OF WHAT VALUE ARE THE ARGUMENTS or proofs for the existence of God? Is any one of them convincing? Do any of the proofs compel assent? People of keen minds and good wills are divided on this issue. Father Frederick C. Copleston (1907–1994) and Lord Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) engaged in a famous BBC radio debate on this very issue. Both of them had achieved world-class stature in the philosophical community. Copleston was a Roman Catholic priest. Russell was an agnostic. Copleston claimed that some of the proofs—especially the cosmological argument based on contingency—were convincing. Russell strongly disagreed.

Which of these distinguished philosophers is correct? Are any of the arguments for the existence of God truly valid and sound? Does it really matter whether they are or are not? What is at stake here? Is belief and trust in God created if some of these proofs are shown to be valid and sound? Is belief and trust in God destroyed if all of these proofs are shown to be flawed?

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), considered to be one of the outstanding physicists and mathematicians of his time, tried unsuccessfully for a number of years to reach confidence in the existence of God. At last, on November 23, 1654, weary with trying and in the midst of a “dark night of the soul,” he had what is termed a mystical experience. To remind himself of this important event in his life, he made a record of it on a parchment that he rolled up and sewed into the lining of his coat. The document was discovered in his coat after his death. Hardly intended for public display and discussion, the document contains a sentence that is germane to the value of proofs for the existence of God. Near the top of his Memorial (as the document came to be called) Pascal wrote, “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob; not of the philosophers and scholars.” Pascal appears to be saying that confidence in the existence of the God of the biblical tradition arises from a personal encounter with this God in the midst of real life struggles, and not from a philosophical proof or scientific investigation. For Pascal, belief in God is neither generated by nor dependent on philosophical proofs. The Danish
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) would agree with that—as would many thoughtful, serious, religious persons.

If these proofs neither make nor break faith in God, what is their value? Steven M. Cahn, a philosopher and academic administrator, in the article that follows, tries to show the irrelevance to religion of philosophic proofs for the existence of God. Divine reality is construed in different ways by different religious traditions, and it is an enormous leap to identify the God of a particular religious tradition with the God whose existence is demonstrated by any of the proofs if any of them are sound. According to Cahn, belief in a particular God in a specific religious tradition is rooted not in proofs, but in a self-authenticating religious experience (such as Pascal’s mystical experience). Clearly, proofs are irrelevant to such religious belief and practice. Do the proofs have any value, then? Cahn allows that they might provide insight into significant philosophical issues.

Steven Cahn has taught at a number of institutions including Vassar College, New York University, the University of Vermont, and the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York where he also served as Provost from 1984 to 1992. His books include Fate, Logic and Time (1967, 1882), The Eclipse of Excellence: A Critique of American Higher Education (1973), Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia (1986, 1994), and Philosophical & Explorations: Freedom, God and Goodness (1989).

Philosophic proofs for the existence of God have a long and distinguished history. Almost every major Western philosopher has been seriously concerned with defending or refuting such proofs. Furthermore, many contemporary philosophers have exhibited keen interest in such proofs. A survey of the philosophical literature of the past decade reveals quite a concentration of work in this area.

One might expect that religious believers would be vitally interested in discussions of this subject. One might suppose that when a proof of God’s existence is presented and eloquently defended, believers would be most enthusiastic, and that when a proof is attacked and persuasively refuted,
believers would be seriously disappointed. But this is not at all the case. Religious believers seem remarkably uninterested in philosophic proofs for the existence of God. They seem to consider discussion of such proofs as a sort of intellectual game which has no relevance to religious belief or activity. And this view is shared by proponents of both supernaturalist and naturalist varieties of religion. For example, Søren Kierkegaard, a foremost proponent of supernaturalist religion, remarked: “Whoever therefore attempts to demonstrate the existence of God . . . [is] an excellent subject for a comedy of the higher lunacy!” The same essential point is made in a somewhat less flamboyant manner by Mordecai M. Kaplan, a foremost proponent of naturalist religion, who remarks that the “immense amount of mental effort to prove the existence of God was in vain, since unbelievers seldom become believers as a result of logical arguments.”

In what follows, I wish to explain just why religious believers have so little interest in philosophic proofs for the existence of God. I wish to show that their lack of interest is entirely reasonable, and that whatever the philosophic relevance of such proofs, they have little or no relevance to religion.

The three classic proofs for the existence of God are the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological. Each of these proofs is intended to prove something different. The ontological argument is intended to prove the existence (or necessary existence) of the most perfect conceivable Being. The cosmological argument is intended to prove the existence of a necessary Being who is the Prime Mover or First Cause of the universe. The teleological argument is intended to prove the existence of an all-good designer and creator of the universe.

Suppose we assume, contrary to what most philosophers, I among them, believe, that all of these proofs are valid. Let us grant the necessary existence (whatever than might mean) of the most perfect conceivable Being, a Being who is all-good and is the designer and creator of the universe. What implications can be drawn from this fact which would be of relevance to human life? In other words, what difference would it make in men’s lives if God existed?

Perhaps some men would feel more secure in the knowledge that the universe had been planned by an all-good Being. Others, perhaps, would feel insecure, realizing the extent to which their very existence depended upon the will of this Being. In any case, most men, either out of fear or respect, would wish to act in accordance with the moral code advocated by this Being.
Note, however, that the proofs for the existence of God provide us with no hint whatever as to which actions God wishes us to perform, or what we ought to do so as to please or obey Him. We may affirm that God is all-good and yet have no way of knowing what the highest moral standards are. All we may be sure of is that whatever these standards may be, God always acts in accordance with them. One might assume that God would have implanted the correct moral standards in men’s minds, but this seems doubtful in view of the wide variance in men’s moral standards. Which of these numerous standards, if any, is the correct one is not known, and no appeal to a proof for the existence of God will cast the least light upon the matter.

For example, assuming that it can be proven that God exists, is murder immoral? One might argue that since God created man, it is immoral to murder, since it is immoral to destroy what God in His infinite wisdom and goodness has created. This argument, however, fails on several grounds. First, if God created man, He also created germs, viruses, disease-carrying rats, and man-eating sharks. Does it follow from the fact that God created these things that they ought not to be eliminated? Secondly, if God arranged for men to live, He also arranged for men to die. Does it follow from this that by committing murder we are assisting the work of God? Thirdly, if God created man, He provided him with the mental and physical capacity to commit murder. Does it follow from this that God wishes men to commit murder? Clearly, the attempt to deduce moral precepts from the fact of God’s existence is but another case of trying to do what Hume long ago pointed out to be logically impossible, viz., the deduction of normative judgments from factual premisses. No such deduction is valid, and, thus, any moral principle is consistent with the existence of God.

The fact that the proofs of God’s existence afford no means of distinguishing good from evil has the consequence that no man can be sure of how to obey God and do what is best in His eyes. One may hope that his actions are in accord with God’s standards, but no test is available to check on this. Some seemingly good men suffer great ills, and some seemingly evil men achieve great happiness. Perhaps in a future life these things are rectified, but we have no way of ascertaining which men are ultimately rewarded and which are ultimately punished.

One can imagine that if a group of men believed in God’s existence, they would be most anxious to learn His will, and consequently, they would tend to rely upon those individuals who claimed to know the will of God. Diviners, seers, and priests would be in a position of great influence. No
doubt competition between them would be severe, for no man could be sure which of these oracles to believe. Assuming that God made no effort to reveal His will by granting one of these oracles truly superhuman powers (though, naturally, each oracle would claim that he possessed such powers), no man could distinguish the genuine prophet from the fraud.

It is clear that the situation I have described is paralleled by a stage in the actual development of religion. What men wanted at this stage was some way to find out the will of God. Individual prophets might gain a substantial following, but prophets died and their vital powers died with them. What was needed on practical grounds was a permanent record of God’s will as revealed to His special prophet. And this need was eventually met by the writing of holy books, books in which God’s will was revealed in a permanent fashion.

But there was more than one such book. Indeed, there were many such books. Which was to be believed? Which moral code was to be followed? Which prayers were to be recited? Which rituals were to be performed? Proofs for the existence of God are silent upon these crucial matters.

There is only one possible avenue to God’s will. One must undergo a personal experience in which one senses the presence of God and apprehends which of the putative holy books is the genuine one. But it is most important not to be deceived in this experience. One must be absolutely certain that it is God whose presence one is experiencing and whose will one is apprehending. In other words, one must undergo a self-validating experience, one which carries its own guarantee of infallibility.

If one undergoes what he believes to be such an experience, he then is certain which holy book is the genuine one, and consequently he knows which actions, prayers, and rituals God wishes him to engage in. But notice that if he knows this, he has necessarily validated the existence of God, for unless he is absolutely certain that he has experienced God’s presence, he cannot be sure that the message he has received is true. Thus, he has no further need for a proof of God’s existence.

For one who does not undergo what he believes to be such a self-validating experience, several possibilities remain open. He may accept the validity of another person’s self-validating experience. He thereby accepts the holy book which has been revealed as genuine, and he thereby also accepts the existence of God, since unless he believed that this other person had experienced the presence of God, he would not accept this person’s opinion as to which is the genuine book.
It is possible, however, that one does not accept the validity of another person’s supposedly self-validating experience. This may be due either to philosophical doubts concerning the logical possibility of such an experience or simply to practical doubts that anyone has, in fact, ever undergone such an experience. In either case, adherence to a particular supernatural religion is unreasonable.

But having no adherence to a supernatural religion does not imply that one does not still face the serious moral dilemmas which are inherent in life. How are these dilemmas to be solved? To believe that God exists is of no avail, for one cannot learn His will. Therefore, one must use one’s own judgment. But this need not be solely an individual effort. One may join others in a communal effort to propound and promulgate a moral code. Such a group may have its own distinctive prayers and rituals which emphasize various aspects of the group’s beliefs. Such a naturalistic religious organization does not depend upon its members’ belief in the existence of God, for such a belief is irrelevant to the religious aims and activities of the group.

Is it surprising then that proponents of both supernaturalist and naturalist religion are uninterested in philosophic proofs for the existence of God? Not at all. A supernaturalist believes in God because of a personal self-validating experience which has shown him (or someone he trusts) not only that God exists, but also what His will is. A philosophic proof of the existence of God is thus of no use to the supernaturalist. If the proof is shown to be valid, it merely confirms what he already knows on the much stronger evidence of personal experience, if the proof is shown to be invalid, it casts no doubt on a self-validating experience.

On the other hand, the naturalist believes either that no one has learned or that no one can learn the will of God. If, therefore, a proof for the existence of God is shown to be valid, this has no implications for the naturalist, for such a proof does not provide him with any information which he can utilize in his religious practice. If, on the contrary, a proof for the existence of God is shown to be invalid, this casts no doubt on the naturalist’s religious views, since these views have been formulated independently of a belief in the existence of God.

Who, then, is concerned with philosophic proofs for the existence of God? First, there are those who believe that if such proofs are invalid, religion is thereby undermined. This is, as I have shown, a wholly erroneous view. Neither supernaturalist nor naturalist religion depends at all upon philosophic proofs for the existence of God. To attack religion on the
grounds that it cannot provide a philosophic proof for the existence of God is an instance of *ignoratio elenchi*.

Secondly, there are those who believe that if the philosophic proofs for the existence of God are invalid, our moral commitments are necessarily undermined. This is also, as I have shown, a wholly erroneous view. It is, however, a common view, and one which underlies the so-called moral argument for the existence of God. According to this argument, it is only if one believes in the existence of God that one can reasonably commit oneself to respect the importance of moral values. This argument is invalid, however, for, as I have shown, belief in the existence of God is compatible with any and all positions on moral issues. It is only if one can learn the will of God that one can derive any moral implications from His existence.

Thirdly, there are philosophers who discuss proofs for the existence of God because of the important philosophical issues which are brought to light and clarified in such discussions. So long as philosophers are aware of the purpose which their discussions serve, all is well and good. It is when philosophers and others use discussions of this sort as arguments for and against religion that they overstep their bounds. Religion may be rationally attacked or defended, but to refute philosophic proofs for the existence of God is not to attack religion, and to support philosophic proofs for the existence of God is not to defend religion.