YOU CAN’T IMAGINE HOW difficult it is to choose only one selection about Kant written by Lewis White Beck. Beck, who is the dean of Kant interpreters in the United States and perhaps the world, has translated Kant, written about Kant, extended Kant’s analyses, and provided commentaries about Kant’s work. The following selection is taken from just such a work, a commentary on Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*.

Scholars generally agree that Kant’s original intention was to write only one book dealing with human knowledge, *Critique of Pure Reason*. That work, however, opened up further questions that Kant explored in two other critiques: *Critique of Practical Reason* (dealing with moral judgments) and *Critique of Judgment* (dealing with beauty and art). Some interpreters refer to these as Kant’s first, second, and third critique, as does Beck.

In *Critique of Pure Reason* (the first critique) Kant argues that we cannot prove the existence of God because the traditional arguments for God’s existence do not work. Any argument, such as the cosmological argument, that proceeds from the existence of the world to God as its cause is an illegitimate application of the principle of causality. Why? Because we can only legitimately and with confidence apply this principle to those things we can experience with our senses, and neither God nor the world can so be experienced. The ontological argument fails, Kant argues, because it presumes that existence is a predicate; that is, to say that something exists is to add to its qualities. If God is the most perfect being, then God possesses all positive qualities including existence. But if existence is not a predicate, which is Kant’s position, then the ontological argument fails. To say that something exists is only to make a claim that there is an instance of that thing in reality, and again that is something we know only by sense experience.

If these were Kant’s last words on the subject, he might be thought to be one of the more eloquent atheists in the philosophical tradition. But such is not the case. Kant returns to the question of God’s existence in *Critique of Practical Reason* (the second critique) and there offers a moral argument for God’s existence. Of all the traditional arguments for God, Kant thinks the
design argument (he calls it the physicoteleological argument) was the most compelling, and though it fell short of being a coercive proof, Kant says that it is always an argument deserving of respect. He goes on to argue that such an approach to God is enhanced by morality; indeed, his claim is that the only valid theology is moral theology.

How these twists and turns are worked out is explained in detail by the Beck article that follows. How the argument works, and whether in the end it succeeds, are issues you will wrestle with as you work through the reading. Also, understand what Kant means by the *summum bonum*. Do you agree that this is the highest good? What does it contribute to Kant’s analysis for him to describe the existence of God as a postulate? Kant further says that religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands; what do you think this means? Beck says that “there is no such thing as . . . a system of moral rules derived from knowledge of God.” Why is this the case? Do you agree with Beck’s (and Kant’s) claim? Finally, do you find Kant’s moral argument convincing? Why or why not?

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5. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In *The Only Possible Premise for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1764) Kant proposed an ontological argument quite different from the Cartesian form, and in Part II of that work he supplemented the ontological with a teleological argument. The ontological argument in the Cartesian form was refuted in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but he did not consider at any later time the specific kind of ontological argument that he himself had invented; instead of being refuted, it just died a natural death along with the rest of speculative rationalistic metaphysics, for it suffered from the fundamental defect of all ontological arguments, viz., that it is not possible to know the existence of anything from mere concepts.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* God is called the “Ideal of Pure Reason,” not just an Idea; for God is thought of as a single individual substance and the ground of the existence and unity of all things in general. Three possible theoretical proofs are distinguished: the ontological, or proof of existence from the concept of perfection; the cosmological, or proof of the existence of

a first cause from the existence of the world; and the physicoteleological, or proof from the empirical evidence of intelligent design in nature. These are the only possible proofs, for they have as their respective premises a mere concept, a concept of existence, and a concept of a specific existence. The structure of the refutation can be briefly described. The ontological argument is invalid because “God exists” is a synthetic proposition and therefore cannot be proved without intuition, but intuition of a super-sensuous being is necessarily lacking. The other arguments, however, while they, as it were, lead up to the concept of God, cannot realize it without surreptitiously introducing the ontological form of argument. Hence no theoretical proof of God’s existence is possible.

The teleological argument, however, is worthy of respect and remains subjectively persuasive even when its formal fallacy is revealed. It remains useful when its concept of God as the Author of design in nature is used simply as a regulative Idea for anticipating the orderliness of nature. Its use as a regulative maxim can always benefit science in the comprehension of nature and never injure it except by misuse, even when the facts discovered by its use do not bear out the expectation of teleological unity. But if God as the source of order in nature is taken as an object of knowledge, as in the pretensions of natural theology, the interest of theoretical reason is infringed, since the concept of God, now taken anthropomorphically, is used “to impose ends upon nature, forcibly and dictatorially, instead of [helping us to pursue] the more reasonable course of searching for them by the path of physical investigation”—though this investigation is guided by the regulative Idea that the variety of nature is to be explained under a minimum of laws, which is rendered intelligible on the assumption of a design.

Like the other Ideas, therefore, the Idea of God properly understood is a problematic one that cannot be asserted by theoretical reason but need not be asserted for the purposes of theory. Theory can use it, provided only that its possibility is guaranteed. But the needs of practical reason build on this possibility an assertion. The first attempt to justify this has already taken place in the first *Critique*.

The reader of this commentary has already had the passage in which this attempt is made called several times to his attention; only a brief reminder of it is needed here. The *summum bonum* is not possible unless the soul is immortal and God exists—the former because in this world happiness and worthiness to be happy are not matched, and the latter because they cannot be brought into unison without a supernatural agency. The *summum bonum*
is a necessary object of the will; hence it is necessary to postulate it along with its conditions. But though Kant says it is not the desire for happiness, even happiness in accord with virtue, that is the motive to morality, he nevertheless says that without the *summum bonum* and these conditions of it, “the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of admiration and approval, but not springs of purpose and action.” We postulate the existence of God “in order that through such agency effect may be given” to the moral laws.

The element of reward is no longer a principal premise for the argument for immortality in the second *Critique*, but Kant does not omit it from the later argument for the existence of God. Nevertheless, with the development of the theory of autonomy, there is a decisive modification of the peculiar feature of the argument of the first *Critique*. The belief in the existence of God is based upon the putative necessity of the second element in the *summum bonum*; but he now succeeds in explaining more fully how it can be present and not function as a motive—a matter that made the conclusion in the first *Critique* seem heteronomous, as pointed out above. Now the reason for assuming the *summum bonum* and its conditions is not that man naturally desires happiness and happiness is a component of the *summum bonum*; it is that the moral command would not be just ineffective, *it would be null and void*, if it commanded the impossible, and the *summum bonum* would be impossible (so far as human mind can comprehend it) if God did not exist.

We are now ready to summarize Kant’s argument for this postulate.

1. Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will.
2. Man’s will is not the cause of nature and does not bring nature into complete harmony with the principles of his will.
3. There is, therefore, no ground in the moral law (or in nature) for expecting a necessary connection between the morality and happiness of men.
4. But such a connection, in the concept of the *summum bonum*, is postulated in the command that we ought to seek the *summum bonum*.
5. The highest good must, therefore, be possible.
6. Therefore, a cause adequate to it must be postulated.
7. Such a cause must be the Author of nature, acting through understanding and will. Such a being is God.
Let us begin our examination of this argument with statement 3. The disproportion of worthiness to be happy and actual happiness can be and often has been taken as evidence against the existence of God, at least in the sense of statement 7. How then does Kant manage to build this premise of his opponents into an argument for the existence of God? The answer is found not in any alleged theoretical fact or hypothesis of the kind ordinarily used to “solve” the problem of natural evil, but in the practical premise (4), viz., “Seek to realize the highest good.”

We have already commented extensively on this alleged imperative. We have argued that, as an imperative, it is a command only that we seek virtue, let the eschatological chips fall where they may. But Kant regards the second component of the *summum bonum* as essential because he holds an ideal of the rationality of morals. This is described at the beginning of chapter ii of the Dialectic. Happiness, he says there, is required in the *summum bonum* “not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself his end but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which impartially regards persons in the world as ends in-themselves.” (Here we meet Kant’s version of the English philosophers’ “disinterested observer.”) “For to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it and yet not partake of it could not be in accordance with the complete volition of an omnipotent rational being, if we assume such only for the sake of argument.”

This seems innocent enough; but notice that it completely displaces premise 4, the practical clause of which made the argument of the second *Critique a moral* argument. The alleged command to seek to establish the *summum bonum* now contributes nothing to the conception of the distribution of happiness in accord with worthiness. The argument based on this conception of the *summum bonum* as rational is a revision of the teleological argument, which is purely theoretical.

It is not, of course, a physicoteleological argument, but only an analogy to it. It is a teleological argument, based not on the moral command in question but on the moral phenomenon as requiring a designer for the adjustment of two disparate things to each other. This is not made clear in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where the moral argument is compared with the physicoteleological to the detriment and censure of the latter. But it dominates the final theological sections of the *Critique of Judgement*, and the moral argument of the second *Critique* had already been assigned to the obscurity of a difficult footnote by the time Kant wrote the treatise on religion. The explicit formulation of the new teleological argument is given in the *Metaphysik der*
Sitten, in the sample of moral catechism Kant works out. The passage is as follows:

**Teacher:** When we are conscious of a good and active will through which we hold ourselves to be worthy (or at least not unworthy) of happiness, can we base on it the certain hope of partaking of this happiness?

**Pupil:** No, not on that alone... Our happiness remains only a wish that cannot be a hope unless some other power is added.

**Teacher:** Has reason perhaps grounds in itself to believe in God, i.e., to assume as real a power that apportions happiness according to desert, ordering nature and ruling the world with supreme wisdom?

**Pupil:** Yes; for we see in the works of nature which we can judge such an extensive and profound wisdom that we cannot explain it except through the inexpressibly great art of a Creator; and from this we have reason to promise ourselves a not less wise government as respects the moral order, which is the highest ornament of the world; to promise ourselves that if we do not make ourselves unworthy of happiness through trespassing against our duty, we may also hope to participate in it.5

This passage is especially noteworthy. There is no discussion of the *summum bonum* in the *Metaphysik der Sitten*. The proof of God’s existence is an argument from design, pure and simple. As a theoretical argument, it “always deserves to be mentioned with respect,” but it is neither theoretically coercive nor independent of the ontological argument. Yet it is, if my analysis is correct, the hidden sense of the moral argument, since the practical premise of the moral argument—the command to seek the whole *summum bonum*—merely calls attention to the internal heterogeneity of this concept without placing us under any obligation to seek the second of the components.

The shift from the practical to the theoretical argument, however, contributes nothing to the theoretical fruitfulness of the concept of God; it may indeed lessen it. For theoretical arguments, as shown in the first *Critique*, could lead, if they were valid, only to the cosmological concept of a cause, which is less than what is meant by God, or they enrich the concept with anthropomorphic predicates, reasoning by analogy. These analogies, however, never lead to the superlatives demanded by the concept of God.6 If the anthropomorphic elements in the physicoteleological conception are removed, nothing is left of the concept of God but the mere name.
The moral argument, paradoxical though it may seem, leads to a less anthropomorphic conception of God than that of natural theology. For all the predicates essentially attributed to God are predicates which define merely a rational being endowed with a will, and these concepts are not empirical, psychological concepts. We do not need to consider the peculiar nature of human understanding or will—that the former is discursive and that the latter is sensuously affected—in the definition of moral personality, but only the canonical relation of the former to the latter. This relation is the starting point for the (moral) argument for the existence of God, and this is the only essential content that the concept of God has. The only conclusions that can be drawn from the concept concern these two in their interrelations; they are all moral in their import. If we try to “sensualize” the conception of God, we weaken its moral force by mixing empirical concepts drawn from human nature with the purely rational concepts of a moral being in general.

The only valid theology, therefore, is moral theology; God is a concept belonging not to physics (or its extension, metaphysics) but to morals. Until the moral motive was explored, metaphysics, based on the study of nature, did not need a rational theology, and no trace of one is found before moral consideration generated it. Similarly, the ultimate teleology of the world is moral, not natural. The final purpose of creation is moral; it is the *summmum bonum*. Men serve and glorify God—in the figurative sense, the only one Kant will permit—by respect and obedience to his command.

The theological discussion in the second *Critique* ends here without developing the most interesting philosophical and ethical conclusions which are implicit in it. The theoretical interest in the concept of God is to find an absolute and sufficient ground for the unity of the world, a cause of all causes, and a purpose of all purposes. If we examine this doctrine a moment, the transition from the penultimate to the last paragraph of Section V will not appear so sudden. Kant says: “It follows that, in the order of ends man (and every rational creature) is an end in himself.” But how it follows is explained only in the *Critique of Judgment*.

The third Critique argues that the purposive order of nature must be judged as itself without a purpose, unless we can find in it something that it is an absolute purpose, under which all other purposes can be subsumed. This absolute purpose must be an autonomous will, for a good will is that by which a being can have an absolute (not relative) worth and, in reference to it, the world itself can have a final purpose, i.e., be a system consonant with and therefore admissible by reason.
The purposes in the phenomenal world, under the law of nature, can thus be synthesized only by the Idea of an intelligible world in which the final purpose is a moral one, the existence of rational beings in a realm of ends.

Our conception of purpose and natural mechanism is dependent upon the fact that we possess a discursive understanding; if we had an intuitive understanding, these two conceptions could be constitutively and not merely regulatively synthesized. In the regulative Idea of a complete teleological order, which is possible only if there is moral autonomy as an end in itself, the two legislations of reason—the theoretical and the practical, or nature and the realm of ends—are at last shown to be compatible with each other. Only in such a world, in which we suppose that there is a legislation for nature by a moral governor, can the necessary connection between the two elements of the *summum bonum* be thought. Without this conception, we would have to give up this conception of the *summum bonum* or suppose that it is brought about only beyond the realm of nature or that it remains a miraculous event in a world whose lawful constitution has nothing to do with moral law.

It is the concept of the *summum bonum* as the final purpose of the world with its corollary concept of God that finally bridges the gap between nature and morals. Through these concepts Kant believes that he is enabled to approach most nearly the goal of a single system of philosophy and to show that practical and theoretical reason are finally one and the same. The system that brings them into unison, however, exists only for reflective judgment, i.e., as a guiding maxim for the systematization of experience, not as a determinative principle from which specific natural and moral consequences can be drawn. If it were not a merely regulative principle for judgment, we should have the double absurdity of a theological physics and a theological morality.

### 6. Morality and Religion

There is no such thing as a theological morality, i.e., a system of moral rules derived from knowledge of God. There are three reasons for this. First, we do not have the knowledge. Second, if we did have it and used it as a moral premise, the autonomy of morals would be destroyed. Third, moral laws are not dependent upon any lawgiver, as if a difference in the nature of God (or the non-existence of God) would make any difference in the determination of duty. Theological morals commits a *hysteron proteron*; for our entire con-
cept of God, so far as it is valid, grows out of our moral conceptions. Actually, of course, this is not true, for theological belief is originally historical, not rational. It is based on revelation or alleged revelation and is never pure but contains historical and psychological accidents. But it contains a hidden kernel of pure rational belief, which Kant uncovers in his treatise on religion, in the *Strife of the Faculties* and the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*.

Religion is “the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, i.e., arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such.” They can be recognized as commands only under the assumption of a legislator, who need not be the author of the law but only thought of, in religion, as the source of our obligation to obey it. There are no duties to God, certainly no duty to believe in his existence; but regarding all duties as if they were divine commands of a morally perfect and omnipotent legislator for both morals and nature connects the moral disposition with the hope for the *summum bonum* and adds, to respect for the law, dimensions of love of and adoration for God.

This is not a wholly new and adventitious accommodation of Kant’s moral ideas to an inherited religious tradition. His attitude toward morality, from the beginning, had a religious humility and single-mindedness, and he is here only claiming that his moral system already contains the essential element of religion. Religion, properly understood, is nothing but the recognition of the holiness of morals, to the defense of which the whole of his ethical work had been devoted from the beginning.

Nevertheless, the definition of religion acknowledges a dimension of moral law that was taken from it by the Copernican Revolution in ethics. *Sittengesetz* and *Moralgesetz* were relatively new words in German philosophy when Kant wrote; and prior to Kant they meant a law for morality drawn from the will of God, as a supplement to natural and positive law. Kant secularized the conception of moral law, against the theonomic doctrines of both the Wolffians (e.g., Baumgarten) and the critics of Wolff (especially Crusius), and thereby erected what has been called “the first non-theological philosophical ethics since Thomasius.”

The definition of religion given here does not add any new substance or authority or content to the moral law. It is not a transformation of the ethical position that Kant has just gained against theonomy but a restriction, rather, of the broader claims of religion itself to have dogmas and sources of insight disconnected from the moral. The definition of religion must be taken quite
literally: it is a definition of religion, not a surreptitious modification of the concept of morals.\textsuperscript{13}

Christianity, the only true religion,\textsuperscript{14} is also the only one that contains a true moral theory. It is not heteronomous, because it commands that we seek holiness apart from the motive for divine reward. And it does not base the knowledge of what the law commands on the acceptance of any historical dogma. But, while it is as pure as the Stoic conception, it is more realistic, in not permitting us to think that holiness (or wisdom) is humanly possible without the grace of God. And without this confession of human impotency, the moral ideal is secretly degraded to a level achievable by natural man. In the face of the sublimity of the moral law, however, humility and not Stoic pride is the only adequate response.

7. \textbf{The Two Awesome Things}

Natural theologys, arising from the contemplation of nature, is supplemented by contemplating that which is not nature; not by contemplating God, of whom we have only a “conjecture” and whom we do not see in his “awful majesty,” but by harkening to the “heavenly voice of duty” in us.

The two realms of reason, the theoretical and the practical, are brought into poignant juxtaposition in the celebrated conclusion: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” These two had often before been represented together by Kant,\textsuperscript{15} but never with the grand simplicity of this passage. That the two were deeply connected in Kant’s own life of feeling, no doubt having first been joined by Kant’s mother,\textsuperscript{16} is sufficiently attested by the early biographers who knew him personally.

But there is a marked progress in this passage, not only stylistically but also philosophically; it arises from the fact that, when writing the earlier ones, Kant had not yet succeeded in sharply distinguishing between the legislations of the two realms. In his earlier works he had thought of the starry heavens as a possible abode of moral beings of a higher order than man or as the place of our souls after death. All that is now transcended in the complementary conceptions of an unmoral astronomy and a non-naturalistic ethics; all that remains of the older conception of the relation of the moral law to the natural law is the Typic. The stark contrast between the two, not some simple harmony hazarded between them, gives force to their bold contexture. What had previously been thought of as a synthesis from the standpoint of the
physical object—the evidence of natural teleology, the natural origin of the moral disposition—he now sees as a synthesis of contrasts within man’s own rational nature. The starry heavens seem sublime because man first feels reduced by them to impotency, only to rise above them again when he knows that his rational nature, which comprehends them, is not subdued but heightened by the magnitude and power revealed in them. He erroneously attributes a sublimity to nature which actually belongs only to his own rational being; the sublimity ascribed to nature is a clue to his own superiority to nature, for we convert “respect for the idea of humanity in our own subject into respect for the object.” What the starry heavens awake in us only indirectly is produced directly by the contemplation of the moral law, sublime in itself, and of the moral agent who embodies the law; the humility thus induced in man is itself sublime.

There is no tendency remaining now to use natural concepts in the articulation and elaboration of moral ideas or to confuse two things, to the detriment of each. But the two things are not set before us merely as a literary peroration. Even on the last pages Kant extracts a lesson of use to moral philosophy by drawing an analogy from the history of astronomy.

“Admiration and respect,” he says, “can indeed excite to inquiry, but they cannot supply the want of it.” The consequence of passive admiration and an admixture of human wants in subsequent astronomical investigation was astrology. A like undisciplined elaboration of the “noblest attribute of human nature” led, in morals and religion, to fanaticism and superstition. With the perfection of the method of scientific investigation in astronomy and physics, there was brought forth “a clear and henceforth unchangeable insight into the structure of the world.” Perhaps even more important, it gave a model to philosophy, to set it on the secure path of science. This method he now recommends in the investigation of morals. “Science,” in the sense of critically and methodically directed inquiry, is “the narrow gate that leads to wisdom.”

The Critique of Practical Reason is meant to be the key to that narrow gate.

**ENDNOTES**

1 Kant uses the word “possibility” in two senses, and thus sometimes says that the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows the Ideas to be possible and at others that it could not show them to be possible. “Possible” in the first usage means “logically possible,” i.e., thinkable without contradiction or thinkable through the (unschematized) categories; in the second, it means “really possible,” i.e., pos-
sible in the sense of the first Postulate of Empirical Thought in General (Critique of Pure Reason), or having some connection with a given structure of actual experience. The sense in which the existence of God is logically possible is the same as that in which, for instance, the inhabitants of another planet are logically possible. But the real possibilities are different, for the existence of God is not connected with intuitions but only with concepts. To be really possible in the sense meant in the second Critique is to be \((a)\) logically possible and \((b)\) related necessarily to some other fact (viz., the moral) whose reality is given. Thus the fact of pure reason is the practical corollary of intuition in converting mere concepts of the logically possible into cognitions that the logically possible is really possible (cf. Critique of Practical Reason, 66.).

Only in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 101 (Greene and Hudson, 92) does Kant seem to have been able to argue for the existence of God exclusively from the first component of the sumnum bonum. The highest moral good, he there tells us, cannot be achieved by an isolated individual, but only in a moral commonwealth. The establishment of this moral commonwealth cannot be the work of man, who can only make himself worthy of membership in it; its actual establishment can be only by the grace of God. Virtue is worthiness to this grace (which now replaces worthiness to be happy), and the sumnum bonum is the Kingdom of God to be established by God. Hence the moral command to seek the Kingdom of God requires that such a moral legislator exist or justifies the belief and hope independently of the rewards it may contain. The last time the moral argument is given in its classical form, involving both the components of the sumnum bonum is in Critique of Judgment, § 87, where it is presented with only one modification. Here the natural desire of man for happiness is not taken as a prior condition for the definition of the sumnum bonum, but the existence of God is taken as the condition under which a man may morally set before himself any purpose as necessary, even if the realization of it is not within his power. This purpose is not happiness desired and subsequently restricted to the moral condition of worthiness, but happiness only insofar as it is morally earned. A similar thought is in über den Gemeinspruch . . . .

Though Kant supplemented the moral argument in various ways, as we have seen, he did not renounce it (cf. George A. Schrader, “Kant’s Presumed Repudiation of the Moral Argument in the Opus postumum,” Philosophy, XXVI [1951]. That the “new” doctrines of the Opus postumum can be found side by side with the moral argument is shown also by Walter Reinhard, Über das Verhältnis von Sittlichkeit und Religion bei Kant (Bern: Haupt, 1927).

The practical consequences of this impartiality is the conception of each man as an end-in-himself.

Kant has not begged the question by this statement, as it might appear. The conception of God here is not used to establish the concept of the sumnum bonum. The conception of an impartial observer is the essential one; it follows that if there were an impartial observer with the requisite power, the sumnum bonum would be made real.

We are told that the teleological argument is a desirable confirmation of the moral.
Critique of Practical Reason—an obvious echo of Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The necessary anthropomorphism of the physicoteleological conception of God is described in Critique of Pure Reason.

The development is placed about the time of Anaxagoras in Critique of Practical Reason, but it seems to be attributed to Christianity in Critique of Pure Reason.

Critique of Practical Reason. It has quite other premises, from which it follows much more clearly and convincingly in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Kant to Jacobi, August 30, 1789: “If the gospel had not previously taught universal moral laws in their purity, pure reason would not have been able to comprehend them in such perfection; but since they are given, one can now convince anyone of their correctness and validity merely by reason.”

Against Wolff, who had divided duties into those toward self, toward others, and toward God.

Kiesewetter, one of Kant’s most enthusiastic (yet singularly instructive) followers, would not have regarded this as an addition. He wrote Kant, March 3, 1790 (XI, 137): “I am convinced . . . that the fundamental principle of your moral system is perfectly harmonious with the Christian religion, perhaps even that if Christ had heard and understood you he would have said, ‘Indeed, that is what I intended to say in speaking of the love [of] God.’”

By Herbert Spiegelberg, Gesetz und Sittengesetz (Zurich and Leipzig: Niehaus, 1935). This book gives a valuable account of the development of the concept of moral law; few studies, I think, show Kant’s originality in concepts and terminology better than this account of the slow development of the notion of moral law and its differentiation from natural and divine law.

Streit der Fakultäten, VI. “Love God” and “love thy neighbor” alike have only ethical content (Critique of Practical Reason). Aside from the fact that Kant’s theology was moral and that of the deists was natural, this connection of morals and religion, whereby the latter contributes nothing to the content of the former, is common to both. Thus Kant says that there is no material difference (difference in object) between morality and religion, but only a formal difference; and Tindal characteristically wrote: “Acting according to the reason of things considered in themselves [is morality; religion is] acting according to the same reason considered as a rule of God” (Christianity as Old as Creation; quoted from Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, I, 144).

Perpetual Peace, VIII; There can be only one true religion because there is only one true morality. Similarly, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 107 (Greene and Hudson, 98), and Streit der Fakultäten, VII, 36: there is only one religion, of which Christianity is the plainest (schlichteste) form.

Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, concluding paragraph; Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, II, 208–9; Träume eines Geistersehers, II, 332; Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund . . ., II, 141. A similar conjunction in Seneca, one of Kant’s favorite authors, has been pointed out by Vaihinger in Ad Helviam matrem de consolatione cap. viii (cf.
“Ein berühmtes Kantwort bei Seneca?” *Kant-Studien*, II [1898], 491–93); but, as Vaihinger indicated, the Seneca passage is more like those in Kant’s precritical writings than that in the *Critique*.

16 In the famous statement on his reverence for his mother (Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund* [1804], neunter Brief), he speaks of her as having “planted and nourished the seed of the good” and “opened [his] heart to the impressions of nature,” the same combination as in the present apothegm.

17 He has drawn a similar analogy in *Prolegomena*, IV, 366: “Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the school as . . . astronomy to the astrology of the fortune-teller.”