore that impulse of self-unmaking which is part of the literary tradition of silence. Pop and silence, or mass culture and deconstruction, or Superman and Godot—or as I shall later argue, immanence and indeterminacy—may all be aspects of the postmodern universe. But all this must wait upon more patient analysis, longer history.

Yet the history of literary terms serves only to confirm the irrational genius of language. We come closer to the question of postmodernism itself by acknowledging the psychopolitics, if not the psychopathology, of academic life. Let us admit it: there is a will to power in nomenclature, as well as in people or texts. A new term opens for its proponents a space in language. A critical concept of system is a “poor” poem of the intellectual imag-
ination. The battle of the books is also an ontic battle against death. That may be why Max Planck believed that one never manages to convince one’s opponents—not even in theoretical physics!—one simply tries to outlive them. William James described the process in less morbid terms: novelties are first repudiated as nonsense, then declared obvious, then appropriated by former adversaries as their own discoveries.

I do not mean to take my stand with the postmoderns against the (ancient) moderns. In an age of frantic intellectual fashions, values can be too recklessly voided, and tomorrow can quickly preempt today or yesteryear. Nor is it merely a matter of fashions; for the sense of supervention may express some cultural urgency that partakes less of hope than fear. This much we recall: Lionel Trilling entitled one of his most thoughtful works Beyond Culture (1965); Kenneth Boulding argued that “postcivilization” is an essential part of The Meaning of the 20th Century (1964); and George Steiner could have subtitled his essay, In Bluebeard’s Castle (1971), “Notes Toward the Definition of Postculture.” Before them, Roderick Seidenberg published his Post-Historic Man exactly in mid-century; and most recently, I have myself speculated, in The Right Promethean Fire (1980), about the advent of a posthumanist era. As Daniel Bell put it: “It used to be that the great literary modifier was the word beyond. . . . But we seem to have exhausted the beyond, and today the sociological modifier is post. . . .”

My point here is double: in the question of postmodernism, there is a will and counter-will to intellectual power, an imperial desire of the mind, but this will and desire are themselves caught in a historical moment of supervention, if not exactly of obsolescence. The reception or denial of postmodernism thus remains contingent on the psychopolitics of academic life—including the various dispositions of people and power in our universities, of critical factions and personal frictions, of boundaries that arbitrarily include or exclude—no less than on the imperatives of the culture at large. This much, reflexivity seems to demand from us at the start.

But reflection demands also that we address a number of conceptual problems that both conceal and constitute postmodernism itself. I shall try to isolate ten of these, commencing with the simpler, moving toward the more intractable.

1. The word postmodernism sounds not only awkward, uncouth; it evokes what it wishes to surpass or suppress, modernism itself. The term thus contains its enemy within, as the terms romanticism and classicism, baroque and rococo, do not. Moreover, it denotes temporal
linearity and connotes belatedness, even decadence, to which no postmodernist would admit. But what better name have we to give this curious age? The Atomic, or Space, or Television, Age? These technological tags lack theoretical definition. Or shall we call it the Age of Indeterminance (indeterminacy + immanence) as I have half-antically proposed? Or better still, shall we simply live and let others live to call us what they may?

2. Like other categorical terms—say poststructuralism, or modernism, or romanticism for that matter—postmodernism suffers from a certain semantic instability: that is, no clear consensus about its meaning exists among scholars. The general difficulty is compounded in this case by two factors: (a) the relative youth, indeed brash adolescence, of the term postmodernism, and (b) its semantic kinship to more current terms, themselves equally unstable. Thus some critics mean by postmodernism what others call avant-gardism or even neo-avantgardism, while still others would call the same phenomenon simply modernism. This can make for inspired debates.

3. A related difficulty concerns the historical instability of many literary concepts, their openness to change. Who, in this epoch of fierce misprisions, would dare to claim that romanticism is apprehended by Coleridge, Pater, Lovejoy, Abrams, Peckham, and Bloom in quite the same way? There is already some evidence that postmodernism, and modernism even more, are beginning to slip and slide in time, threatening to make any diacritical distinction between them desperate. But perhaps the phenomenon, akin to Hubble’s “red shift” in astronomy, may someday serve to measure the historical velocity of literary concepts.

4. Modernism and postmodernism are not separated by an Iron Curtain or Chinese Wall; for history is a palimpsest, and culture is permeable to time past, time present, and time future. We are all, I suspect, a little Victorian, Modern, and Postmodern, at once. And an author may, in his or her own life time, easily write both a modernist and postmodernist work. (Contrast Joyce’s *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* with his *Finnegans Wake.*) More generally, on a certain level of narrative abstraction, modernism itself, may be rightly assimilated to romanticism, romanticism related to the enlightenment, the latter to
the renaissance, and so back, if not to the Olduvai Gorge, then certainly to ancient Greece.

5. This means that a “period,” as I have already intimated, must be perceived in terms both of continuity and discontinuity, the two perspectives being complementary and partial. The Apollonian view, rangy and abstract, discerns only historical conjunctions; the Dionysian feeling, sensuous though nearly purblind, touches only the disjunctive moment. Thus postmodernism, by invoking two divinities at once, engages a double view. Sameness and difference, unity and rupture, filiation and revolt, all must be honored if we are to attend to history, apprehend (perceive, understand) change both as a spatial, mental structure and as a temporal, physical process, both as pattern and unique event.

6. Thus a “period” is generally not a period at all; it is rather both a diachronic and synchronic construct. Postmodernism, again like modernism or romanticism, is no exception; it requires both historical and theoretical definition. We would not seriously claim an inaugural “date” for it as Virginia Woolf pertly did for modernism, which she said began “in or about December, 1910”—though we may sometimes woefully imagine that postmodernism began “in or about September, 1939.” Thus we continually discover “antecedents” of postmodernism—in Sterne, Sade, Blake, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Jarry, Tzara, Hoffmannsthal, Gertrude Stein, the later Joyce, the later Pound, Duchamp, Artaud, Roussel, Bataille, Broch, Queneau, and Kafka. What this really indicates is that we have created in our mind a model of postmodernism, a particular typology of culture and imagination, and have proceeded to “rediscover” the affinities of various authors and different moments with that model. We have, that is, reinvented our ancestors—and always shall. Consequently, “older” authors can be postmodern—Kafka, Beckett, Borges, Nabokov, Gombrowicz—while “younger” authors need not be so—Styron, Updike, Capote, Irving, Doctorow, Gardner.

7. As we have seen, any definition of postmodernism calls upon a fourfold vision of complementarities, embracing continuity and discontinuity, diachrony and synchrony. But a definition of the concept also requires a dialectical vision; for defining traits are often antithetical, and to ignore this tendency of historical reality is to lapse into single
vision and Newton’s sleep. Defining traits are dialectical and also plural; to elect a single trait as an absolute criterion of postmodern grace is to make of all other writers preterites. Thus we can not simply rest—as I have sometimes done—on the assumption that postmodernism is anti-formal, anarchic, or decreative; for though it is indeed all these, and despite its fanatic will to unmaking, it also contains the need to discover a “unitary sensibility” (Sontag), to “cross the border and close the gap” (Fiedler), and to attain, as I have suggested, an immanence of discourse, an expanded noetic intervention, a “neognostic im mediacy of mind.”

8. All this leads to the prior problem of periodization itself, which is also that of literary history conceived as a particular apprehension of change. Indeed, the concept of postmodernism implies some theory of innovation, renovation, novation, or simply change. But which one? Heraclitean? Viconian? Darwinian? Marxist? Freudian? Kuhnian? Derridean? Eclectic? Or is a “theory of change” itself an oxymoron best suited to ideologues intolerant of the ambiguities of time? Should postmodernism, then, be left—at least for the moment—unconceptualized, a kind of literary-historical “difference” or “trace”?

9. Postmodernism can expand into a still larger problem: is it only an artistic tendency or also a social phenomenon, perhaps even a mutation in Western humanism? If so, how are the various aspects of this phenomenon—psychological, philosophical, economic, political—joined or disjoined? In short, can we understand postmodernism in literature without some attempt to perceive the lineaments of a postmodern society, a Toynbeean postmodernity, or future Foucauldian épistémè, of which the literary tendency I have been discussing is but a single, elitist strain?

10. Finally, though not least vexing, is postmodernism an honorific term, used insidiously to valorize writers, however disparate, whom we otherwise esteem, to hail trends, however discordant, which we somehow approve? Or is it, on the contrary, a term of opprobrium and objurgation? In short, is postmodernism a descriptive as well as evaluative or normative category of literary thought? Or does it belong, as Charles Altieri notes, to that category of “essentially contested concepts” in philosophy which never wholly exhaust their constitutive confusions?
No doubt, other conceptual problems lurk in the matter of postmodernism. Such problems, however, can not finally inhibit the intellectual imagination, the desire to apprehend our historical presence in noetic constructs that reveal our being to ourselves. I move, therefore, to propose a provisional scheme that the literature of silence, from Sade to Beckett, seems to envisage, and do so by distinguishing, tentatively, between three modes of artistic change in the last hundred years. I call these avant-garde, modern, and postmodern, though I realize that all three have conspired together to create that “tradition of the new” which, since Baudelaire, brought “into being an art whose history regardless of the credos of its practitioners, has consisted of leaps from vanguard to vanguard, and political mass movements whose aim has been the total renovation not only of social institutions but of man himself.”

By avant-garde, I mean those movements that agitated the earlier part of our century, including Tataphysics, Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Suprematism, Constructivism, Merzism, de Stijl—some of which I have already discussed in this work. Anarchic, these assaulted the bourgeoisie with their art, their manifestoes, their antics. But their activism could also turn inward, becoming suicidal—as happened later to some postmodernists like Rudolf Schwartzkogler. Once full of brio and bravura, these movements have all but vanished now, leaving only their story, at once fugacious and exemplary. Modernism, however, proved more stable, aloof, hieratic, like the French Symbolism from which it derived; even its experiments now seem olympian. Enacted by such “individual talents” as Valéry, Proust, and Gide, the early Joyce, Yeats, and Lawrence, Rilke, Mann, and Musil, the early Pound, Eliot, and Faulkner, it commanded high authority, leading Delmore Schwartz to chant in Shenandoah: “Let us consider where the great men are / Who will obsess the child when he can read. . . .” But if much of modernism appears hieratic, hypotactical, and formalist, postmodernism strikes us by contrast as playful, paratactical, and deconstructionist. In this, it recalls the irreverent spirit of the avant-garde, and so carries sometimes the label of neo-avant-garde. Yet postmodernism remains “cooler,” in McLuhan’s sense, than older vanguards—cooler, less cliquish, and far less aversive to the pop, electronic society of which it is a part, and so hospitable to kitsch.

Can we distinguish postmodernism further? Perhaps certain schematic differences from modernism will provide a start:
Modernism
Postmodernism
Romanticism/Symbolism
'Pataphysics/Dadaism
Form (conjunctive, closed)
Antiform (disjunctive, open)
Purpose
Play
Design
Chance
Hierarchy
Anarchy
Mastery/Logos
Exhaustion/Silence
Art Object/Finished Work
Process/Performance/Happening
Distance
Participation
Creation/Totalization
Decreation/Deconstruction
Synthesis
Antithesis
Presence
Absence
Centering
Dispersal
Genre/Boundary
Text/Intertext
Semantics
Rhetoric
Paradigm
Syntagm
Hypotaxis
Parataxis
Metaphor
Metonymy
Selection
Combination
Root/Depth
Rhizome/Surface
Interpretation/Reading
Against Interpretation/Misreading
Signified
Signifier
Lisible (Readerly)
Scriptible (Writerly)
Narrative/Grande Histoire
Anti-narrative/Petite Histoire
Master Code
Idiolect
Symptom
Desire
Type
Mutant
Genital/Phallic
Polymorphous/Androgynous
Paranoia
Schizophrenia
Origin/Cause
Difference-Differance/Trace
God the Father
The Holy Ghost
Metaphysics
Irony
Determinacy
Indeterminacy
Transcendence
Immanence
The preceding table draws on ideas in many fields—rhetoric, linguistics, literary theory, philosophy, anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, even theology—and draws on many authors—European and American—aligned with diverse movements, groups, and views. Yet the dichotomies this table represents remain insecure, equivocal. For differences shift, defer, even collapse; concepts in any one vertical column are not all equivalent; and inversions and exceptions, in both modernism and postmodernism, abound. Still, I would submit that rubrics in the right column point to the postmodern tendency, the tendency of indeterminance, and so may bring us closer to its historical and theoretical definition.

The time has come, however, to explain a little that neologism: “indeterminance.” I have used that term to designate two central, constitutive tendencies in postmodernism: one of indeterminacy, the other of immanence. The two tendencies are not dialectical; for they are not exactly antithetical; nor do they lead to a synthesis. Each contains its own contradictions, and alludes to elements of the other. Their interplay suggests the action of an ambilectic, pervading postmodernism. Since I have discussed this topic at some length elsewhere, I can advert to it here briefly.

By indeterminacy, or better still, indeterminacies, I mean a complex referent which these diverse concepts help to delineate: ambiguity, discontinuity, heterodoxy, pluralism, randomness, revolt, perversion, deformation. The latter alone subsumes a dozen current terms of unmaking: decreation, disintegration, deconstruction, decenterment, displacement, difference, discontinuity, disjunction, disappearance, decomposition, de-definition, demystification, detotalization, delegitimation—let alone more technical terms referring to the rhetoric of irony, rupture, silence. Through all these signs moves a vast will to unmaking, affecting the body politic, the body cognitive, the erotic body, the individual psyche—the entire realm of discourse in the West. In literature alone, our ideas of author, audience, reading, writing, book, genre, critical theory, and of literature itself, have all suddenly become questionable. And in criticism? Roland Barthes speaks of literature as “loss,” “perversion,” “dissolution”; Wolfgang Iser formulates a theory of reading based on textual “blanks”; Paul de Man conceives rhetoric—that is, literature—as a force that “radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration”; and Geoffrey Hartman affirms that “contemporary criticism aims at the hermeneutics of indeterminacy.”

Such uncertain diffractions make for vast dispersals. Thus I call the second major tendency of postmodernism immanences, a term that I employ
without religious echo to designate the capacity of mind to generalize itself in symbols, intervene more and more into nature, act upon itself through its own abstractions and so become, increasingly, immediately, its own environment. This noetic tendency may be evoked further by such sundry concepts as diffusion, dissemination, pulsion, interplay, communication, interdependence, which all derive from the emergence of human beings as language animals, *homo pictor* or *homo significans*, gnostic creatures constituting themselves, and determinedly their universe, by symbols of their own making. Is “... this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is about to topple, and that man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon?” Foucault famously asks. Meanwhile, the public world dissolves as fact and fiction blend, history becomes derealized by media into a happening, science takes its own models as the only accessible reality, cybernetics confronts us with the enigma of artificial intelligence, and technologies project our perceptions to the edge of the receding universe or into the ghostly interstices of matter. Everywhere—even deep in Lacan’s “lettered unconscious,” more dense than a black hole in space—everywhere we encounter that immanence called Language, with all its literary ambiguities, epistemic conundrums, and political distractions.

No doubt, these tendencies may seem less rife in England, say, than in America or France where the term postmodernism, reversing the recent direction of poststructuralist flow, has now come into use. But the fact in most developed societies remains: as an artistic, philosophical, and social phenomenon, postmodernism veers toward open, playful, optative, provisional (open in time as well as in structure or space), disjunctive, or indeterminate forms, a discourse of ironies and fragments, a “white ideology” of absences and fractures, a desire of diffractions, an invocation of complex, articulate silences. Postmodernism veers towards all these yet implies a different, if not antithetical, movement toward pervasive procedures, ubiquitous interactions, immanent codes, media, languages. Thus our earth seems caught in the process of planetization, transhumanization, even as it breaks up into sects, tribes, factions of every kind. Thus, too, terrorism and totalitarianism, schism and ecumenism, summon one another, and authorities decreate themselves even as societies search for new grounds of authority. One may well wonder: is some decisive historical mutation—invoking art and science, high and low culture, the male and female principles, parts and wholes, involving the One and the Many as pre-Socratics used to say—active in our midst? Or does the dismemberment of Orpheus prove no more
than the mind’s need to make but one more construction of life’s mutabilities
and human mortality?

And what construction lies beyond, behind, within, that construction?